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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis addresses the problem of the dissonance between the formulation of highly 
generalized norms in world society and the failure of those norms to find accommodation in 
law. To construct this problem and its possible solutions, the thesis adopts Niklas Luhmann’s 
systems theory and functional method of analysis. Employing a distinction between private 
and public law, the thesis begins by examining the accommodation of such general norms in 
a model of global law beyond the state which is commonly held to accommodate an 
increasing range of norms at the global level. However, the limits of this legal system in 
relation to general norms are located in its exclusive specialization in the niches of world 
society and in its marginalization of state entities which remain crucial to the stabilization of 
those norms. The thesis therefore examines public international law as a legal system that is 
also increasingly orientated to realizing normative expectations of global public goods. 
Through analysis, the thesis identifies the limits of this legal system in relation to normative 
expectations of the prohibition of nuclear weapons. This antinuclear norm is nonetheless 
shown to be clearly formulated and recognized in world society, and the thesis traces the 
solution to this problem to transnational social movement organizations which stabilize the 
norm through formal decision-making and through communication of the norm to 
organizations of the political and legal systems. This forms the basis of a theory of the 
functional specification of social movement organizations as a solution to the problem of 
general norms. Finally it is argued that lawyers must develop a more definite appreciation of 
these developments, so that any structural relationship with social movement organizations 
reflects the functional importance they have gained in world society.   
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1 Introduction 
 
 
1.1  Introduction to the thesis 
 
Following Talcott Parsons, we can assume that there is a link between greater 
differentiation and greater generalization of the symbolic basis, especially “values,” on 
which society seeks to formulate its unity. But what happens if generalized values can 
no longer be accommodated in differentiated society? If, although formulated and 
recognized, they are inadequately realized?  
 
 Luhmann (2013a), 154 
 
The aim of this study is to investigate a related and more poignant question: what happens if 
norms arising in a similar context, and equally formulated and recognized in society, are 
inadequately realized in law? Norms also become couched at a higher level of generality with 
the progressive differentiation of society, and this is not simply a matter of deducing a 
process from an abstract functional requirement.1 Rather, this can even be seen on a more 
concrete level in relation to the negative side-effects which arise from the increasing 
specialization and complexity of society.2 The global scale of these side-effects generates 
normative expectations of a highly generalized character. In relation to the globalizing 
tendencies of a military, technological and scientific complex, for example, there arise 
expectations of peace and the prohibition of the use of weapons of mass destruction. In 
relation to the apparent destructive tendencies of expanding economic and technological 
systems, there arise expectations of prevention of the degradation of the natural environment 
and the conservation of biological diversity. In relation to the autonomous development of an 
economic system, channelled through global centres and tax havens with the aid of 
communications technology, there arise expectations of more sustainable and integrated 
development around the world. In relation to a co-evolution of the economic and health 
systems, instrumentalized in the pharmaceuticals industry, there arise expectations of 
universal access to adequate healthcare for children, supported by world food security and the 
                                                          
1 A common criticism of the structural-functionalist approach to generalized values presented by Parsons 
(1971) is expressed in the question: ‘Why should it be that what is necessary does indeed happen?’, Joas (2008), 
93.  
2 The functional differentiation of modern society is well recognized by sociologists beyond Parsons and 
Luhmann. See also, for example, Durkheim (1964); Simmel (1964); Weber (1968).   
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universal access to clean water and sanitation. The list of norms arising in response to the 
pathologies of an increased functional differentiation of modern society goes on and on, and, 
as they emerge, many fall under the existing umbrella of an even greater expectation of the 
universal positivization and peremptory status of human rights. 
At the same time, this is not simply a matter of equating values with norms.3 Despite 
the obvious difficulties such expectations may face in respect of legal institutionalization, in 
modern society they often find formulation as proto-legal communications, as, for example, 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, or even as assertions of jus cogens,4 
obligations erga omnes,5 or a so called ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine.6 Beyond this, a 
broad range of general norms are now commonly asserted through submissions, amicus 
briefs, declarations, or other more informal channels in adjudication and deliberations before 
the multiplicity of courts and governance institutions at the global level.7 Moreover, it is the 
very global nature of the negative side-effects of functional differentiation which gives these 
norms such definite formulation.8 The completely new spatial dimensions of such problems,9 
together with the ‘equalizing effect’ they may have in terms of exposing a large class of 
people to the same phenomena,10 means that the expectations they kindle are not as vague or 
relative as values. Instead they are so sharply perceived and strongly committed to that they 
often find a cogent and widespread formulation that is both sustained in institutional 
discourse and even highly resistant to disappointment. When people around the world claim 
anthropogenic climate change is real, for example, it is not simply a value they hold, but 
something they ‘know’ to be real (whether they are correct or not), and therefore something 
                                                          
3 Parsons (1971) is also often criticized for the way in which his concept of ‘societal community’ effectively 
merges generalized values with a cohesive system of norms. However, it is the relativity of values which 
distinguishes them from norms, for example on the basis that they do not represent the discursive elaboration of 
legal validity (Habermas,1996, 154), or that they offer no prescription for action in cases of conflict (Luhmann, 
2008a, 29).  
4 See for example Articles 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; see also the Furundžija 
case (Prosecutor v. Furundžija), case no. IT-95-17/I-T (1999). 
5 Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd (Belgium v. Spain) (Second Phase), ICJ 
Reports 1970. 
6 See for example, UNGA Res 60/1 (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1 at paras 138–139. 
7 See for example the increasing submission of amicus briefs by NGOs to the European Court of Human 
Rights, Van den Eynde (2013); even when normative expectations are unable to find any formulation in legal 
proceedings, they may still register as normative expectations on a general level. Thus, for example, in 2011 the 
Pacific island nation-state, Palau, announced  its intention in a United Nations General Assembly debate to 
apply to the ICJ for an advisory opinion on legal responsibility for climate change.  It was later dissuaded from 
doing so: see Beck and Burelson (2014). 
8 The use of nuclear weapons against Japan in 1945 has been presented as the ‘first global event’, Albrow 
(2014a), 73; see also Jaspers (1953); Arendt (1994). 
9 Blühdorn (2000), xiv. 
10 Beck (1992), 36. 
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they see as requiring action and accountability.11 In addition, functional differentiation also 
provides the medium for the increased communication of such norms. Norms are constantly 
galvanized by the multifarious social movements and nongovernmental organizations which 
organize themselves to project these expectations at the centres of legal and political 
institutionalization; by a global media coverage which may often help to scandalize public 
opinion and sensationalize the plight of such causes;12 and through communications 
technology that allows the exchange of information and development of further forms of 
collaboration on the global level.13  
Typically these concerns are associated with a critical theory approach which is 
generally focused on the potential alienating effects of the process of modernity.14 Ulrich 
Beck in particular has addressed the ways in which the global side-effects of modernity may 
promote normative expectations in society. Beck’s concept of ‘risk society’ proposes a new 
epoch, characterised by technological, environmental and economic risks of an 
unprecedented scale and quality to human welfare and survival.15  One of the most important 
observations made in this respect is that such risks are no longer attributed to nature but, 
instead, become identified as ‘problems resulting from techno-economic development 
itself’.16 Such a development is seen as promoting a ‘reflexive modernity’ in which society is 
increasingly confronted with its ‘own products’, and in which traditionally ‘natural’ problems 
are charged with a new social, political and cultural force.17 With this, it is argued, the ‘motor 
of social transformation’ comes to be based upon the side-effects of modernity rather than 
instrumental rationality, in which a ‘public’ emerges, not on the basis of ‘consensus of 
decisions, but out of dissent about the consensus of decisions.’18 
Beck’s account of ‘risk society’ has proved highly influential as a sociological 
articulation of the issue of risk in modern society.19 Nonetheless, there are some issues with 
Beck’s theory which limit its application to the present study. In particular, his optimistic 
concept of a ‘reinvention of politics’20 as a comprehensive shift from the nation-state towards 
                                                          
11 Oreskes (2013), 560. 
12 Fischer-Lescano (2003). 
13 Yang 2003; Lannon 2008; see also Anheier, Glasius, and Kaldor (2012), 3-10. 
14 Finding its early powerful expression in Adorno and Horkheimer (1972). 
15 Beck (1992).  
16 Ibid., 19. Even the weather comes to be seen as a risk in this sense, Hall (2012). This is an evolutionary 
pattern for society, symbolically represented by the probes currently expanding out into space. 
17 Beck (1992), 154f. For a similar concept of a ‘global age’ defined by a new social awareness of the 
finiteness of society, see Albrow (1996).  
18 Beck (2006), 339. 
19 Blühdorn (2000), 82. 
20 Beck (1996). 
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civil society as the locus of political action which may comprehensively resolve the problems 
of such risks is lacking in important qualifications.21 It is doubtful that the nation-state can be 
so marginalized from any political solution to the kind of side-effects of functional 
differentiation which have been presented above, and there is little evidence to support the 
emergence of the radically different concept of politics that Beck presents.22 These problems 
are reflected in the lack of attention Beck devotes to the complexities of law and the legal 
institutionalization of the norms that might arise in response to the perceived pathological 
side-effects of modernity. Legalization is largely treated as following unproblematically from 
the imagined radical transformation of politics in risk society. This short-coming reflects the 
more general deficiencies of the critical theory tradition in terms of thinking about law in 
global society, which make it generally unsuitable for the present study.23  
The present study is not exclusively focused on phenomena which are external to law. 
By analogy, it is not only about the ‘soil’ within which transnational law grows, but also 
about the ‘roots’ of such law, and (depending on how one sees it) about the structures that 
evolve if there are any defects in the ‘natural’ absorption of environmental stimuli, or about 
those that evolve to protect law against the absorption of harmful externalities. Thus, a more 
refined sociological theory is necessary in order to gain perspective on both the social norms 
that arise in respect of the pathological side-effects of functional differentiation and the 
particular logics of the legal system. It is for this reason that the present study will rely upon 
the systems theoretical approach developed by Luhmann himself to address the question of 
what happens if general norms are inadequately realized in the differentiated forms of 
transnational law. His sociological theory of law is perhaps most infamous for proposing a 
concept of law as a distinct social system, removed from its environment and based only on 
itself. What is generally less noted is the way in which Luhmann’s sociological theory of law 
explicitly emphasizes the legal system as being a ‘differentiated functional system within 
                                                          
21 Blühdorn (2007), 5. 
22 Goldblatt (1996), 86. Another common critique made of Beck’s concept of ‘risk society’ is that it suffers 
from ‘theoretical inconsistency’, most notable in respect of his ambiguity about whether such risks are real or 
whether they are social constructions (see Blühdorn, 2000, 86). It could be argued, however, that towards the 
end of his career, and arguably as a result of Luhmann’s influence, Beck came to premise his concept of ‘risk 
society’ on the more solid ground of risk as a social construct; compare, for example, Beck (1992) with Beck 
(2009) in this respect. 
23 Habermas has admittedly developed a sophisticated account of law and gives central place to the norm 
(1996), however, his approach is not useful for the present study of general norms excluded from law because it 
is too focused on the potential legal positivization of a wide array of norms through discursive rationality. That 
is, too much is externalized into the future under this theoretical model (which also highlights Habermas’ 
influence on reflexive law, Teubner, 1983) to provide the conceptual tools for constructing the problem of 
norms which can be formulated on some general societal level, yet go unrealized in law.  
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society’.24  In striking this balance between an external and internal perspective on law, 
Luhmann can be said to have successfully transcended the classical division of labour 
between the jurist’s fixation on the interpretation and application of law, and the sociologist’s 
focus on the context and conditions of law. Luhmann’s theory not only allows for an 
understanding of the particular logics of the legal system, but brings into view law’s function 
in relation to the larger social system.25 This dual focus becomes an important tool for the 
present study. 
Admittedly the proposition of relying on Luhmann’s sociological theory of law in the 
context of an issue typically associated with a critical theory of ‘risk society’ may strike some 
readers as odd. Luhmann is notorious for his so-called ‘anti-humanism’,26 as well as for his 
‘post-natural’ and ‘post-ecologist’ concept of the environment.27 For him, human beings as 
psychological and biological systems are excluded from society as a system of 
communication, just as the natural world is.28 Thus, environmental and humanitarian issues 
are always relative to the social systems that make them such, and any attempt to address 
them will only take effect within the system and not the environment—in other words, they 
achieve nothing but the reproduction of communication.29 But Luhmann’s so called ‘anti-
humanism’ or ‘post-ecologism’ should not be exaggerated, and certainly does not in any way 
exclude the relevance of his sociological theory to the present topic. Starting from the 
position that ‘there are self-referential systems’,30 Luhmann was all too aware of how the 
developed autonomy of such systems could lead to very real undesirable side-effects. Early in 
his career he already expressed concern about a ‘disequilibria of functional differentiation’ 
resulting from certain areas of society leaping ahead to the global level, prior to the 
development of, what he called, ‘appropriate forms of life and institutions.’31 Towards the 
end of his life he appeared even more concerned about what the autonomy of functional 
systems would mean for society, pondering the consequences, for example, ‘if science 
offered the possibility of producing energy from nuclear fission’ for military purposes, or ‘if 
                                                          
24 Luhmann (1989a), 138. 
25 Luhmann (1995).  
26 Moeller (2012), 19ff. Which has apparently done much to alienate Luhmann from American readers, see for 
example, Diamond (1992), 1766. 
27 Blühdorn (2000), 129f. 
28 Luhmann (1989b).  
29 His ultra-sociological perspective answers an emphatic ‘No!’ to the proverbial question about whether a tree 
that falls in the woods when there is no one there makes a sound. It may well be, he admits, that ‘oil wells may 
run dry and average climatic temperatures rise and fall’, but if this does not register in communication it 
effectively does not happen, (Luhmann, 1989, 28f). 
30 Luhmann (1995), 15. Emphasis added. That ‘reality’, however, is based only on self-referential 
construction, (ibid., ff).  
31 Luhmann (1985a), 258.  
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the dynamics of the international financial system’ rendered liberal and socialist policies of 
regional and national political systems ‘meaningless’.32 
Moreover, although Luhmann may not have had any hope for political or legal action 
effectively resolving the threat posed by functional differentiation to humanity or the natural 
environment, he did follow Beck in so far as he recognized how such problems are 
increasingly attributed to technology and decision-making in modern society.33 This is 
important for this study, as it represents the locus where normative expectations may arise in 
response to the side-effects of modernity. The fact that, as technology expands, dangers in 
society come to be increasingly identified as risks taken by decision-makers, ultimately 
admits a degree social contingency that is always open to opposition and demands for further 
changes. To use the example above, no one will form normative expectations in relation to 
the nuclear fission involved in the birth of a star, but they can, and do, when the process is 
undertaken for other purposes by decision-makers in society. 
On top of this, Luhmann is prepared to admit that the ‘follow-up costs of modern, 
functionally differentiated society’ cannot be ignored once they have become the subject of 
communication.34 In this sense they become problems of communication and the stability of 
society itself. In particular, such risks pose a problem if they are generative of norms that are 
formulated and recognized in society, but inadequately realized in the various sectors of 
differentiated society. Such a tension between facts and validity, Luhmann argues, may 
register as paradoxical impositions on the ‘life situation’ of individuals, who require 
externalisations, or ‘meaning’, in such a way as to resolve the paradox.35 Law, for its part, 
cannot escape a functional reference to such problems. The functional specification of the 
legal system in reference to normative expectations orientates it to such ‘meaning’ problems, 
and the continued reproduction of society. This is not to assert that the legal system becomes 
dysfunctional if it fails to fulfil this role in respect of general norms in world society—this is 
not the concern of the thesis. Rather it is to highlight the pertinent questions as to what 
happens to the norms which prove too general for realization in law, what structures evolve in 
reference to the problem, and how the legal system evolves in response to such structures. 
                                                          
32 Luhmann (2013a), 309.  
33 Although, in his own ‘sociological theory’ of risk, Luhmann consigned Beck’s influential book on risk 
society (which had been published just the year before) to a single footnote (1993, 5, n.10). For detailed 
accounts of the similarities and differences between Beck and Luhmann, see Thornhill (2000), van Loon (2002), 
and Blühdorn (2000), (2007). 
34 Luhmann (2013a), 127. 
35 Ibid., 156. 
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If there is a greater challenge for this thesis, it is in successfully constructing the 
problem that there are indeed a class of general norms that do not find adequate realization in 
legal institutionalization. Law is a difficult discipline to engage with from this angle, as it 
does not directly lend itself to an analysis of norms which are formulated and recognized in 
general society, but inadequately realized within the legal system itself. In an orthodox 
approach to law, norms are either legal or illegal, and this is to be established by an 
argumentative practice which, on the one hand, is geared towards the legal system’s own 
symbols of validity while, on the other, remaining constantly poised for a change of law. 
Moreover, as Luhmann and others have shown, law has evolved many sophisticated 
mechanisms for unfolding its own foundational paradox and for expanding itself, even in the 
most meagre and rarefied contexts.  
As stated, Luhmann’s sociological theory of law does offer a way of crossing between 
this internal and external boundary of the legal system to undertake the kind of analysis to be 
pursued in this study.36 And there is some reassurance in this respect in the fact that Luhmann 
himself was willing to admit the increasing incidence of normative expectations which ‘lie 
largely beyond the established juridical world of forms’—even if he chose not to make those 
norms a research topic in itself, but considered it rather as another factor pointing to the 
marginalization of law in world society.37 However, Luhmann’s line of analysis has been 
radically developed further by others in such a way as to propose a more robust concept of 
global law which obscures the issue, and ultimately makes it a little more difficult to rule out 
the legal institutionalization of general norms emerging in world society. This approach 
generally views the ‘fragmenting dynamics’ of functional differentiation as transforming and 
revitalizing law to engage the increasing dimensions of social life that cannot be reached by 
the territorially locked legal institutions of the nation-state.38 Law can then be taken up by a 
plurality of private regimes in world society as a ‘transient’ medium capable of ‘singing-to-
every-tune’ as specific social needs dictate.39 In the ‘Byzantine mixture of legal and social 
norms’ that emerges,40 the lines between traditional concepts of the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ 
become blurred in such a way as to suggest the potential legal institutionalization of ‘a 
                                                          
36 For a development of this approach as a redirection from ‘systemic preference to critical absence’, see 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (2010), 27ff.  
37 Luhmann (2004), 468ff. 
38 Zumbansen (2014), 334. 
39 Calliess and Zumbansen (2010), 151.  
40 Amstutz (2008), 466. 
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broader range of principles, than hitherto, including public law and human rights 
dimensions’.41  
One of the boldest approaches in this respect is that of Gunther Teubner. In extensively 
identifying the ways in which functional spheres of global society have been able to juridify 
and even constitutionalize themselves without reliance on the traditional politico-legal 
mechanisms of the nation-state, Teubner has illuminated new ways in which the ‘original 
needs for security of expectations and solution of conflicts’ can be satisfied at the global 
level. 42 More important in the present context, he has built up a concept of global law beyond 
the nation-state with an eye firmly fixed on the problem of the rationality maximisation of 
different global functional systems, which he sees as cloaking ‘an enormous potential for the 
endangerment of people, nature and society.’43 This has led him to the conception of a robust 
form of law to address these problems, and even one in which the incremental social 
positivization of fundamental rights at the global level is viewed as being ‘completely 
plausible’.44 
Teubner’s advances in this respect are such that it represents the first Rubicon to be 
crossed for an account of general norms unrealized in law. Just how can the problem of 
general norms be constructed if there is so much potential in the social positivization of 
norms? The challenge, however, is not as formidable as it might appear from a distance. 
Firstly, the hype surrounding Teubner’s model of law can be deflated with critique. Despite 
the recognition that it has deservedly garnered, some have questioned the limits of Teubner’s 
model of global law. Generally speaking, one may question whether the balance struck 
between ‘ecologization’ and ‘modernization’ can ever be achieved in the way in which 
Teubner imagines.45 Specifically in the context of norms and legal validity, it has been 
pointed out how in practice such a particularistic approach will often tend toward favouring 
the regime rather than more general interests. In the words of Simma and Pulkowski: ‘Life on 
the planet becomes more interesting than the fate of the universe.’46 Moreover, this points to 
the further observation that what is often cited as ‘global’ in this context is actually taking 
place at more ‘limited sub-global levels’.47 These concerns are also reflected in an internal 
tension within systems theoretical accounts about the normative and political implications of 
                                                          
41 Collins (2008), 270.  
42 Teubner (2004), 2.  
43 Teubner (2009), 330. 
44 Teubner (2012), 124.  
45 Latour (1998).  
46 Pulkowski and Simma (2006), 505. 
47 Twining (2009), 24. See also for this point in respect of human rights, Augenstein (2012).  
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such a model of law of world society.48 While this is not directly an issue for the present 
study, the thesis takes seriously questions about the implications of the incremental and 
aggregative positivization of norms under Teubner’s model of law, in light of the propensity 
for social systems to deviate from, rather than adapt, to ecological concerns.49 Again the goal 
is not to engage in a full scale critique of Teubner’s theory of law, but rather to question the 
ability of modern legal systems to adequately realize the kind of general norms involved. 
Secondly, it should be highlighted that systems theory has, in recent years, increasingly 
moved away from the kind of questions which the present study addresses. Again this is most 
evident in Teubner’s work, in so far as his theory of global law is developed through a 
progressive move from ‘structure to process’, from ‘norm to action’, and from ‘function to 
code.’50 Reflecting a more general trend, this pronounced concern with differentiating legal 
from other social phenomena has distracted much ‘attention from other theoretical questions 
that are badly in need of attention.’51 It is quite common now for scholars who set out to 
examine the ‘function’ of law under a systems theoretical analysis to conflate that issue with 
one of ‘coding’, and to engage exclusively in an analysis of the latter.52 This is not to assert 
that function has been all together ignored by systems theorists of global law. Rather some 
have developed a concept of the function of law in world society as being divided—operating 
in an internal dimension as a predominantly normative medium, while simultaneously 
operating in an external dimension as a predominantly cognitive medium which facilitates the 
transfer of social components between the various normative orders of world society.53 One 
might wonder whether function can really be split in this way without confusing it with an 
issue of ‘performance’,54 but the important point is that, despite the way in which the concept 
of the function of law has been overhauled in recent years by systems theorists, none of this 
absolves law (or the observer) of reference to general norms which do not fit neatly into the 
various niches of fragmented society. Even in so far as they go unrealized in differentiated 
society, such norms remain a problem for meaning and communication.  
The purpose of exploring the critiques made of Teubner’s concept of global law will be 
to map out the limits of that legal system and to delineate more clearly the kind of norms 
                                                          
48 Zumbansen (2014), 334, fn. 118.  
49 Christodoulidis (2011), (2013).  
50 For the tipping point in this direction, seeTeubner (1992), 1450.  
51 Twining (2003), 251. 
52 Calliess and Renner (2009). 
53 Amstutz (2009), (2011); Kjaer (2013), (2014). 
54 On the distinction between ‘function’, ‘performance’, see Luhmann (1977), 36-38. According to Luhmann 
confounding function and performance must be ‘carefully avoided’ as it involves mixing up system references 
and thus results in ‘considerable semantic confusion’, Luhmann and Schorr (2000), 41; Luhmann (2013a), 96.  
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which are unlikely to find accommodation in that model. Part of the strength of Teubner’s 
concept of the gradual legal realization of a range of norms in world society, lies in the way 
in which it successfully externalizes that realization into the future. While some have been 
willing to admit that such an externalization is ‘a quest which is continuously pursued but is 
unlikely to be factually realised’,55 neither Teubner nor others have conceded this point. 
Teubner does admit, however, that not all normative expectations can be realized through the 
model of global law that he proposes; that, in light of the fragmented nature of world society, 
any ‘high expectations’ of global law must be curbed, and that the best that law can offer is ‘a 
kind of damage limitation’ by serving as a ‘gentle civilizer of social systems’.56 At other 
points Teubner acknowledges how ‘groping attempts to juridify human rights cannot hide the 
fact that this is, in the strict sense, impossible’, while lamenting the fact that such a ‘burning 
issue’ has ‘no prospect of resolution’ through law.57 Beyond this, relatively few details are 
provided as to the kind of norms which are therefore unlikely to be juridified under global 
law, but it can be speculated that they would include some of those listed at the outset of this 
introductory chapter. Along with normative expectations of the prohibition of weapons of 
mass destruction or world food security, one could also include norms of the responsibility of 
nation-states governments to protect their populations from mass atrocity crimes, the 
obligation to extradite or exercise criminal jurisdiction in respect of human rights violations, 
the relocation of military spending for sustainable development, the prohibition of any 
national administrative action that degrades the natural environment, the conservation of fish 
stocks in the high seas, or even the extension of society into outer space or in exploration of 
the deep sea-bed.  
The norms listed above as unlikely to find realization in Teubner’s concept of global 
law reveal how the nation-state cannot be entirely marginalized from important normative 
questions in world society.58 From this perspective, another legal system—more 
cumbersome, and famously consuming everything from ‘apology to utopia’59—looms into 
view. Although traditionally established on the basis of ensuring the peaceful coexistence of 
sovereign nation-states, public international law has evolved in the last sixty years to 
additionally orientate itself towards facilitating cooperation between such entities in relation 
                                                          
55 Kjaer (2014), 137. 
56 Fischer-Lescano and Teubner (2004a), 1045. 
57 Teubner (2011a), 214. 
58 Indeed this is a frequent criticism of Teubner’s concept of law, see Thronhill (2011b), 245; Kjaer, (2011b), 
290. See also Mann (1997) for a more general thesis of the continued importance of the nation-state 
organization in a globalized society.  
59 Koskenniemi (2005).  
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to the pressing problems arising at the global level.60 Moreover international lawyers have 
been relatively unperturbed by the fragmentation of world society which drives this, simply 
seeing it as a quality that has always marked the international system,61 and expanding itself 
instead through the proliferation of international courts and institutions that results from such 
a dynamic.62 Within the international legal system there has been plenty of scope to read 
these changes as the basis of an extension of public international law beyond its original 
inter-state basis towards a true ordre public which effectively ‘incorporates common interests 
of the international community as a whole, including not only states but also human 
beings’.63 As such, the public international legal system can be said to have become 
functionally orientated to many of the normative expectations that emerge in response to the 
risks associated with functional differentiation. 
Of course international law faces its own problems in realizing the highly generalized 
norms arising at the global level. Despite the increasing reference of that legal system to such 
norms, it remains structurally orientated to providing a legal framework for the sovereign 
independence of nation-states. The problems this underlying structural condition causes for 
the accommodation of global public goods are well-known.64 Moreover, contrary to claims of 
a ‘waning’ of state sovereignty,65 the structure of national sovereignty which emerged in the 
late Middle Ages appears to remain so deeply embedded within the current globalization and 
the functional differentiation of society itself that there is no end in sight for these problems. 
However, international law has been dealing with this tension between sovereignty and a 
more general reference since its inception, and it will be shown that international courts have 
evolved sophisticated mechanisms for overcoming this problem. These devices do not always 
realize general norms to the extent that many would like, yet, considering the difficulties 
international law faces in this respect, they do achieve a certain degree of the stabilization of 
those normative expectations. Much like global private law, public international law has kept 
pace with globalization through increasing self-reference and reliance on coding.  
Again, this makes it difficult to pinpoint exactly where the limits of law are in relation 
to general norms. Yet, the balance between generalized norms and the atomistic interests of 
states can only be maintained for so long. The tension between global public goods and state 
                                                          
60 Friedmann (1964). 
61 See Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission on the Fragmentation of International 
Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.628. 13 April 2006. See also Jenks (1953). 
62 van den Herik and Stahn (2012). 
63 Simma (2009), 268; see also Klabbers (2009b). 
64 Krisch (2014).  
65 And this is not only claimed by global private lawyers, see, for example, Schreuer (1993); Peters (2009a). 
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sovereignty puts the international legal system under incredible strain, and there have been 
cases which have brought the opposing references to general norms and sovereignty doctrine 
so sharply into contention that the legal system’s usual devices have been simply rendered 
inadequate. The objective of this thesis will be to move towards this unfamiliar territory of 
the limits of law. This is not as sceptical as it may appear, though. Only from here can one 
begin to see the relevance of the problem of highly generalized norms in contemporary world 
society. 
 
1.2  Methodology 
 
As stated, the present study relies on Luhmann’s systems theory, and it pays the ‘high entry 
costs’ for doing so. Luhmann’s work alone is complex enough that it requires significant time 
and energy before one even knows how to use it. The limited attention which the 
methodological implications of the theory have received can be explained, partly at least, as a 
consequence of the epistemological basis of the theory being somewhat at odds with the 
‘canons of classical method’.66 The basic distinction between system and environment, 
whereby the system must reduce environmental complexity through self-referential selection, 
does not give much hope for discovering the world ‘as it really is’. For Luhmann, science is a 
social system as much as anything else, and the ‘reality’ arrived at through empirical research 
is therefore only the validation of the research’s own constructions.67   
There are, nonetheless, ‘methodological consequences’ to the insight that social 
systems are free to organize and reproduce themselves,68 and a very definite role for method 
that goes along with the theory. It is worth stopping to consider this because it will become 
central to this thesis. The method generally adopted with Luhmann’s systems theory is ‘the 
method of functional analysis’.69 It involves beginning with social problems (‘functional 
references’, ‘reference problems’) and then comparing alternative social structures in terms of 
how well they contribute to the resolution of the problem.70 This springs from Luhmann’s 
aversion to Parsonian ‘structural-functionalism’, whereby given structures are assumed to 
serve some particular function.71 Parsons had it the wrong way round according to 
                                                          
66 Besio and Pronzini (2010), para. 4.  
67 Luhmann (2012), 16.  
68 Ibid., 17.  
69 Luhmann (1995), 52.  
70 Stichweh (2011), 10.  
71 Ibid. 
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Luhmann—it should be ‘functional-structuralism’, that is the researcher should start with the 
social problem, the function that needs to be fulfilled, and then look for the structures that 
could do this.72  
This brings a degree of contingency into the relations between problems and solutions. 
Through it we come to ‘recognise the existence of structural dynamics, adaptation, 
development and, one of Luhmann’s key concepts, the functional equivalence of different 
kinds of structures.’73 This redefines function as the ‘unity of the difference between a 
problem and several functional equivalent solutions to the problem’.74 However, it is 
important to note that the purpose here is not one of solving the problem. The method of 
functional analysis ‘can (but does not have to) result in the possibility of substitution’—
indeed, in most cases the problem will have already been solved.75 It is also important to note 
that the aim is not to discover causal relations between problems and solutions in the form of 
cause and effect. Function, as Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos points out, ‘is the question, 
rather than the causal answer’.76 Again the concern for causal relations between problems and 
solutions is rejected by the epistemological basis of the theory. Rather the ‘insight’ of the 
functional method according to Luhmann ‘lies athwart causalities: it resides in comparing 
them.’77 In other words, what are compared are the problem-solutions, the cause-effect 
relationships themselves. In this way, one not only keeps in mind the ‘purely hypothetical 
status of causal assumptions’, but actually brings them into the comparison.78 
At first sight this appears relatively straightforward: one identifies the problem, then 
looks to established solutions to the problem, then compares them with other problem-
solutions, etc. However, its proper execution is somewhat more demanding than this. The 
comparison of functional equivalents presupposes a preceding theoretical analysis of the 
problem and the systems involved.79 It is only through such analysis of the problem that a 
                                                          
72 Luhmann (1962); Hornung (2006), 191. Merton also criticized structural-functionalism on this basis, 
arguing the approach treated cultural forms as ‘specialized and irreplaceable’, and suggesting instead an 
alternative functions—some latent, some manifest, (1967), 88; see also Merton, (1957), 86ff. 
73 Hornung (2006), 191.  
74 Luhmann (2013a), 82. Luhmann may have drew some inspiration here from Merton’s notion of alternative 
functions, but whereas for Merton the issue was one of exposing latent functions, for Luhmann it is about the 
contingency of functional equivalents. Also Luhmann’s concept was also reflected in the idea of ‘equifinality’ 
advanced in von Bertalanffy’s open systems theory: ‘In any closed system the final stage is unequivocally 
determined by the initial conditions … If either the initial conditions or the process is altered, the final state will 
also be changed. This is not so in open systems. Here, the same final state may be reached from different initial 
conditions and in different ways. This is what is called equifinality.’ Von Bertalanffy (1968), 40. 
75 Luhmann (2013b), 82.  
76 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (2010), 68.  
77 Luhmann (1995), 53. 
78 Ibid., 53-54.  
79 Luhmann (1970), 25.  
20 
 
clear point of reference or criterion can be established under which different structures can be 
compared as functional equivalents.80 In other words, it is only through such preceding 
analysis that the problem reference can be used as a ‘connecting thread’ to questions about 
other possibilities.81 This indicates the role differentiation and circular relationship between 
theory and method in Luhmann’s systems theory.82 It is the task of theory to construct the 
problem (and this means the problems generating observations are themselves scientific 
constructions).83  Systems theory is especially useful here for breaking ‘through the illusion 
of normality, to disregard experience and habit’, to explain the ‘normal as improbable’.84 For 
example, systems theory poses question such as, how are ‘old village forms of neighbourly 
help and gratefulness’, as instruments balancing out needs over time, capable of being 
supplanted by legally secured financial credit?85 The task of method then is to generate 
analyses that in turn develop the theory. Thus, to stay with the example, one would research 
instrumental changes in the development of the economy from the seventeenth to nineteenth 
century, and plough the findings back into developing the theoretical construction of the 
problem.86 However, the purpose of method is not to test a hypothesis by controlling a 
representative sample. Rather, theory ‘steers’ method, and searches for ‘tendencies that it 
regards as relevant and for which it can offer a meaningful interpretation.’87 
Through repeated application of theory and method in this respect, Luhmann was able 
to significantly develop theoretical understanding of social problems. In a basic sense the 
problem is always one of the difference of complexity between system and environment;88 
but as Luhmann’s social system theory developed the construction of basic problems became 
ever more specific. Knudsen catalogues these basic problems as ‘double contingency’, 
‘contact’, ‘motivation or connectivity’, and ‘paradox’.89 The problem of double contingency 
relates to the contingency of selections between ego and alter, and can be construed as the 
basis of emergence of the full range of social systems which mediate expectations through 
                                                          
80 Hornung (2006), 192.  
81 Luhmann (1995), 53. 
82 Knudsen (2010), para. 12. 
83 Ibid., para. 9 and 10. For Luhmann ‘functions are always constructions of an observer.’ (2013b), 83.  
84 Luhmann (1995), 115.  
85 Luhmann (1985a), 106. 
86 And one can also use systems theory in this sense while focusing more explicitly on the empirical method, 
see, e.g. Thornhill (2011c).  
87 Besio and Pronzini (2010), para. 10.  
88 A vestige of causality which Kjaer notes nonetheless undermines the otherwise radical constructivism of 
Luhmann’s theory, see Kjaer (2012), 162.  
89 Knudsen (2010), para. 24. 
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communication.90 It will figure heavily in the present study. The problem of ‘contact’ relates 
to communication with individuals who are not present, and is resolved through diffusion 
media.91 It is not directly relevant to the present study, but will come up at various stages in 
so far as it relates to the effect of communication technology on the communicative network 
that give formulation to general norms in world society. The problem of ‘motivation’ relates 
to the need for improbable communication to be accepted and used as the basis of further 
communication. It will figure in the present study, not only because law itself is a 
symbolically generalized communication medium, but because the expansionist tendencies of 
media-steered subsystems are a significant aspect of the ‘dark side’ of functional 
differentiation which kindles highly generalized norms. Finally, the problem of ‘paradox’ 
relates to the contingency of all communication, and is resolved by invisibilizations and 
displacements. This problem will also present itself at several points in discussion of the issue 
of generalized norms that go unrecognized in law, and particularly in respect of how law 
often deals with the problematics of general norms.   
Although the present study will draw on these concepts of social problems throughout, 
this does not mean that it can simply identify the problem of general norms as one of double 
contingency, for example, and then launch straight into a search for and comparison of 
possible solutions. Again it needs to be stressed at the outset that the method of functional 
analysis is ‘as much about analysing the problem something is a solution to, as it is about 
analysing how problems are solved.’92 The present study must therefore strive to construct 
the problem for itself as the criterion for comparing functional equivalents can only be 
established through construction and refinement of the problem reference. The basic 
problems established by Luhmann as presented above are only archetypes.93 It is for this 
reason that I will spend the next four chapters, and the greater part of the thesis, constructing 
the problem and comparing functional equivalents in reference to such, before even arriving 
at a hypothetical statement of a functional substitute.  
What is the point of all this? What problem does the functional method solve that is 
relevant to the present study? Somewhat ironically, what the examination of the issue of 
general norms (formulated and recognized on some general societal level but unrealized in 
‘differentiated’ society) requires is an approach that can ‘break through the illusion of 
                                                          
90 Luhmann (1995), 103ff. 
91 Knudsen (2010), para. 24.  
92 Ibid., para. 32.  
93 Ibid., para. 31. 
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normality’.94 The very general nature of the norms, their exclusion from the now normal 
functional subsystems of differentiated society, means the problem can be easily obscured 
behind structures that have come to be taken for granted (again, it will be shown that in fact 
both global private law and international law have their own ways of invisiblizing the 
problem).  
Luhmann’s ‘radical functionalism’95 offers a way to break through this. The value of 
the functional method can be said to lie in its capacity to ‘enable scientific research to 
surprise itself.’96 As part of modern society, sociological research is permeated by the 
understandings of the object it aims to study.97 The method of functional analysis, and the 
specific use of the problem/solution distinction serves as a way of interrupting or gaining 
distance from existing social structures. It is a way of generating observations and further 
analyses and questions. In this respect, Knudsen presents the functional method as a ‘kind of 
dynamo’ for systems theory.98 The distinction of problem/solution ‘becomes a solution to the 
problem of how to move analyses further’.99 This is reflected, as Knudsen argues, in the 
‘peculiar form’ of the problem/solution distinction.100 It is ‘empty’ because it does not specify 
the content of the problem—this is achieved by theory. But once theory adequately constructs 
the problem, the problem/solution distinction becomes ‘dynamic’, enabling the singular 
analysis to transgress its own boundaries, and running together with other distinctions and 
thus opening up new questions.101 It is only at this point that the method pays off. As 
Luhmann says, it is only on the basis of the ‘scaffolding composed’ of statements arrived at 
through the functional method that it may ‘seem worthwhile to investigate underlying 
causalities empirically.’102 
                                                          
94 See above, n. 84. Of course the norms themselves, that is their content, have not provided any basis for 
methodological guidelines. That is important because science as a social system depends on value-free 
communication. (Luhmann, 2012, 17). 
95 Thornhill (2000), 174. 
96 Luhmann (2012), 13. 
97 Knudsen (2010), para. 36. 
98 Ibid., para. 38.  
99 Ibid., para. 49. 
100 Ibid., para. 50. 
101 Ibid., paras. 49 and 50.  
102 Luhmann (1995), 54. Besio and Pronzini (2010) present a typology of empirical materials that are typically 
used in Luhmann’s functional analysis: (1) explanation of trivialities as socially uncontested facts that are 
immediately observable (e.g., that one cannot be in London and Paris at the same time presents a space/time 
contradiction that has both increased and lessened with modernization, Luhmann (1995), 386.); (2) structural 
analysis through observation of operational recursivity (e.g., interviews and participant observation to identify 
chains of decisions taken within an organization, see below, Section 6.4); (3) semantic analysis in observing the 
distinctions employed by a social system in its self-description (e.g., content analysis of documents to identify 
the typical distinctions employed in corporate governance); and (4) the empirical observation of structural 
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It is for this reason that the functional method of analysis is adopted for the present 
study. By theoretically constructing the problem of general norms, and by utilizing this 
through the distinction of problem/solution, the study hopes to generate new observations and 
questions about general norms that go unrealized in law. It should be stated though that it is 
not the aim of the study to answer or explore the full range of questions and observations that 
can be generated by the functional method. Because the greater part of the thesis is to be 
taken up with developing the construction of the problem, even before the problem/solution 
distinction is fully operationalized, there will only be space for further analysis of a select few 
of the observations generated. This should not, it is hoped, detract from the thesis however. 
Exposing further possible solutions for general norms through proper construction of the 
problem, and ‘reproblematizing’ established institutions in view of possible alternatives,103 is 
a necessary step towards further research in the area of general norms and law.  
Finally, adopting this approach means that one does not start out in the typical fashion 
of identifying a research problem, then stating a hypothesis, and then devising research 
questions in order to test the hypothesis. The formulation of a hypothesis and the design of 
questions to test the hypothesis can only be arrived at after proper functional analysis (and 
again, so far as one continues to accept the tenets of the systems theoretical approach which 
generates the insight, one does not test the hypothesis in order to prove or disprove it’s 
‘reality’, but rather to develop theoretical understanding). For this reason, the thesis does not 
begin by offering a hypothesis and laying out research questions to that end. The primary 
research question, as stated at the outset, is about generalized norms that are formulated and 
recognized at the global level, but which are inadequately realized in law. The rationale for 
this, as stated and as will be demonstrated further below, is that this specific question has not 
been subject to systems theoretical and functional analysis.104 This question will be 
developed in the course of the thesis.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
couplings (e.g. content analysis and interviews to identify ‘decision intersections’ of corporations, courts and 
patent offices in the development of pharmaceutical patents). 
103 Luhmann (2000b), 138.  
104 Of course the researcher can, nonetheless, be ‘highly idiosyncratic in his problem choices and may be have 
value reasons for doing research’ (Luhmann, interview with Nico Stehr, Stehr (1982), 45). I would argue this is 
inevitable, and, as will be argued in the sixth chapter, Luhmann himself can be seen to have had ‘value reasons’ 
for the research he chose to conduct, and the research he chose not to conduct. 
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1.3  Thesis Outline 
 
The use of systems theory and functional analysis directs the structure of the thesis. The next 
chapter will begin with analysis of the extent of positivization of norms that is likely to be 
achieved by global private law, and principally the model of global law beyond the state as 
presented by Gunther Teubner. This may appear somewhat arbitrary—the thesis could 
perhaps have equally started with public international law as a functional equivalent of global 
private law. However, Teubner’s model of law in particular is an obvious place to start 
because it presents a robust form of law that has evolved with globalization. Indeed, in many 
ways, it presents a model of global law that has evolved to address the dark side of functional 
differentiation which kindles highly generalized norms. It therefore imagines the social 
positivization of a range of fundamental norms that arise at the global level and which 
ostensibly remain locked out of the traditional politico-legal mechanisms of the nation-state.  
The next chapter will then look in more depth at the extent of positivization of norms 
under Teubner’s concept of law. The aim is to further construct the problem of norms which 
arise from globalization but which are unlikely to find realization in the differentiated system 
of global law beyond the nation-state. This is not straightforward by any means. Teubner’s 
model of law envisions an incremental, aggregative positivization of norms and this 
externalization into the future may in itself stabilize norms to some degree. However, after 
considering the advances made by Teubner’s concept of law, the chapter will subject it to 
some critical analysis in order to bring it into proper perspective with the prodigious nature of 
highly generalized norms arising at the global level. What comes out of this is the insight that 
there are a class of norms which are clearly not included within the self-contained regimes of 
Teubner’s concept of global law, and these can be generally introduced as those norms which 
cannot rely solely on social positivization in marginalization of the nation-state. In the fourth 
section the chapter moves to methodological considerations to argue that through a series of 
‘turns’, Tuebner’s theory of law, and the systems theoretical approach to law in general, has 
moved away from asking the kind of questions that the present study is engaged with, and 
that the focus has generally shifted away from ‘function’ and more towards ‘code’. The fifth 
section of the next chapter will, however, briefly qualify this finding by discussing recent 
systems theoretical attempts to readdress the function of global law. The chapter will close by 
arguing that even where this is the case, however, the function of the norm and the normative 
function of law is conceptually reduced to the interior worlds of the fragments of global 
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society, and little attention is paid to law’s reference to the norms that prove too general for 
those special spheres. 
Thereafter, it is deemed necessary in the third chapter to return to an early point in 
Luhmann’s systems theoretical account of law when law’s functional reference to the norm 
was considered at a much more elemental level. Because the overarching aim here is the 
adequate construction of the problem of general norms that go unrealized in law, the chapter 
does not focus directly on the function of law itself, but begins instead by abstracting the 
norm from law and considering the function of the norm from this earlier systems theoretical 
perspective. Only after this analysis does the chapter move to considering the function of law 
as the congruent generalization of normative expectation in the temporal, social and material 
dimensions. This is very important because it becomes the criterion for considering 
functional equivalents at a later stage. Of course the function of law became less important to 
Luhmann’s theory of law after his autopoietic turn, when it became clear that systems 
required binary coding to achieve their autopieisis. However, the chapter will show also that 
Luhmann’s shift to a theory of the autopoiesis of law in no way denied the importance of the 
function of law; in a sense it only made the search for functional equivalents all the more 
pressing.  
At this stage the thesis will be equipped with a better understanding of the problem and 
a better awareness of the criterion for the search for functional equivalents. In the fourth 
chapter it will examine public international law in relation to the problem. The traditional 
functional reference of international law may have been to the regulation of interstate 
relations, however many consider international law to have adopted an broader social 
function as a result of the increasing globalization and interdependence of nation-states in 
response to the negative side-effects of functional differentiation. Moreover, as stated, the 
realization of some norms arising at the global level seems to require the action of the nation-
state, and thus international law may prove a more stable route for the positivization of 
certain norms. Nonetheless, before moving to examine the positivization of norms on a more 
empirical basis in fifth chapter, chapter four aims to explore on a theoretical level some of the 
underlying structural conditions of international law which can be said to significantly 
undermine its ability to positivize highly generalized norms arising from the negative side-
effects of an advanced stage of functional differentiation. The general theme of this chapter is 
that international law’s emergence with the shift to the functional differentiation of society 
has entrenched another functional orientation of the legal system to the sovereignty of nation-
states, which continues to undermine its realization of general norms. The three sections of 
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the chapter will present a tripartite scheme of structural conditions—the structural coupling 
between international law and politics, the relationship between international law and 
physical violence, and state sovereignty as segmentary differentiation—which are 
problematic in this respect.  
Following those considerations, the fifth chapter will move to examining the plight of 
general norms in international law on a more empirical basis. Two norms will be looked at in 
particular in this respect. The first will be the normative expectation of the peremptory and 
universal status of human rights. This will be shown to occupy a very central but mysterious 
place in international law, something international law cannot turn away from but which it 
cannot seem to give any definite form or substance to. Through analysis of case law it will be 
demonstrated that international law has come to rely on a distinction between procedural and 
substantive law to unfold the paradox of this normative hierarchy in a consensualist legal 
order. This is presented as adequately maintaining the function of international law in respect 
of normative expectations of the peremptory status of human rights norms. However, it is 
also presented as highlighting the danger of the use of procedural rules amounting to a denial 
of justice. The second section of this chapter will go on to look at normative expectations of 
the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the famous example of non liquet when the 
International Court of Justice considered the illegality of nuclear weapons. The failure of 
international law in this instance to fully decide the question admitted regarding the illegality 
of nuclear weapons is presented in systems theoretical terms as amounting to a failure of law 
to secure its autopoiesis and as exposing the foundational paradox of the legal system. Most 
importantly the Court’s non-decision in the nuclear weapons case is presented as the clearest 
example of a norm receiving formulation and recognition on a general level, but ultimately 
(and very clearly) failing to find realization in law.  
Thus, having established at least one norm (the prohibition of nuclear weapons) that 
finds adequate formulation at the general level, but which cannot find realization in either 
global private law or public international law, chapter six moves on to considering functional 
equivalents beyond law in respect to that norm. It looks in particular to the many social 
movement organizations that were actively involved in bringing the normative question about 
the illegality of nuclear weapons to the Court. Even though Luhmann himself neglected to 
examine how social movements increasingly rely on organization, the chapter employs his 
systems theoretical concept of organization to highlight how social movement organizations 
are able to make decisions about general norms that law cannot decide, and how they are able 
to communicate those norms to their environment. It is argued that while the recursive 
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decision-making on the normative decision-premise of such organizations absorbs the 
uncertainty surrounding the general norm, the communicative capacity of those organizations 
allows them to keep the norm in circulation in society and thereby maintain the prospect that 
the norm may, over time, find realization within differentiated society. Whether the norm 
finds realization in law or not is beside the point. This is presented as a generalization of 
normative expectations in the temporal, social and material dimensions, and thus a possible 
functional substitute for law in respect of some highly generalized norms of global society.  
Whilst no space is provided to undertake a broad empirical study of the hypothesis that 
social movement organizations could provide a functional substitute to law in respect of 
general norms, the chapter engages in some empirical research within the limited area of 
antinuclear organizations. According to the systems theoretical construction of the function, 
the research object is taken as the decisions of those organizations, and the communication of 
the antinuclear norm at the organization’s environment. This is conducted through document 
analysis and interview of a select number of participants who are able to testify to the 
decisions of the organizations on normative decision-premises and the ways in which the 
organizations communicate and project those norms at the legal system and other system in 
their environment.  This limited basis of empirical research will be used to refine the theory 
developed regarding the function of social movement organizations in world society. 
There are a number of further research possibilities that present themselves on the 
hypothesis of the social movement organization as a functional equivalent to law in respect of 
general norms. However, the thesis uses the final chapter to look at how international law has 
come to structurally rely upon the development of civil society organizations.  On the one 
hand, international law is construed to have adopted a limitative approach to civil society 
organizations which involves the development of principles and mechanisms to scrutinize the 
accountability of civil society organizations that take part in global governance. However, 
attempts in this direction are shown to inevitably rebound to questions about the legitimacy of 
law itself, and it is therefore argued that any limitative approach to social movements 
organizations in particular must be scaled back, and must at all points be guided by an 
awareness of the function and institutional context of these organizations in representing a 
‘global opposition’. On the other hand, law is presented as having developed a constitutive 
approach whereby the inclusion of civil society organizations is seen as directly relevant to 
the legitimacy of international law, and whereby mechanisms can be proposed to ensure the 
participation of such organizations in the formal law-making process. However, the chapter 
argues that even this kind of formalization may lead to a co-option and over-determination 
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that would ultimately frustrate the important function that such organizations may have 
achieved in world society. The chapter ends by arguing that as far as the participation of civil 
society organizations within international law is necessary, the legal formalization of those 
organizations for that aim must be sensitive to the function of those organizations in world 
society and the particular organizational arrangements which have evolved in that respect.   
 
1.4 A note on terminology: ‘general norms’ and ‘world society’ 
 
The reader may by this stage have expected some clearer definition of the term ‘general 
norms’ beyond the basis that they are formulated and recognized in society without being 
realized in law. The generality relates to the perspective of the differentiated society, and 
particularly the legal system. However a clearer definition of those norms which are too 
general to find specification within the differentiated legal systems is something which can 
only be developed in the course of the thesis. At this stage the prefix ‘general’ is to be given 
its ordinary meaning: ‘not special: not restricted or specialised: relating to the whole or to all 
or most: universal: nearly universal: public: vague’.105 For purely introductory purposes the 
generality can be loosely presented in the abstract by drawing upon the three ‘meaning’ 
dimensions Luhmann identifies as being used to construct ‘meaning’ in social systems.106 In 
the social dimension, the generality could refer to the vague institutionalization of those 
norms in respect of law, the difficulty of identifying a clearly defined demos which holds 
such normative expectations, and the apparent dislocation between the social arenas in which 
those norms are formulated and the differentiated legal systems available at the global level. 
In the material dimension, it could refer to the difficulty of defining the boundaries of the 
context of those norms, and how they might meaningfully attach to various factual patterns in 
which the norm might arise. Finally, in the temporal dimension the generality could refer to 
the cumbersome nature of those norms being such that they cannot be externalized into the 
future with mere promises, or with distinctions which avoid the issue and present only a 
justice ‘to come’. They require, as it will be seen, clear and consistent decisions. 
These meaning dimensions will be demonstrated to be directly relevant to the function 
of law. Moreover, the generality of the norm in each of these dimensions should disappear 
when an adequate solution to the problem can be pinpointed.  
                                                          
105 Chambers English Dictionary, Cambridge: W & R Chambers Limited, 1988.  
106 Luhmann (1995), 59-102. 
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Secondly, a brief note should be made about the use of the terms ‘world society’ and 
‘global society’ in the thesis. The German Weltgesellschaft, as Luhmann uses it, is somewhat 
more technical, referring specifically to a single communicative network and temporal 
horizon that expands the globe.107 The term is also used by new-institutionalist scholars in a 
technical sense to denote the global expanse of cultural ideals.108 Nonetheless, the difference 
between ‘world society’ and ‘global society’ is not great,109 and the thesis will at times 
employ the terms interchangeably, often in reflection of the theoretical approach it is 
discussing. Thus, for example, it might use the term ‘world society’ while discussing 
Luhmann’s systems theory, and then switch to the term ‘global society’ when discussing the 
approach of international lawyers. This should not, hopefully, cause the reader serious 
confusion.  
 
                                                          
107 Luhmann (1997a); Luhmann (2012), 85ff; Albrow (2014b), xxxv-xxxvi. 
108 See for example, Drori, Hwang and Meyer (2006). 
109 Albrow, (2014b), xxxv-xxxvi. 
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2  Beyond global law beyond the state? 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
It is a noted mark of distinction for Luhmann’s functionalist approach to law that it predicted 
the fragmentation of law in world society1 some twenty-nine years before the International 
Law Commission felt compelled to formally address the ‘risks ensuing from the 
fragmentation of international law’.2 In 1971 Luhmann hypothesized that, in order to remain 
an important risk carrier of societal evolution, law would ultimately have to reflect the 
functional differentiation that was driving the development of world society.3 The problem, 
which was all too evident at that point in history, was that law remained chronically anchored 
in the framework of national political systems, which, unlike many other areas of society, had 
not been able to leap ahead to the global level. The problems did not end there though, as he 
saw it. In fact, if one is inclined to credit Luhmann’s prescience, it may also be said that he 
successfully predicted the increasing ‘relative normativity’4 of law at the global level because 
the only way it was envisaged that law could adapt to these societal developments was 
through the further admittance of cognitive mechanisms into its basic normative structure. 
Many of the functional areas which had developed their autonomy and expanded beyond 
territorial boundaries—such as economy, science, technology, news broadcasting, tourism, or 
research—clearly indicated a ‘non-normative style of expectation’ which Luhmann in 
‘speculative exaggeration’, presented as a ‘shift of evolutionary primacy from normative to 
cognitive mechanisms.’5  Thus it was envisaged that law would have to transform in such a 
way that the structural conditions for learning within each social system would be supported 
through ‘normatisation’.6 Here one can already see the problem looming of the tension 
between this cognitive shift and the need for normativity. And, with that, one can then see the 
                                                          
1 Fischer-Lescano and Teubner (2004a), 1000. 
2 For final report see, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law’, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, 
A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006. 
3 Luhmann (1971). 
4 Another phenomenon which has caused some professional anxiety amongst international lawyer, see Weil 
(1983). For more balanced accounts of the challenge of soft law to international legal scholarship, see Ellis, 
(2012), 313; Chinkin (1989). 
5 Luhmann (1985a), 262.  
6 Luhmann (1971). 
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basis of the closing sentence of Luhmann’s final treatise on law: the further speculative 
exaggeration that law ‘might well level off with the evolution of global society.’7   
Despite these ominous warnings scholars have since been able to transform Luhmann’s 
‘speculative exaggeration’ of law’s demise into a story of law’s expansion. Through 
identification of the ways in which law becomes ‘parasitic on the codes and rationalities’ of 
the multifarious fragmented areas of contemporary society,8 law has been reimagined as a 
highly dynamic social system that is, in fact, ‘everywhere’ in a functionally differentiated 
society.9 Thus, in looking beyond the traditional political institutional centres to explore the 
‘peripheries’ where law meets with other social sectors,10 this approach has tapped into the 
global arenas beyond the nation-state which are ‘populated by a multitude of norm makers’,11 
and which also normatively engage in ‘jurispersuasion’ and make claims to legal authority.12 
Law is instrumentalized in these spheres when it is reconstructs the social conflicts of 
transnational communities, alienates them to a sufficient degree from their particularistic 
contexts, and refines them through a tailored juridification process.13 
Within this approach, the work of Gunter Teubner stands out in particular. In 
developing a very bold concept of law and constitutionalism at the global level, Teubner is 
commonly acknowledged as a ‘leading exponent’,14 presenting ‘one of the most highly 
evolved positions’ in the field,15 and as someone ‘at the forefront’ in developing an inspiring 
sociological theory of law that engages the enormous complexity and fragmentation of world 
society.16 However, what really makes Teubner’s work particularly relevant to the present 
study is the way in which he has, for decades now, developed a concept of law which has 
consistently engaged with the ‘dark side’ of functional differentiation and the destructive 
side-effects of such systemic autonomy which generate highly generalized norms in world 
society.17 In a sense Teubner is consumed with- and driven by questions about the 
                                                          
7 Luhmann (2004), 490. 
8 Sand (2013), 203.  
9 Zumbansen (2009), 30.  
10 Teubner (2004), 75. 
11 Zumbansen (2006), 745. 
12 Schiff Berman (2005), 538-539. 
13 Cotterrell (2012), 15. 
14 Walker (2012), 17.  
15 Thornhill (2011b), 244. 
16 Verschraegen (2011), 218.  
17 See, for example, Teubner (1997b), (2010a), (2011b), (2011e). Other approaches also identify a far-reaching 
transnational legal system, even constitutionalization, beyond the traditional public sphere (Calliess and 
Zumbansen, 2010, 34, 168; Zumbansen, 2012a), which is able to accommodate a range of public policy 
concerns, including human rights. (Zumbansen, 2006). Although these approaches are not so emphatically 
directed at the negative side-effects of functional differentiation, and are arguably somewhat more reserved than 
Teubner’s envisioned legalization and constitutionalization of human rights, focusing, for example, on civil 
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‘implacable compulsion for growth’ of self-reproducing social systems,18 the destructive 
tendencies which result from this, and how law can address these issues in a heterogeneous 
and polycentric society. Arguably it is his prolonged engagement with these fundamental 
questions, and the sophisticated theory of law he has built up in answer to them, which makes 
Teubner such a controversial and exemplary figure in this field. Teubner’s contribution is 
specifically located in his explicit recognition that the contemporary significance of human 
rights issues lie, not in the traditional concern for the protection of individuals against the 
misuse of political power, but in the ‘broader problem of protecting global societal 
differentiation and offsetting the external, negative consequences of globalised function 
systems for society at large, the environment and individual persons.’19  
As stated in the introductory chapter, in order to be able to trace the ‘connecting thread’ 
from the problem reference of general norms to functionally equivalent structures, it is 
necessary under the systems theoretical and functional method to first construct the problem 
fully. The first step in this respect is to theoretically establish that there are likely to exist a 
class of norms that cannot be accommodated by the dynamic model of law beyond the 
nation-state that is increasingly presented as positivizing a range of norms which arise at the 
general global level. It is both the ambition of Teubner’s model of law, and the extent in 
which it engages the dark side of functional differentiation which generates highly 
generalized norms at the global level,20 which marks it out as a sturdy foil for the purposes of 
the present study. With this in mind, this chapter will proceed in four sections. The first 
section will present a more detailed picture as to the extent of legalization envisaged under 
Teubner’s concept of global law. In recent years the way in which Teubner has developed 
this concept has come to be seen as announcing something of a ‘normative turn’ for systems 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
litigation in municipal courts (see also Koh, 1991; Scott, 2001), which even in 2006 was deemed ‘mixed at 
best’, and reflecting ‘problematic aspects’ (Zumbansen ibid., 747). These problems have become even greater 
since the US Supreme Court’s limitation of alien tort litigation in the Kiobel case (Kiobel v Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. (2013), 1659, 1669; see Young, 2014; Paust (2014); see also Augenstein, 2014, 53ff; 
and for further discussion of the case, see below, section 5.2).   
18 Teubner (2011e), 14.  
19 Verschraegen (2011), 218. 
20 This is not to suggest that Teubner presents his concept of global law as a panacea to the ills of society. One 
can often find, buried within in his work, muted warnings for the reader to curb her enthusiasm for legalization 
at the global level. For example, after laying out an extensive pluralist model for law in global society, 
Teubner—together with Andreas Fischer-Lescano—concludes by suggesting that any ‘high expectations’ of 
global law under their model must nonetheless be ‘curbed’ in light of the fragmented nature of global society, 
and that if such a model of law can achieve anything under these circumstances, it is only to offer a kind of 
‘damage limitation’ to dampen the destructive tendencies of autonomous subsystems, as a ‘gentle civilizer of 
social systems’ (Fischer-Lescano and Teubner (2004a, 1045). Even his later concept of societal 
constitutionalism, which may be presented as having shifted ‘to ‘doing justice’’ (Christodoulidis 2011, 239) to a 
‘global public interest’ (Teubner 2012), comes with a lament over the impossibility of ever ‘doing justice’ to 
‘real people’ (Teubner, 2012, 148). 
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theoretical accounts of law.21 The label is an intriguing one in the context of his study, and 
the first section aims to examine how his approach has come to earn this label. The second 
section will move on to consider critiques of Teubner’s model of global law with the aim of 
scaling down and properly framing such a model of law in the context the kind of prodigious 
normative expectations outlined as the subject of the study in the introductory chapter. The 
inherent technocracy of Teubner’s model of law beyond the nation-state has raised concerns 
about the political implications of law-making so removed from organized civic 
participation,22 and it is worth exploring these in so far as they highlight the jurisdictional 
limits of such a model of law. Once Teubner’s model of law has been scaled to the 
perspective of the problem of highly generalized norms the third section will move on to 
consider why the question about the fate of general norms has been precluded from analysis 
under the systems theoretical account of law developed by Teubner and others. If the second 
section addresses substantive issues in terms of questioning the normative capacity of 
Teubner’s global law, the third section addresses methodological issues in terms of 
identifying how the theoretical construction of global law beyond the nation-state has 
increasingly engaged in a shift of focus from ‘function’ to ‘code’ that has effectively 
obscured from view the kind of questions taken up in this study. The fourth section will 
qualify this to some degree by demonstrating how recent systems theoretical accounts of 
global law have sought to re-address function. However, even this will be shown to be a 
rather blinkered perspective on function, and ultimately one that also fails to engage the 
question of the present study.  
 
2.2  Systems theory’s ‘normative turn’ 
 
As much as Teubner has been consumed by the potentially dire consequences of the ‘freed up 
energies’ of the functional systems of global society ‘spinning out of control’,23 he has not 
given into fatalism about catastrophe. Although his concern may, to some extent, reflect the 
traditional concerns of the Frankfurt School, he follows Luhmann in so far as he sees 
catastrophe as ‘contingent’.24 Things, in other words, could always turn out differently. This, 
undoubtedly, is part of the strength of his approach. The odd mix of acute sensibility to the 
                                                          
21 Christodoulidis and Francot-Timmermans (2011). 
22 Kjaer (2014), 148. 
23 Teubner (2011b), 224. 
24 Often framed by the different reactions of Marx, Weber and Luhmann to the destructive energies of 
functional differentiation, see Teubner (2010a), 330; (2011b), 224; (2012), 78.  
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destructive energies of functional differentiation, together with a perceived contingency of 
catastrophe, has spurred Teubner to push the boundaries of a paradigm that ‘the system 
cannot operate in its environment’,25 without ever seemingly losing faith in the promise of 
deus ex machina. This has no doubt proved foundational for a concept of law which is now 
seen as providing a potential ‘line of defence against the structural violence of the logics of 
systems running amok.’26 
On a more concrete level, these advances can be traced back to the concept of 
‘reflexive law’ which Teubner developed in the early 1980s. This concept of reflexive law 
will be examined further below—for now it is necessary only to note the way in which the 
concept of reflexive law proved a forerunner for the concept of global law beyond the state. 
As a response to the crisis of the welfare state and the problems of excessive juridification, 
‘reflexive law’ entailed a much more fluid and rarefied concept of law, which was able to 
seep into and sensitively regulate the various niches of modernity.27 It was thus ‘reflexive’ in 
the sense that it was conceived as being able to take up, as need be, the many different 
rationalities of a functionally differentiated society, and to translate them into its own code.28 
As such, this concept of law reflected functional differentiation itself, and this later became 
an important quality for law in relation to the advanced globalization of society, when 
functionally differentiated areas exploded their boundaries and developed their autonomy at 
the global level.29 In response to the dissonance between an increasing normativization at the 
transnational level, and the inadequacy of traditional politico-legal frameworks of the nation-
state, Teubner identified the ways in which law emerges out of the fragmented social 
institutions which had ‘followed their own path’ to the global level.30 In much the same way 
that reflexive law had been able to attach to and legalize various rationalities in modern 
society at the national level, law is seen as taken up in the ‘norm hungry’ autonomous 
fragments of global society.31 Where the autonomy of these social fragments is such that law 
is able to develop appropriate ‘instruments of second order observation’ 32—in a process of 
self-juridification that can be compared to Hart’s concept of a legal system through the 
                                                          
25 Luhmann (2002a), 50. 
26 Christodoulidis and Francot-Timmermans (2011), 188. 
27 Teubner (1983). 
28 Zumbansen (2009), 21.  
29 Luhmann noted these trends as early as 1972 (1985a), but ‘globalization’ did not become a pronounced 
sociological subject until the early 1990s, see for example Appadurai (1990), Roberston (1992).  
30 Teubner (1997), 4. 
31 Teubner (2010a), 331.  
32 Teubner (1997), 8.  
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establishment of ‘rules about rules’33—then they emerge as ‘self-contained legal regimes’ of 
global society.34  
Initially, much of these self-juridifying regimes were limited to the specialized spheres 
of the global economy, producing what Teubner labelled a ‘new lex mercatoria’ as an 
emerging self-regulated legal system35 which did not originate within the politico-legal 
structure of the nation-state, but which relied on commercial contract as means of de-
paradoxifying its self-referential foundation.36 Over time this model has been developed to 
recognize such self-juridifying mechanisms in other social spheres. Contra any ‘crude’ 
reduction to simple association with market supremacy,37 such self-juridification is now 
commonly attributed to the emergence of other areas of global law, such as lex digitalis,38 lex 
constructionis,39 lex sportiva,40 and countless other areas such as transnational copyright law, 
medical patent protection, transnational criminal law, international financial regulation and 
transnational cybercrime.41 Moreover, the coupling of law with a plurality of incompatible 
rationalities is considered to be only a good thing; much like Habermas’ discourse theory of 
law, and Ladeur’s theory of ‘post-modern’ law,  such a ceaseless ‘contextualization’ and 
‘relativization’ of law is seen as opening ‘possibilities for productive confrontations between 
discourses.’42 
Despite the wide range of norms that would obviously find legalization in the 
constellation of various specialized technical regimes of global society, there is no basis of a 
normative hierarchy supporting the peremptory status of norms under such a polycentric 
model where the binding decision is replaced by a ‘sequence of decisions within a variety of 
                                                          
33 Hart (1997). 
34 Fischer-Lescano and Teubner (2004a).  
35 For an opposing view, see Michaels (2007), who after considering empirical evidence, concludes that ‘lex 
mercatoria is not a self-sufficient legal system.’ (458); See also, Shultz (2008). 
36 Teubner (1997), 12. This refers to the systems theoretical concept of the foundational paradox of functional 
systems which must be externalised and invisiblized through the use of distinctions (Luhmann 2013a). In order 
to not be disabled by such a paradox, it must externalized or made invisible to the functional system. See below, 
section 4.2, n. 89. 
37 Calliess and Zumbansen (2010), 6.  
38 See, for example Calliess (2002, 188), who defines this as ‘a third-level autonomous legal system beyond 
municipal and public international law, created and developed by the law-making forces of an emerging global 
civil society, founded on general principles of law as well as societal usages, administered by private dispute 
resolution service providers, and codified (if at all) by private norm formulating agencies.’ 
39 Perez (2004); Fischer-Lescano and Teubner (2004a), 1034. 
40 Teubner (2015), 6. 
41 Fischer-Lescano and Teubner (2004a), 1034; see also, Calliess and Zumbansen (2010).  
42 Teubner (1997b), 160. Others who also consider such ‘relativization’ and ‘contextualization’ of law as 
productive, see it nonetheless as leading to something of an ‘ironic turn’ for reflexive law, in that law potentially 
comes to be seen as just another, albeit highly particular, form of communication, see Zumbansen (2009). 
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observational positions in a network’.43 Nevertheless, together with Andreas Fischer-
Lescano, Teubner has developed an intriguing concept of how normative expectations of the 
peremptory status of norms may indirectly gain legalization under their model of law. Careful 
to avoid the two extreme positions of natural law based on established hierarchy of 
peremptory norms on the one hand and the ‘hijacking’ of human rights by the logics of the 
decentralised closed regimes on the other, Teubner and Fischer-Lescano instead stress a 
certain ‘network logic’ and the ‘indirect effect’ of norms reflecting a ‘common validity core’ 
in their theoretical model.44 Of course any subordination of the self-contained legal regimes 
to a common validity core is fundamentally at odds with the dynamics of functional 
differentiation,45 but Teubner and Fischer-Lescano are able to circumvent this by maintaining 
that ‘the autonomous and decentralized reflections of networks nodes’—which as part of a 
network seek compatibility with other nodes—can build on the ‘assumption of common 
reference points’ to the peremptory norm.46  Thus, each functionally differentiated regime is 
able to construe the peremptory norms of general society through their own reflexive 
mechanisms. This is ‘nothing but an operative fiction’ they admit, but by building on such a 
fiction each regime is seen to potentially orient their own rule-making to the ‘abstract, 
seemingly common philosophical horizon’.47 According to Teubner and Fischer-Lescano 
there is no need to, in fact, harmonize the reference points. Rather, all that is required is some 
‘prompting’ of the ‘regime-internal self-organization so the different regimes can establish 
their own grammars for their version of a global ius non dispositivum.’48 This prompting role, 
they imagine, can be taken up by a range of processes, including the ‘scandalizing of sectors 
of public opinion’, ‘pressure from international politics’, or ‘co-operation between 
autonomous regimes’.49  
This must be seen to represent the first bold step in the ‘normative turn’ in Teubner’s 
system theory of law. Such illusory integration may not achieve the aspirations of a 
normative hierarchy expressed by international lawyers,50 but considering the problems that 
international law has faced in establishing peremptory norms—which will be explored in the 
fifth chapter—the concept of functional regimes constructing ‘common’ peremptory norms 
                                                          
43 Fischer-Lescano and Teubner (2004a), 1018. 
44 Ibid., 1033. 
45 Indeed why Teubner and Fischer-Lescano should strive at all to reconcile their model of law with the 
concept of peremptory norms is in itself interesting, see Paulus (2004).  
46 Fischer-Lescano and Teubner (2004a), 1033. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 1034. 
49 Ibid. 
50 See for example Orakhelashvili (2008), or Tomuschat (1999). 
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represents a real attempt at securing the ‘intra-regime responsiveness to the immediate human 
and natural environment’ from a disciplinary apparatus which had hitherto considered such 
ecological awareness impossible.51  
Systems theory’s so called ‘normative turn’, however, only really hit its stride in 
Teubner’s concept of societal constitutionalism developed in more recent years.  Teubner’s 
thesis in this respect, briefly stated, is that in contrast to notions of a constitution emerging 
suddenly in ‘the representative institutions of international politics’ or as ‘a unitary global 
constitution overlying all areas of society’, the constitution of world society is ‘emerging 
incrementally in the constitutionalisation of a multiplicity of autonomous subsystems’.52 In 
this respect, Teubner points to the secondary rules of self-contained legal regimes as 
constitutionalizing themselves when they juridify norms of a ‘quality’ that are parallel to 
those of traditional political constitutions.53 This ‘quality’, moreover, does not depend on 
political institutions which have evolved within the framework of the nation-state,54 but 
rather depends on them being of both a ‘constitutive’ and ‘limitative’ nature.55 Such norms 
are ‘constitutive’ when they promote inclusion within the relevant social sphere; they are 
‘limitative’ when they forestall the crowding out effects and prevent the expansionist 
tendencies of the functional systems ‘tipping into destructiveness’.56  
The potential ‘tip into destructiveness’ of functional systems is seized upon by Teubner 
as a pivot point for a trajectory into the constitutionalization of world society. In fact, 
experience of the ‘dark side’ of functional differentiation is seen as ‘almost an essential 
condition of the transformation of the inner constitution’ of social systems.57 ‘Drawing a 
bow’, as he puts it, from the self-harming growth compulsions of social systems,58 Teubner 
presents the point where the catastrophic effects of functional differentiation are directly 
immanent as a ‘constitutional moment’ which induces the system to a ‘process of critical self-
reflection’.59 It is here that Teubner presents the opportunity for law to bring ‘external 
pressures’ to bear in such a way as to push the system into ‘self-limitation’.60 However, in 
recognition that it is only possible to develop limitations from within the offending system-
                                                          
51 Fischer-Lescano and Teubner (2004a), 1037.  
52 Teubner (2010a), 221. Emphasis added. 
53 Teubner (2012), 74. 
54 Although, somewhat problematically, they are ‘highly political’ (Teubner, 2011d, 248), and rely, to some 
degree, on ‘instruments of state power’ (ibid., 250). 
55 See also Fischer-Lescano (2007), 17.  
56 Teubner (2012), 79.  
57 Teubner (2011e), 10. 
58 Ibid.  
59 Teubner (2012), 75.  
60 Ibid., 84.  
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specific logics,61 it is not the law per se or any other external social process which enables 
such self-reflection in the immediate risk of crisis, but rather the coupling of the ‘medial 
reflexivity’ of law with the ‘medial reflexivity’ of the focal social system itself.62 This 
‘double reflexivity’63 is the key to Teubner’s societal constitutionalism. It can be seen as a 
‘structural coupling between “societal law” and “societal politics”’.64   
Of course this, in itself, will not temper the destructive tendencies of functional 
systems; reflexive law’s ‘sensitivity to context’65 may allow for the constitutional code of the 
focal social sphere to take precedence, while still remaining geared towards an expansionist 
‘tip into destructiveness’. But the ‘normative pulse’ of this model lies within the proposed 
‘hybrid reflexivity’ of subsystems.66 In this respect, Teubner presents a ‘hybrid binary meta-
code’ as emerging, which ‘takes precedence not only over the legal code, but also the code of 
the function system concerned.’67 As such, it provides an additional level of reflection 
through which it sensitizes the reflexivity of the focal social system to ‘public 
responsibility’.68  
This represents a considerable departure from the pessimism of Luhmann’s original 
hypothesis about law in global society. With it, the systems theoretical account of law in 
world society can now be said to reflect ‘profoundly normative expectations’.69 From here 
Teubner even considers it ‘completely plausible’ for fundamental rights now to be 
incorporated into the systems theoretical concept of law at the global level.70 Whereas before, 
he had been careful about posing any ‘worldwide validity, higher right, and constitutional 
                                                          
61 Teubner (2011e), 18.  
62 Teubner (2012), 104.  
63 Ibid.,105. In this respect, Teubner develops Luhmann’s concept of the structural coupling of the legal and 
political systems as a means of externalizing the foundational paradoxes of both, and of channelling 
environmental irritations into the respective systems (Luhmann, 2004). Under Teubner’s societal 
constitutionalism, however, the emerging transnational regime law deals with the problem by externalizing its 
paradox to the authority of the focal social system, while the focal social system externalizes its paradox to the 
evolved legal regime. This has led to ‘four remarkable phenomena’: a proliferation of judge made law, a 
resurgence of natural law, a change of direction for protest movements, and the differing status of emerging 
constitutions, see Teubner (2015). 
64 Guski (2013), 526. Although Teubner’s ‘societal politics’ here (which might be described as the reflexive 
capacity of the functional regime to regulate its first-order operations through second-order observation) is not 
political enough for some. Kjaer sees Teubner’s concept as excessively focused on the legal at the exclusion of 
the societal political dimension. For Kjaer constitutions do not occur between law and any given system, but 
only when law can be structurally coupled to regulatory structures which possess a ‘distinct political quality’ 
(Kjaer, 2011b, 310), which he sees as only being present in his stringent concept of ‘formal organisation’ (Kjaer, 
2014, 112, 137ff).  
65 Calliess and Zumbansen (2010), 5.  
66 Christodoulidis (2013), 655. 
67 Teubner (2012), 110. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Priban (2012), 453.  
70 Teubner (2012), 124.  
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rank of universal human rights’71 as being within the reach of a necessarily fragmented global 
law,72 Teubner now considers the alternative of leaving them to the ‘contingencies’ of 
international law ‘hard-to-swallow’, and sees their claim to universality now demanding 
instead ‘worldwide legal validity’.73  
For this reason Teubner views it necessary to look to the potential located within the 
self-contained regimes of global society. He emphasizes that it is only the ‘decision practice 
of transnational regimes themselves that enacts fundamental rights within their borders.’74  
As an example of such ‘social positivization’ of fundamental rights in global society, Teubner 
points to how the World Trade Organisation (WTO) may draw upon social norms in such a 
way as to ‘positivize standards of fundamental rights that are valid within the WTO’.75  The 
same thing, he argues, can be said in respect of private arbitral tribunals within the 
International Chamber of Commerce, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
(ICSID) or the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). But what is 
important to note here is that it is the special regimes themselves which are seen as making 
the ‘validity decision’ on the norm when their arbitral tribunals select them as standards of 
fundamental rights in their individual rulings and their specification of which fundamental 
rights are binding within the particular regime.76 
As to the question of whether fundamental rights apply also to private actors, Teubner 
postulates that we should ‘consider the concept of generalisation and respecification’.77 The 
first step involves generalization of fundamental rights beyond the nation-sate context to 
consider their ‘overall social significance’. This draws upon concepts which presented the 
function of fundamental rights in relationship to the medium of power, that is, specifically in 
relation to the political;78 as Thornhill puts it, the semantic fusion of sovereignty and rights 
contributed to the emergence of the modern nation-state, by allowing ‘the state to consolidate 
a distinct sphere of political power and employ the political power as an abstracted and 
inclusive resource’, while at the same time allowing it ‘restrictively to preserve and to 
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delineate a functional realm of political power’.79 Teubner develops this concept, however, 
by abstracting this dual role of fundamental rights beyond the political system to apply it to 
all functional systems in society, to ensure the ‘overall population in the function systems of 
world society and exclusion of individual and institutional areas of autonomy from these 
function systems.’80 In this sense fundamental rights are said to guarantee, on the one hand, 
the ‘inclusion of the overall population within the relevant social sphere’ and, in this way, 
contribute to the constitutive function of civil constitutions ‘when they support 
autonomisation of social-sub areas.’81 On the other hand, fundamental rights are also 
involved in the limitative function of social constitutions, giving individuals and institutions 
outside the constituting social sphere guarantees of autonomy against its expansionist 
tendencies.82  
If the first step, then, is about conceiving fundamental rights beyond the context of the 
nation-state, the second step (respecification) is about the question as to what is appropriate 
to the receiving field at the global level. This is not simply a case of adapting state articulated 
fundamental rights to the particular qualities of private law—that, he admits, would be too 
specific. Instead respecification, according to Teubner, means that fundamental rights ‘must 
be readjusted to the rationality and normativity of different sub-areas.’83 Essentially this 
means that fundamental rights must take the form used to communicate within the formal 
organization of those respective media. Thus, it is important to note that rather than ‘falsely 
homogenizing fundamental rights in state and society’, what is being advocated here is the 
‘indirect effect’ of fundamental rights, that is they are only operationalized through a 
‘context-specific transformation’ within the specific regime.84 
According to Teubner it is only when coming to consider the inclusionary effect of 
fundamental rights, however, that ‘it becomes clear what it means to orient the generalization 
and respecification of fundamental political rights towards function system-specific media 
instead of abstract values.’85 Here, for example, the political right to vote and rights of an 
active civic nature which permit the entire population access to the political power medium 
can be generalized in such a way ‘that access to communication media in all function systems 
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are not only permitted, but actually guaranteed by means of fundamental rights.’86 That, of 
course, cannot be implemented in its generality, as some kind of political right of access to 
society, but is rather a ‘task of a careful respecification to formulate the function system 
specific conditions in order to permit access to diverse social institutions.’87 What is 
envisaged here is a neat downloading or funnelling of the general norm into the specific 
logics of the functional regime, without filtering off its legitimating character. Where this is 
achieved, Teubner speculates, ‘such fundamental rights of inclusion might also act as a 
trigger for greater socio-political aspirations.’88 
While the inclusionary effect of fundamental rights is still seen to be at a rudimentary 
stage of development, the protective, exclusionary effect is seen to be ‘considerably further 
advanced’.89 Here, such rights set boundaries to totalizing tendencies of function systems. 
Politics is an obvious offender in this respect, but for Teubner social problems in a 
functionally differentiated society cannot be limited to the relation between the nation-state 
and the individual, political institutions in general, or even the more diffuse conceptions of 
power in a Foucauldian sense. Since all function systems are prone to expansionist 
tendencies, the ‘fragmentation of society is today central to fundamental rights as protective 
rights.’90 As the violations of fundamental rights stem from functional differentiation and the 
totalizing tendencies of function systems, Teubner argues that there is no longer any point in 
approaching their horizontal effect as an issue of balancing the private rights of actors. The 
issue of human rights, he argues, should be seen as the ‘endangerment of individuals integrity 
of body and mind by a multiplicity of anonymous, autonomized, and today globalized 
communicative processes.’91   
The above elements can be said to represent the main features of the ‘normative turn’ in 
Teubner’s systems theory of law. It constitutes a formidable attempt to thoroughly engage the 
destructive tendencies of functional differentiation, and the risks such developments pose to 
society and the natural environment. The sophisticated architecture of Teubner’s theory in 
engaging these pressing problems, together with the clarity with which it is often presented 
has, as noted, received considerable recognition for its potential advance in light of the 
difficulties faced for legalization at the global level. But the institutionalization of Teubner’s 
theory is now such that it is difficult to get a clear picture of the limits of this model of 
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legalization. Teubner is not exactly clear where those might lie, and the incremental and 
aggregative nature of the social positivization of norms creates something of a presumption 
of a justice ‘to come’. This places a certain onus on the researcher who wishes to address the 
issue of norms which cannot be accommodated within such a model of law to turn this 
presumption itself into a problem. It is in this regard that the thesis turns to critique of 
Teubner’s model of law. 
 
2.3  Some problems with global law beyond the state 
 
There is certainly legitimacy to the argument that ‘our analytical lens ought not to be how the 
law performs in the context of globalization, but in how we theorize the relation between law 
and society.’92 The opportunities and challenges that globalization has resulted in for society 
will not be met if one simply resigns to the demise of law, and thus limit one’s focus, for 
example, to social norms and power relations at the global level. However, this should not be 
a bar to re-problematizing established legal institutions and considering alternative solutions, 
for this will only generate further insights into the relation between law and society. Thus, the 
current section considers some criticisms that have been made of Teubner’s theory of global 
law in order to get a more solid idea of where the limits of the social positivization of norms 
under this model of law lie, and thus to construct the problem of general norms that cannot be 
accommodated in law. The section first presents the common criticism that Teubner’s 
concept of global law ignores the continued centrality of the nation-state to the positivization 
of many norms that arise at the global level, before linking this to a systems theoretical 
critique about the likelihood of the mechanisms of ‘reflexive hyrbridity’ being able to achieve 
the ecological awareness that is essential to the legalization of fundamental rights under 
Teubner’s model of law.  
The more common criticism levelled at Teubner’s concept of law and societal 
constitututionalism is that it fails to sufficiently articulate the significance of the nation-state 
at the global level, and that consequently it comes to rely on it without recognizing that it is 
doing so. Thornhill, for example, notes that, although Teubner presents a sophisticated theory 
of how societal constitutionalism emerges on the basis of functional differentiation and the 
potential risks thereof, he fails to consider the ways in which political power within the 
nation-state and the international system has also evolved as a result of functional 
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differentiation, and the way in which both transnational law and the trajectory of the nation-
state are deeply intertwined as a result.93 Thus, according to Thornhill, Teubner makes ‘no 
conceptual attempt either to disarticulate power from the state, or to render meaningful the 
semantic relation between politics (that is, social exchanges having to do with power) and 
statehood’.94 Thus, it might be said that Teubner, in his ambition to identify the societal 
positivization of norms without reliance on statist mechanisms, conceptually marginalizes the 
role of the nation-state in transnational society. In this sense, although Teubner appears to 
have advanced the concept of the role of civil society in the development of transnational 
law, he effectively reproduces the old distinction between private and public, only to focus on 
one side of it.  
A consequence of this omission is the way in which it conceptually obscures 
juridification of issues which must rely on ‘standards which are general across domains.’95 
Thus, as Paulus points out, balancing between two opposing logics will not always be 
possible, and in those instances a ‘political’ choice will ultimately be required.96 For him, the 
‘legitimacy’ of a decision under those circumstances ‘can only come from a process which is 
considered legitimate by the international community at large’.97 Gert Verschraegen makes a 
similar observation in respect of human rights. For him the nation-state retains a ‘crucial, 
mediating role’ in respect of human rights, despite the functional differentiation of society. 
As the recent ‘migrant crisis’ in Europe only shows, ‘the old distinction of citizens and 
strangers remains of critical importance’.98 And this relates not only to constructing borders 
to keep strangers out, but also to the privilege it accord governing bodies within those 
borders. Thus the juridification and constitutionalization of specialized regimes of world 
society will not be able to protect the rights of those ‘unfortunate’ individuals who remain the 
‘captives’ of weak or failed nation-states as Verschraegen says.99 Rather, the protection of the 
fundamental rights of those individuals continues to rely either on ‘domestic (and 
increasingly regional) regimes’100 in terms of ensuring the transnationally constructed rights 
of their citizens, or on a coalition of domestic regimes willing to intervene within the borders 
of another to enforce those rights.  
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Further problems with Teubner’s concept of law can be identified from a more direct 
systems theoretical perspective. Foremost, in this respect, is questioning the ‘medial 
reflexivity’ which is held up as the ‘decisive criterion’ of Teubner’s concept of societal 
constitutionalism.101 Luhmann called this ‘processual self-reference’, or simply ‘reflexivity’, 
and stated that the basic form of this mechanism is ‘always selection of selection’.102 The 
primary advantages of such is that it allows communication processes to acquire ‘a greater 
degree of freedom’, ‘a greater range of application’, ‘a growth of selection achievement’, 
‘better capacity to adapt’,103 and even ‘enables processes to guide and control themselves.’104 
One can see this in every day communication, from simply asking someone to clarify a 
communication term (e.g.,‘What do you mean when you say ‘functional differentiation’?), or 
in a more advanced setting, for example, in the way emergency room doctors establish a way 
of talking to each other to increase the conditions they can address and the actions they can 
take.105   
Teubner aims to capitalize on this social dynamic towards a greater range of application 
through the mechanism of hybrid reflexivity, i.e., not just the reflexivity of the social system 
itself, but the ‘double reflexivity’ that comes about when processual self-reference is applied 
in this way to another form of processual self-reference. However, it must not be forgotten 
that the establishment of such reflexive mechanisms always requires ‘a certain protection 
against interference from other types of processes’, and can be guaranteed only by 
‘differentiation and specification of particular societal part systems in social reality’,106 and 
with this the inevitable condensation of self-referential selections of the system. Thus, it not 
only leads to a greater range of application, but may also result in the greater indifference of 
the system to its environment. It thus might be questioned whether the system can maintain 
its own reflexivity in hybridity with another reflexive system in its environment.  
Writing about ‘reflexivity’ in 1984, Luhmann left open the question as to the effect of 
frequent reflexivity on the ‘manner and the clarity with which participants experience 
themselves as persons.’107 However, as far as it can be seen, Luhmann’s answer in this 
respect would not admit to the kind of ecological awareness that Teubner’s theory of societal 
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constitutionalism relies on.108 Thus, in his final major work, Die Gesellschaft der 
Gesellschaft, he says: ‘systems theory must abandon the cherished idea of inferring the 
adaptation of the system to the environment from the causal relations between the system and 
the environment. … As far as I can see the overall effect is not adaptation, but greater 
deviation.’109 Thus, the ‘adaptation’ Luhmann admitted to previously in his analysis of 
processual self-reference may be said to be purely adaptation of the system to the complexity 
of the environment, and not the type of adaptation as an external influence compelling 
‘learning adaptation’ in the system on which Teubner relies in his theory of societal 
constitutionalism.110 In other words, according to a strict Luhmannian analysis, Teubner’s 
hybrid reflexivity is more likely to result in systemic deviation from ecological concerns 
rather than any real line of defence against the destructive tendencies of functional 
systems.111  
To an extent such a conclusion is also reflected in the ‘internal critique’ of Teubner’s 
theory made by Emilios Christodoulidis.112 His concern might be said to be more about the 
legitimacy of the ‘politics’ that is implied in Teubner’s concept of societal constitutionalism, 
but in making his points in this direction he underlines many of the potential limits of 
Teubner’s model of law with respect to the potential juridification of norms generated beyond 
the more narrow confines of the self-contained regime. Chrsitodoulidis does not see the 
catastrophic consequences of functional differentiation as being so contingent, nor does he 
have as much faith in the ‘hollowed out’ constitutionalism imagined by Teubner being able to 
address the risks that it is called upon to respond to.113 Directly questioning the quietly 
presumed capacity of such an ‘incremental, aggregative and fragmentary’ model of 
positivization, Christodoulidis worries that the ‘hallmark’ constitutional qualities we have 
come to expect may always come ‘too late’ under such a model.114 For him, the problem 
starts even with the idea of a constitutional moment. How do we know when it is reached, he 
asks. Where will it register? History, as he notes, is littered with instances of social 
devastation, where not only did constitutional moments fail to register, but, in some cases, 
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where there is ‘not even a trace of the language that the vanquished used to describe the loss 
of their worlds.’115 
Christodoulidis is sceptical, also, of the concept of a ‘reflexive equilibrium’ of 
constitutive rules as a means of keeping the ‘imperialistic tendencies’ of partial rationalities 
in check through ‘limitative’ considerations of their proper boundaries and spheres.116 How 
likely, he asks, is that the different constitutive and the limitative logics will balance and be 
commensurate? After all, the respective rationalities, as he points out, operate at different 
levels: one ‘sub-systemic’, while the other at a more primary social level.117 The real problem 
as Christodoulidis sees it is that, in the delicate balance struck by Teubner between the 
specific and the general, the general is always more likely to be re-oriented and over-
determined by the specific in practice.118 This is construed as always potentially ‘short-
circuiting back to the operational requirements of the system to the detriment of the system’s 
performance’, and one might add ‘function’, in world society.119  
Yet, it is in the context of the proposed generalization and respecification of 
fundamental rights that is perceived as being particularly problematic. Generalizations, as 
Christodoulidis points out, are ‘as much selective suppressions as they are selective 
actualizations.’120 This is inherent to a theory of self-reproducing systems. Thus, the danger is 
that what is selected from the environment as the ‘general’ may be actualized within the 
system in such a way as to be ‘overdetermined in the direction—and by the requirements—of 
its respecification.’121 Obviously if this is the case, ‘it might not always be constitutionalism’s 
most cherished achievements that survive the transplantation to the global level.’122 This, 
Teubner might say, depends on what one means by ‘constitutionalism’, but he does clearly 
relate constitutional norms to fundamental rights and global public interest, and 
Christodoulidis has a point when he says that it may be impossible to negotiate the tension 
between what is generalized as constitutional and what is appropriate to the specific field in 
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this respect. There will inevitably be an asymmetry here, and with that, a likely ‘collapse into 
the ‘re-specification’ pole of what is ‘appropriate to the receiving field’’.123 
One might expect that such a ‘collapse into the respecification pole of what is 
appropriate to the receiving field would limit the results in terms of ‘inclusionary’ and 
‘exclusionary’ fundamental rights norms. With regard to the former, Teubner states that it is 
the ‘task of careful respecification to formulate the function-system specific conditions in 
order to permit access to diverse social institutions.’124 He gives the examples of ‘essential 
services in the economic system’, ‘compulsory insurance in the health system’, and 
‘guaranteed access to the internet for the whole population’, as ‘cases where the third-party 
effect of fundamental rights would guarantee undistorted access to social institutions.’125 But, 
whether they do in fact is never explored in the text. Certainly it is not difficult to find 
empirical examples of contrary practice in this respect. In an ICSID case involving 
investment protection in a hybrid public-private dispute, for example, an annulment 
committee denied the importation of some European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence 
upholding shareholders rights of access: ‘The extent of the protections afforded by an 
investment protection treaty,’ the committee said, ‘depends in each case on the specific terms 
of the treaty in question’. 126 In this respect it found comparisons with differently worded 
treaties ‘outside the field of investment protection’ to be of ‘limited utility’.127 Even the one 
example Teubner highlights as ‘an informative example of a right to inclusion’128—‘internet 
neutrality’—is problematic in this respect. For example, one could note the conclusions of a 
recent report commissioned by the Council of Europe on ‘ICANN’s policy and procedure in 
light of human rights’ which concluded that ICANN’s current standards ‘do not fully comply 
with the right to freedom of expression’; that ‘it is desirable that the people-centeredness of 
ICANN’s policy development is further improved’; that a ‘balance must be struck between 
economic interests and other objectives of common interest’ and: that ‘the historically grown 
establishment of ICANN as a private corporation under Californian law may not be a 
sustainable solution for systematically taking into account human rights law.’129 
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Problems in this regard are even more prominent in respect to Teubner’s third imagined 
area of fundamental rights: the guaranteed undistorted access to social institutions in relation 
to ‘essential services in the economic system’.130 Nonetheless, Teubner seems to place his 
hopes more in the horizontal effect of fundamental rights and in their protective function as 
being ‘considerably further advanced’ than the rudimentary stage of development of rights of 
inclusion into the diverse social spheres of global society.131 In particular Teubner holds up as 
exemplary, in this respect, increasing judicial recognition of actions against multi-national 
corporations for violations of fundamental rights. However, this might still be said to be a 
matter of interpretation. The evidence Teubner cites in support of his claims are ambivalent 
in this regard,132 and for many privatization still ‘highlights the possible dangers of decreased 
respect for human rights.’133 This is an area where ‘exaggerated legal claims and conceptual 
ambiguities’ are known to have caused confusion and doubt amongst many lawyers.134 In 
relation to the international investment arbitration, for example, others maintain that 
‘investment tribunals remain relatively reluctant to engage in human rights arguments 
brought by one of the parties, despite the sometimes obvious relevance of human rights 
issues’.135 Teubner’s reference to the World Trade Organization (WTO) as ‘one well-known 
example of constitutional emancipation’ is one which Christodoulidis takes issue with in 
particular. Such ‘emancipation’, Christodoulidis argues, ‘entails the progressive dismantling 
of labor protection as an unavoidable effect of the global organization of trade that 
circumvents any possible municipal safeguards.’136 A key moment of this ‘emancipation’, he 
points out, was when, at the Singapore summit of 1998, the WTO ‘washed its hands of any 
involvement in labor disputes’, and thus relieved itself of ‘the regulation of international trade 
of its effect on the world’s producers.’137 
Finally, Teubner and Fischer-Lescano’s scheme for bolstering jus non dispositivisum in 
a functionally differentiated global society can also be construed as being susceptible to the 
collapse into the logics of the receiving field. How likely is it in practice that the differing 
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versions of ordre public constructed within the separate regimes as network nodes will 
‘gradually move closer together’ through the illusion of a common reference point? It is 
difficult in this respect to overlook the fact that some regimes are more powerful than others. 
Jaye Ellis, for example, in addressing the issue of sustainable development law, points to the 
dearth of institutional environmental or human rights equivalents to the WTO.138 Any 
environmental ruling by the WTO, as she says, ‘would have an impact that environment and 
human rights regimes would find difficult to match.’139 Ellis argues that Teubner and Fischer-
Lescano’s network model is not likely to be effective in achieving ‘global public interests’.140 
Instead, as she sees it, we would more likely be presented with a ‘network in which one 
group of nodes—those devoted to trade and finance—vastly outweighed others in terms of 
influence and impact.’141 According to Ellis there is even a danger that Fischer-Lescano and 
Teubner’s strategy of realizing peremptory norms ‘might actually make regimes like the 
WTO more powerful and exacerbate the disequilibrium among environment, society and 
economy.’142 This can be presented as a more specific expression of Christodoulidis’ systems 
theoretical concern for the tension between generalization and respecification collapsing into 
the logics of the receiving field, and of the ‘system surging along the trajectory of its self-
reproduction.’143 Ultimately, it is difficult to see how Teubner and Fischer-Lescano’s network 
model of the indirect effect of peremptory norms by delineated regimes orienting themselves 
to the ‘fiction of a common reference point’ amounts to anything other than an example of 
the kind of simple ‘transitional semantics’ that Teubner criticizes in attempts to expand 
nation-state rights fundamental standards to the global level.144  
This section has endeavoured to show that, despite the very real advances made by 
Teubner in the conception of law beyond the nation-state, there will likely be a certain class 
of norms arising at the global level which will not find realization with that model of law. 
Exactly which norms are unlikely to find accommodation in that model of law has not been 
stated with any precision. However, the possibilities have been limited in two respects. First, 
there are those norms which can only be established through communicative reference to the 
nation-state. As demonstrated, Teubner’s model of law ignores the continued and 
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fundamental role of the nation-state in globalized society,145 and therefore makes little 
provision for those norms which seemingly rely upon some prospect of state action for their 
realization.  Secondly, it can be said that the degree to which Teubner’s model relies on the 
specialized reflexive mechanisms of highly differentiated social spheres is unlikely to 
accommodate the full range of norms which are formulated at a much more general level and 
which are, in reflection, of a much more generalized character. 
The construction of the problem of such norms and insight into further possibilities is 
not only achieved by problematizing this model of law in a substantive sense, however, but 
also through analysis of the methodology which has led to this approach. The next section 
will address how Teubner and others have made a series of turns away from the perspective 
from which one can gain an insight into the problem of general norms.  
 
2.4  A series of ‘turns’ away from the function of law and norms 
 
It may strike the reader as odd to assert at this point that the way Teubner has developed the 
systems theoretical account of law has effectively led to a pronounced focus on the law’s 
coding to the exclusion of any focus on the function of law and norms. Admittedly, section 
2.2 did detail the way in which Teubner has consistently engaged the dark side of functional 
differentiation as a threat to society itself, and presented the very real advances he has made 
in developing a robust concept of law beyond the nation-state, capable let’s say, to some 
degree at least, of mitigating such a threat. The point is, however, that this is not about the 
function of law. That is, it is not about law in relation to society as the larger social system.146 
Instead it is about the performance of law as the orientation of law towards other subsystems 
and, even more so, about reflexion as the orientation of functional subsystems to 
themselves—not only law’s reflexive orientation, but the reflexive orientation of other 
functional systems that law structurally corresponds to under this model of law.  
This is not another critique along the lines of ‘[r]eflexive law can only be self-reflexive 
law’, and therefore can only observe its environment through its own self-reference.147 
Hopefully enough was already said in the last section to underline this difficulty as it might 
relate to the problem of general norms. Rather than critiquing Teubner’s development of the 
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systems theoretical concept of global law on such a substantive basis this section merely aims 
to draw attention to the way in which Teubner and others have made a series of turns away 
from the function of law to focus more on code, and that this has precluded the kind of 
perspective of the problem of general norms that one would need for the present study. 
 First there was the ‘reflexive turn’. Before the concept of social autopoiesis had taken 
hold, Luhmann was developing a more open systems approach which very carefully 
presented the function of law as the congruent generalization of normative behavioural 
expectations148 (this will be examine further below). Teubner never had much use for it.149 
Instead he started out more with the ‘goal to transcend controversies between functionalism 
and critical theory’, and with a concept of ‘reflexive law’ that drew on Nonet and Selznick’s 
‘responsive law’ and Habermas’ ‘discursive rationality’.150 In this Teubner explicitly 
addresses Luhmann’s tripartite schema of system orientations (function, performance and 
reflection) and argues that an incompatible tension between function and performance results 
from the fact that the ‘production of congruent normative generalizations may not suffice to 
provide rules that are well suited to resolve concrete conflicts’, and because the legal system, 
‘through processes of conflict resolution, may produce norms which cannot be congruently 
generalized.’151 Teubner argues that it is the task of legal reflexion to reconcile these 
‘inherent tensions between function and performance’,152 and that law can ‘best do this by 
imposing restrictions on the legal performance dimension’.153 That is, rather than trying to 
establish comprehensive regulation through a central legal system, the performance of law 
should be restricted to ‘more indirect, more abstract forms of social control.’154 But what is 
seen as ‘crucial’ to this achievement is ‘the structural correspondence between legal norms 
and the opportunity structure within societal subsystems.’155 This essentially represents the 
crux of the reflexive law approach that developed in response to the exhaustion of the welfare 
state: law that is ‘reflexive of the many different societal rationalities, which the law was 
charged to “translate” or “reformulate” into its own language, using the legal code.’156 
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There is no doubt that such a concept of reflexive law has been very important for the 
development of law in response to the increasing complexity of society and the apparent 
deficiencies of centralized juridification, and that it was even a logical step for lawyers who 
wished to develop law at the global level where traditional centralized mechanisms of law-
making were lacking anyway. However, the development of reflexive law quite deliberately 
pushed function—as a more comprehensive orientation of law to the general social system—
into the background. As stated, Teubner viewed the functional orientation of law to congruent 
normative generalizations as adding little to the resolution of conflicts in polycontextual 
modern society. Unfortunately, the function of law was even equated to some degree with a 
problematic reliance on a ‘central, elevated place of sovereignty in terms of power and 
knowledge’157. As Teubner puts it, the ‘reflexive orientation does not ask whether there are 
social problems to which law must be responsive’, but rather ‘seeks to identify opportunity 
structures that allow legal regulation to cope with social problems without, at the same time, 
irreversibly destroying valued patterns of social life.’158 There is a perceived need in this 
respect to move away from orientation to the general so that law can develop the ‘very 
particular’ relationships with other functional social spheres, and provide responses to the 
‘specific context’ in which problems arise.159 And this entails a decided shift of focus away 
from orientation to the system of society and towards orientation of functional subsystems to 
themselves: reflexive law is about aiding other social systems in achieving ‘self-organization 
and self-regulation’, about fostering mechanisms that ‘further the development of reflexion 
structures within other social subsystems’.160 
These developments were compounded through the ‘autopoietic turn’. In many respects 
Teubner’s theory of reflexive law was primed for conjunction with the theory of social 
autopoiesis. Teubner had drawn on Habermas’ theory of communicative action to conceive of 
reflexive law as faciliting ‘communicative processes by guaranteeing the “external 
constitution” of the communicatively structured social sphere’,161 and in suggesting general 
social communication as an ‘epistemic minimum in modern society that serves as a common 
base for autonomization of social discourses’ to ensure law’s structural correspondence with 
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other social systems.162 Once the theory of social autopoiesis emerged and the basic social 
element came to be seen as the communicative event—i.e., when the focus shifted from 
structure to process—then the opportunity really presented itself to ‘transcend controversies 
between functionalism and critical theory’.163 
By the mid-1980s Luhmann was also shifting his focus away from structure to process. 
With the autopoietic turn Luhmann came to recognize that functional specification alone 
would be insufficient to secure the differentiation of the functional subsystem. The 
temporalization introduced by the concept of social autopoiesis meant differentiation required 
a recursive closure that could only be achieved through the network of the system’s 
operations.164 For law this meant that the function of congruent generalization of normative 
expectations would no longer suffice for closing the legal system, and that this instead would 
only be achieved by the binary coding of legal/illegal, as an internal structure, established on 
the reflexive mechanisms of the legal system and allowing for recursive connection of system 
operations.165 Despite this shift in focus from structure to process, however, Luhmann did not 
altogether jettison concern for the function of law and focus exclusively on the legal system’s 
reflexivity166—as will be demonstrated further in the next chapter.  
For Teubner, on the other hand, the shift in theoretical focus necessitated by the 
autopoietic turn is much more pronounced. Once the differentiation of the legal system came 
to be seen as depending on coding and not function, and that law could only effectively 
stabilize expectations through the distinction of legal and illegal, then the mandate was 
provided for an even more concerted focus on the reflexive mechanisms of the legal system 
which secured coding. The dominant perspective that came to be adopted is well summed up 
by Calliess’ description of the implications of the theoretical shift in focus from ‘the level of 
norms to the level of communication’: 
 
Suddenly things are very easy, for all law is positive law, i.e., valid by decision only. To 
form a legal system one basically needs three communications ….: (1) a claimant (ego), 
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(2) a defendant (alter), and (3) a court (alter ego, generalised other). These 
communicative acts constitute a legal system by using the code legal/illegal … There is 
no need for norms …Norms will just come naturally with the decisions … Norms as the 
structure of a legal system are thus produced by communication, as a by-product of 
processing legal acts.167 
 
Calliess’ reference to ‘norms’ here apparently means ‘legalized’ rather than ‘social’ norms. 
However, the statement that ‘there is no need for norms’ is also indicative of the exclusion of 
functional reference to norms under this perspective. Because law ‘only stabilizes 
behavioural expectations’ through a distinction of legal and non-legal,168 the emergence of 
the reflexive mechanisms of the legal system which enable legal coding come to be seen as 
most important, and everything else as secondary.  Ironically, even Teubner’s concept of a 
more graduated autopoiesis of the legal system reflects this. Whereas Luhmann’s ‘all or 
nothing’ approach to social autopoiesis169 may have imposed an abrupt distinction between 
law and society, it did present the autopoietic legal system as being just one (albeit 
significant) step away from general society. Teubner’s conceived stages of legal 
autonomization, on the other hand, placed a greater conceptual distance between the 
separation of generalized society and law as autopoiesis. While it did include at the lowest 
stage ‘social conflict’ this only escalates through stages of increasing self-reference until law 
achieves autopoiesis through the self-referential constitution of its elements in a ‘congruent 
manner’.170  And there is no doubt that Teubner’s interests lie in the focus on these latter 
stages of legal autonomization, where one is free to engage in the ‘dissolution of social and 
legal realties into discursivity.’171 
Finally, this shift of focus away from norm and function was consolidated with the 
‘linguistic turn’. In developing the concept of legal pluralism, Teubner argued that the 
‘inherently static, nondynamic, nonprocessual character’ of the structuralist focus on law’s 
reference to normative expectations was unsuitable for delineating law in a complex society 
and unsuitable for providing criteria for legal pluralism.172 Thus Teubner suggested a 
‘linguistic turn’ which he read as common to legal autopoiesis and postmodern 
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jurisprudence.173 The ‘decisive move’ here is presented as one ‘from structure to process, 
from norm to action, from unity to difference and, most important for the legal proprium, 
from function to code.’174  
Teubner relies on this linguistic turn to develop legal pluralism. It is seen as bringing 
forth the ‘dynamic processual character’ of legal pluralism and allowing for the clearer 
delineation of law from non-law in the complex social environment.175 Once the linguistic 
turn is taken, then legal pluralism is ‘no longer defined as a conflicting set of social norms in 
a given field, but as a multiplicity of diverse communicative processes that observe social 
action under the binary code of legal/illegal.’176 This would later prove useful of course in 
addressing the problem of the ‘inchoate forms of global law’,177 where it provided the basis 
of a ‘global living law’ that, in distinction to Ehrlich’s concept, ‘does not draw its strength 
from the law of ethnic communities’ or ‘the life-world of globalized and functional 
networks’, but is founded on ‘the proto-law of specialized organizational and functional 
networks which are forming a global, but sharply limited, identity.’178 Once again it is seen as 
necessary that the ‘core concepts of the classical sociology of law’ be obscured to the 
‘background’, and that the focus shifts from ‘structure to process’, ‘norm to action’, ‘function 
to code’.179 Only this, it is argued, ‘brings forward the dynamic character of worldwide legal 
pluralism and delineates legal from other types of social action.’180  
These series of turns have been important in developing law in orientation to the 
complexities of functionally differentiated society. However, taking these successive turns 
has effectively obscured from any perspective on the problem of general norms taken up in 
this study. That problem can only be properly constructed from a functionalist perspective 
which focuses, not only on the function of law, but on the function of the norm in society. 
Before exploring that however, attention must be turned briefly to those systems theoretical 
accounts which have recently sought to address the function of global law, and to determine 
whether they, unlike Teubner, accommodate the problem of general norms.  
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2.5  The function of law in the multiple worlds of global society 
 
Despite the increasingly pronounced focus on coding and process, the function of law has not 
been altogether absent from systems theoretical accounts of law in world society. To begin 
with the distinction between normative and cognitive expectations which was instrumental to 
the development of Luhmann’s earlier functionalist account of law has proved, and continues 
to prove central to systems theoretical accounts of law in world society. Furthermore, there 
has recently been a more concerted effort to refocus on the issue of the function of law and to 
distinguish further the function of law at the global level. This section aims to show, 
however, that despite the continuing influence of Luhmann’s concept of the function of law 
in society, and the renewed attention on function of law at the global level, systems 
theoretical accounts of law in world society continue to focus on coding at the expense of 
function, or continue to concern themselves with the interior worlds of social subsystems 
rather than reference to the larger social system. In other words, none of these developments 
have really involved a return to the kind of elementary basis of the function of law in social 
interaction provided for in Luhmann’s earlier account, and thus, none have been able to 
include within their purview the problem of general norms with which this thesis is 
concerned. This section then will assess the development of systems theoretical 
understandings of the function of law in world society in respect of the issue of general 
norms.  
While Teubner made a decisive move away from structure to process, norm to action, 
function to code, etc., others have made more attempt to address the function of law in world 
society. Calliess and Renner, for example, ostensibly address the function of law in their 
critique of the economic approach to social norms. Following Luhmann, they state that in 
‘relation to society as a whole, “law fulfils only one function”: “the stabilization of normative 
expectations,” i.e., expectations that are upheld even in case of disappointment.’181 This 
serves their critique of Eric Posner’s view of law as a regulator of the behaviour of social 
actors. However, the focus on the systems theoretical account of function of law is short-lived 
and attention quickly turns to one of coding, albeit under the illusion (and this is important) 
that we are still talking about ‘function’. Thus, just as Teubner is quick to note that 
‘normative expectations alone cannot alone create law’, Calliess and Renner are quick to 
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move to the ‘process in which law decides which norms to protect’.182 From here, the focus 
shifts to the ‘second-order observation’ mechanisms and the ‘operative closure’ of the legal 
system as the ‘network of legal communications perpetually referencing to other legal 
communications’.183 That function ‘can only be fulfilled within the self-referential structures 
of a legal system’ seems to warrant the issue being subsumed under that of coding.184 Thus, 
the focus is on what it takes to fulfil and guarantee function, rather than the function of law 
itself. For Calliess and Renner the function of law is only ‘guaranteed through the self-
referentiality of legal communications’.185 Their specific contribution here is to point out how 
this necessarily involves the development of two ‘enabling conditions’.186 The first they 
define as the ‘verbalisation of conflicts’ allowing for ‘the communication of a social conflict 
in terms of legal/illegal and vis-à-vis a third party’.187 The second enabling condition, they 
argue, is to be found in ‘points of reference for the interlinkage and mutual reference of legal 
communications’.188 These enabling conditions are comparable to Luhmann’s concept of the 
social and material dimensions of the function of law. The selection mechanisms of law they 
envisage are arguably comparable to the temporal dimension of the function of law (which 
will be explored in the next chapter). However, Calliess and Renner never make the explicit 
connection here to the concrete concept of the function of law, nor do they seemed to be 
occupied by any kind of reference to the larger social system beyond countering Posner’s 
theory of the marginalization of law in society. Ultimately, their concern is with coding and 
the differentiation of the legal system through its reflexive mechanisms.189 
The compulsion to skip to the focus on issues of coding of global law can be seen as a 
result of anxiety about theorising how law can institutionalize the norms that emerge in 
society beyond the framework which has traditionally been relied upon within the territorial 
boundaries of the nation-state. In striving to determine whether law can ‘apply the distinction 
of legal/illegal without its embeddedness in the conventional institutional framework of the 
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nation-state’,190 systems theoretical lawyers are consumed with the problem of ‘deciding 
where to draw the line between legal and non-legal norms.191 Understandably, many are 
weary of falling into a trap of merely describing society and of neglecting the important 
questions of how law can evolve to answer many of the questions of world society. But, as 
such, there is a tendency to conflate function with code, and to ignore the more elementary 
social roots of law. 
There has of late, however, been recognition that the function of law in world society 
may be so problematic as to warrant more careful attention. The first moves in this direction 
were made by Marc Amstutz. Amstutz has sought to demonstrate that the function of law in 
world society cannot simply be treated as a functional equivalent to the traditional law of the 
nation-state.192 For him the assumption that the function of law in world society is to deal 
with the problem of the systemic stabilization of normative expectations is ‘highly 
problematical’193 and ‘must be abandoned’.194 Amstutz instead draws upon Luhmann’s 
concept of how the evolutionary primacy shifts from normative to cognitive mechanisms in 
world society195 to argue that ‘the primary functional reference of global law will be to 
expectations that are cognitive in nature.’196 This does not imply that normative expectations 
disappear entirely; one of the tasks of the legal system in intervening in the internal dispute of 
a social system is to lend the operative closure and self-referential structures that Calliess and 
Renner fixate on as a way of maintaining the counterfactual character of expectations within 
that social system. As Amstutz points out, however, whether or not the intervention succeeds 
will depend on the operations of the disrupted social system. That is, any established 
normative order in which counterfactual expectations can be secured is limited to the 
boundary of the social subsystem.  
This leads Amstutz to focus on another potential function that comes about in the way 
that law ‘alienates’ the dispute that emerges from the particular social system:  
 
The point has to be for the legal resolution of the conflict to sensitise the conflict-laden 
system to its ‘blind spots’, i.e., to support the system in recognising its misperceptions in its 
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observation of its own environment and in drawing conclusions from this selfsame 
recognition, in order to bring about conduct which is more appropriate to that very 
environment.197 
 
Amstutz views this as a way for law to intervene, for example, in the economy through 
mitigation of an obsession with profit and through the promotion of empathy for alternative 
social interests; or in science through a balancing of ‘progress’ with protection of the natural 
environment and future generations.198 But of course this function of world law, as Amstutz 
imagines it, reflects the anticipated shift to the evolutionary primacy of cognitive 
mechanisms. Law can only achieve this function through learning ‘to see itself as part of the 
environment’, and thereby forcing itself ‘to develop the conceptions of its environment that 
enable and support its task’.199 In other words, law’s primary function in world society is not 
one of stabilizing counterfactual expectations, but rather one of facilitating learning processes 
which allow for the transfer of meaning components between social spheres and to thereby 
increase the compatibility between the fragments of world society.200 In this way, Amstutz 
clearly articulates the concept of law in world society as having two functions: a minor one in 
providing a normative order to regulate the social conflict within the social system into which 
it intervenes (and which therefore depends upon the boundaries of the social system); and a 
more prominent cognitive based function in which the legal system floods the environment 
‘to make voyages of discovery into society’s ‘mondes intérieurs’’, which then allows it to 
highlight the blind spots of disrupted social systems.201 
This line of analysis has been echoed and developed further by Poul Kjaer.202 He also 
conceives the cognitive aspect as playing a larger role in world society, but recognizes the 
importance of ‘structures characterised by a strong normative component’ in world society.203 
Thus, the cognitive primacy of world society for Kjaer does not simply entail a reduction in 
normative-based communication, a zero-sum game in which more of one implies less of the 
other. Instead it is seen to constitute a ‘reconfiguration’ of the normative and cognitive 
dynamic, as an evolutionary response to multiplicity of normative orders in world society that 
are defined by their ability to condense norms as law through the self-referential structures of 
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a developed legal framework. 204  In respect of such a multiplicity of normative orders, Kjaer 
makes the distinction between, what he calls, the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ dimensions of law. 
‘The former’, as he says, ‘is oriented towards the internal stabilisation and condensation of 
such orders, while the latter is oriented towards the establishment of compatibility between a 
given normative order and other normative orders.’205 Each dimension attributes differing 
weights to normative and cognitive structures in accordance with their function, with the 
orientation towards internal condensation being closely linked to the upholding of normative 
expectations, while the orientation towards external compatibility is seen as constituting ‘a 
structural setting in which adaptability through the reliance on cognitive approaches tends to 
dominate.’206 Normative-based communication play a ‘strategic’ role in this reconfiguration, 
while cognitivization increasingly takes up a ‘tactical’ role, at the ‘operational level’, ‘at the 
level of method rather than theory, and at the level of policy rather than politics’.207 
Thus, similar to Amstutz, Kjaer conceives law in world society as having two 
functions: an internal dimension in which law is to uphold normative expectations against 
disappointing reality and an external dimension to facilitate the transfer of social components 
between the fragments of world society. And despite Kjaer’s attempts to avoid presenting the 
dialectic of normative and cognitive expectations as a ‘zero sum game’, under this model,  
the traditional function of law in upholding normative expectations again recedes further into 
the background while a new dominantly cognitive function comes to the foreground for law 
in world society. In contrast to national law, transnational law, in orientation to the external 
dimension, is said to be ‘primarily orientated toward establishing frameworks of transfer and 
mutual adaptation’.208 In fact, Kjaer adopts the perspective that what is commonly referred to 
as ‘transnational, global or world law’ is in reality only the ‘external law of normative 
orders’.209 This, he argues, becomes especially clear when the distinction between reflexivity, 
performance and function of law is kept mind. As established by Luhmann, the function of 
nation-state law is to facilitate social interaction by maintaining normative expectations even 
when they are not factually realized in society. The function of transnational law, he argues, 
is also concerned with social integration, but the manner in which this is achieved is 
completely different from national law—in fact, the ‘direct opposite’, as he says.210 
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According to Kjaer, this runs deeper than the contrast between national law facilitating social 
integration by upholding counterfactual norms and transnational law facilitating social 
integration by providing for the learning process for the compatibility and transfer of social 
components in a fragmented world society.  It also relates to a contrast between the way in 
which the former introduces ‘a kind of ‘friction’ which tends to reduce the contingency, 
volatility and speed of social change’, while the latter is ‘oriented towards reducing the 
‘friction’ which societal processes, such as economic transactions, encounter due to the 
existence of the diversity of cultures, functional spheres and states’.211 Kjaer speculates that 
this may ‘explain why transnational law is characterised by a far higher level of judicial 
activism in the sense that courts tend to act as the catalysts—rather than as the enforcers—of 
already established norms’.212 
Nonetheless, Kjaer does not deny the relevancy of such a normative function 
altogether. Instead, he acknowledges the continued importance of normatively based 
communication in world society, for example, citing morality as fulfilling ‘an alarm function, 
reproduced along the boundaries of social systems’, which is activated in two instances. The 
first, echoing Teubner, can be described as limitative capacity, and relates the integrity and 
preservation of the social system: ‘when a social system sees itself as being the victim of 
asymmetries, crowding-out effects and colonizing tendencies emerging from its environment 
in the form of, for example, doping, corruption, prostitution, or pollution, that threaten the 
coherency of the system.’213 The second, again echoing Teubner’s concept of the constitutive 
aspect of fundamental rights, relates to a ‘contrafactual’ striving for inclusion within the 
function systems of society, for example for the inclusion of all in the capitalist economy or 
in a global human rights agenda. Kjaer describes such normative communication as fulfilling 
‘the function of pointing to an ‘untapped potential,’ which can be a source of further 
expansion of meaning production’.214 But what exactly this ‘untapped potential’ might be is 
never fully explored. What is presented instead is the ‘gap’ between normative visions and 
their institutionalization, and the ‘central function’ of law in ‘bridging the gap’ through 
condensation and transfer of social components.215 
What is noteworthy about this is that its explicit statement that the differentiation of an 
internal and external dimension of law constitutes a revised function of law in world society. 
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The cognitive primacy of law is not simply viewed as a matter of performance in terms of co-
ordination between differentiated social systems, but is seen to relate to the stability and 
continued reproduction of society as a social system. Thus, Kjaer states, ‘[th]e constitutive 
function of transnational processes for world society as a whole is the facilitation of the 
transfer of social components from one context to another.’216 This represents a clear shift in 
the grand scheme of the systems theoretical approach to the function of law; whereas 
Luhmann questions the degree to which law can continue to admit cognitive elements and 
even speculates that law may ‘level off’ with the increasing compulsion for such 
cogntivization in world society, Kjaer, building on Amstutz, envisions the cognitive primacy 
as revising the function of law and as therefore underwriting its continued expansion in world 
society. 
This section has considered these lines of analysis as a potential qualification to the 
claim made in the previous section that the development of systems theoretical accounts of 
law has obscured the problem of general norms taken up in the present study. However, it 
must be concluded that neither Amstutz’s nor Kjaer’s development of the concept of the 
function of law at the global level in any way brings the problem of general norms back into 
perspective. Amstutz’s argument that the function law in stabilizing normative expectations 
must be ‘abandoned’ appears excessively technocratic, and offers no view on the orientation 
of law to those norms which are generalized beyond the ‘multiple worlds’ of global society. 
Kjaer, on the other hand, does make some attempt to redress the balance and give more 
attention to the function of law in such a fragmented society. However, here too a certain 
tipping point is seen to have been reached whereby normativity has withdrawn into- and has 
become locked within the self-contained normative orders of world society. In this sense, the 
functional reference of the maintenance of normative expectations becomes as fragmented as 
the rest of society, and secondary to an overarching cognitive function that facilitates 
meaning transfer between the fragmented orders; relating the larger system only through the 
developed autonomy of the subsystem. This is still a rather ‘thin’ concept of function which 
affords little perspective on the function and operation of norms arising beyond highly 
differentiated ‘political’ and formalized normative orders. 
This methodological parochialism is reflected in Kjaer’s claim about a far higher level 
of ‘judicial activism’ at the global level.217 Evidently, Kajer means activism in terms of the 
normative expectations that find expression and limitation within the differentiated normative 
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orders. However where is the judicial activism in respect of more general norms? In respect 
of the responsibility to protect the vulnerable locked within ‘independent’ normative orders, 
of protection of the natural environment in the global commons from the atomistic claims of 
established normative orders, of the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction which are 
claimed as an inherent right of self-defence for established normative orders, etc? It is no 
answer to say that the functional differentiation of normative orders is transcending these 
problems. In many cases the problems result from a complex of the functionally 
differentiated normative orders and segmentarily differentiated normative orders of nation-
states; oil drilling in the Arctic, science and technology in nuclear arms, etc. There is scant 
evidence of ‘judicial activism’ of these complex problems within the functionally 
differentiated normative orders of world society, and, as will be explored in the fifth chapter, 
there is even little evidence of ‘judicial activism’ in international courts and tribunals in this 
respect.  
From a systems theoretical perspective, the concept of the function of law always 
entailed some mixture of cognitive and normative expectations. That after all was the very 
focus of Luhmann’s earlier more open systems theory approach to law—the evolution of 
positive law.218 However, even those socio-legal scholars that attempt to address the function 
of law are now mostly interested only in the external and cognitive-dominant function, and 
reduce the normative dimension to a secondary place within the fragments of world society.   
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
Constructing the problem of general norms involves identifying the limits of law at the global 
level. This chapter has focused mostly on the model of law developed by Gunther Teubner as 
a robust ‘private’ global law which engages what would traditionally be deemed ‘public’ 
issues arising from the pathological side-effects of functional differentiation. It represents the 
important advances which socio-legal scholars have made in developing the concept of law in 
relation to high functional differentiation. However, the limits of this model of law have been 
located in its reliance on technocratic specialization within the differentiated spheres of world 
society and in its marginalization of the nation-state in addressing normative issues arising at 
the global level. 
                                                          
218 Luhmann (1985a).  
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Appraising Teubner’s model of global law beyond the state in the context of the present 
study, one is reminded of Jonathan Swift’s famous aphorism: ‘Laws are like cobwebs which 
may catch small flies, but let wasps and hornets break through.’219 Reflexive global law has 
no doubt been important in building up the cobwebs in the corners of differentiated society to 
catch the small flies of globalization. However, the problems that arise from functional 
differentiation are not all ‘small flies’ of specialist discourse. To construct this problem 
further it is necessary to return to an earlier sociological theory of law that was more focused 
upon norms, and upon law’s relationship with the larger social system.   
 
 
                                                          
219 Bartletts Familiar Quotations: A Collection of Passages, Phrases, and Proverbs Traced to their Sources in 
Ancient and Modern Literature, (1992), New York: Little Brown. 
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3  The function of law and norms revisited 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Normally the person who directs attention to the dissonance between the social recognition of 
a norm and its failure to find institutionalization in law does so in critique of the law or in 
projection of the norm itself. One might think of protesters outside the parliament building, or 
even the interpreting judge who in the absence of rules draws on principles to construe the 
law in such a way that it better fits with the norms of the community. However, this is not 
what is pursued here. Rather, what I am primarily interested in is gaining a better 
understanding of the problem of the dissonance between the formulation of norms at a 
general level and the failure of such to find realization in law. Again, this is why the method 
of functionalist analysis is employed. This approach is ‘formulated in the language of 
problems and their solutions’,1 it sees problems only as ‘problem-systems’,2 and it holds open 
the possibility that there can be ‘different, functionally equivalent solutions for specific 
problems.’3 
As part of this it is necessary to look in more depth at the function of law, to better 
understand law’s functional reference to the problem of general norms, and even to better 
understand the function of the norm. As stated in the previous chapter, there has been a 
general move away from the concept of function in systems theoretical accounts of law at the 
global level, and it is thus necessary to revisit the very thorough analysis of the function of 
law contained in Luhmann’s earlier systems theoretical approach.  
This functional reference point of law can be introduced in relatively simple terms as 
the norm. It is fair to say that such a functional reference point for law has become lost to 
some extent in the choppy waters of globalized society. That essentially was the basis of 
Luhmann’s ultimate skepsis about law. Nonetheless, it is still possible to find law’s anchor 
point in the norm at the general level above the ‘multiple worlds’ of global society. It may, in 
the grand scheme of things, be weaker than what might be expected, but it is strong enough to 
assert that the disparity between social norms and law at the global level is still a problem 
which law is functionally orientated to, and—more importantly—one which may prove the 
                                                          
1 Luhmann (1995), 15.  
2 Ibid., 53, 116-117. 
3 Ibid., 15. 
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basis for the emergence of social systems which ultimately prove relevant to the evolution of 
law as a social system even in a globalized society.  
These themes will be explored in this chapter. The first section will examine the 
centrality of the norm to Luhmann’s concept of the function of law. To do so, it is necessary 
to isolate this subject to a degree and address it as a stand-alone section, rather than simply 
subsuming it under the more general topic of the function of law, as might normally be the 
case. Once the relation of the norm to the larger social system has been clearly presented, the 
second section will consider the function of law according to Luhmann’s earlier evolutionary 
approach to law. The reader may be aware that Luhmann devoted a chapter to the function of 
law in his last book on law, Law as a Social System (2004 [1993]).4 However, as will be 
shown, his focus there is somewhat different, and ultimately it is only in the earlier 
evolutionary approach that he develops the more ‘concrete’ concept of the function of law 
that forms the basis of much of his later theory of law.5 The third section, however, will 
attempt to clarify why Luhmann changed ‘tracks’ in his approach to the function of law in his 
later account of law as an autopoietic system, and to understand what this means for the 
earlier account of law as the congruent generalization of behavioural expectations. The aim 
here is to keep track of the thread of the basic functional reference of law in the norm through 
his autopoietic turn, and all the way through to his ultimate speculation that law as a 
functional system may ‘level off with the evolution of global society’.6 Only then can the 
thesis progress to look at another (public) legal system as a solution to global problems, or 
even to other social systems that emerge beyond the law. 
     
3.2 Norms as counterfactually stabilized behavioural expectations  
 
It is a reflection of the complexity of Luhmann’s sociological theory of law that some 
commentators find the ‘central place’ of norms in his theory to be ‘striking’,7 while others 
consider it to be substantially lacking a ‘normative core’.8 Of course, those two positions do 
not necessarily contradict each other. One may, after all, give due consideration to the social 
phenomena of norms without pursuing a normative agenda oneself. This, admittedly, fits well 
                                                          
4 Luhmann (2004), 142-172. 
5 Ibid., 148.  
6 Ibid., 490.  
7 Arato and Cohen (1992), 333.  
8 Krisch (2012), 40. 
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with Luhmann’s well-known ‘political quietism’,9 and his notoriety for proposing a concept 
of law as indifferent to morality, truth, and even the human being.10 However, on a more 
significant level, one cannot advance a concept of law that is so rooted in the dynamic and 
constitutive role of norms in social evolution, and at the same time completely sever oneself 
from the substantive content of normative expectations in society. Even if such a theory does 
present law as evolving towards higher autonomy, in so far as it locates the development and 
function of law in a more elementary basis of norms in society then it must retain perspective 
on a range of social norms and their relevance for social evolution. For this reason, this 
section aims to explore the so-called centrality of norms in Luhmann’s theory of law. Though 
it may often be overlooked, this ‘pre-legal’ aspect of Luhmann’s theory of law is an essential 
element of his concept of the function of law in as much as it provides a problem from which 
the system of law emerges, as well as environmental stimuli which it must select, and through 
which the system is able constitute itself. 
Thus it is necessary to revisit the more functionalist approach which Luhmann 
developed in the early 1970s. Even though the advances made through the autopoietic turn 
came at the cost of a move away from a focus on the norm, the function of the norm remained 
part of the fabric of Luhmann’s later theory of law. But the roots of the central place of the 
norm in Luhmann’s legal theory must be traced back to his 1972 text Rechtssoziologie.11 
Although the primary thesis of the book is one of the ‘function and unavoidability’ of the 
positivization of law,12 it explicitly rejects any idea that law ‘originates from the quill of the 
legislator’.13 Rather, in pursuing an evolutionary approach, this thesis is only arrived at by 
embarking from a most elemental level of law as a social system; from an attempt, that is, to 
‘clarify what is to be understood by the norm and which function the normative ought fulfils 
in social life’.14  
Luhmann begins this endeavour by pointing out the complexity and contingency of 
social life.15 The world is complex because it always offers more possibilities than can be 
actualized. It is contingent because things can always turn out differently from that which is 
expected. In such a world the individual is compelled to be selective and take risks. In order 
                                                          
9 van Loon (2002), 38.  
10 See for a particularly American critique in this respect Diamond (1992), 1766, or Fletcher (1992), 1635. 
11 The English translation was first published by Routledge as A Sociological Theory of Law in 1985, and then 
again in 2014. 
12 Luhmann (1985a), 20.  
13 Ibid., 159.  
14 Ibid., 7.  
15 Ibid., 24. 
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that individuals are not to be paralyzed by such complexity and contingency however, 
expectations serve as inevitable crutches for necessary choice—‘even if one slips once’, as 
Luhmann says, one does not forgo an expectation of ‘solid, well-trodden ground’.16 
Expectations, in this sense, are able to give ‘meaning’ to such a complex and contingent 
world.17 
It is only when other people come into view, however, that the deeper complexity of 
social life becomes clear. Not only do the possibilities actualized by alter become 
possibilities for ego,18 but alter can also vary his behaviour in light of those possibilities, just 
as ego can. With this it becomes necessary ‘not simply to be able to expect behaviour, but 
also the expectations of others in order to find solutions to problems that can be integrated 
and tested.’19 This draws on Parsons’ concept of ‘double contingency’,20 but then makes a 
subtle (but radical) development from it. Rather than simply assuming that the problem of 
double contingency must be resolved by actors internalising norms that already exist as 
culture,21 Luhmann recognizes a greater degree of contingency in such ‘expectations of 
expectations’.22 For him they serve as the basis of ‘conflict and discrepancies in reference to 
which norms have their function.’23 In other words, Luhmann does not assume pre-existing 
cultural institutions to integrate expectations, but takes a closer look at the problem and 
ultimately comes to identify double contingency as the very basis on which norms, law, and 
indeed much of society, emerges.24 
                                                          
16 Ibid., 25. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Preceding Beck’s influential concept of ‘risk society’ by 20 years (Beck 1992), Luhmann recognized the 
price to pay for this immense increase in this kind of social awareness in modern society as ‘the potentialisation 
of risk’, ibid., 26.    
19 Ibid.  
20 Parsons et al. (1951). 
21 Ibid, 14-15. In so equating norms with macro social structure, Parsons, according to Luhmann, misses many 
nuances to expectations, including the difference between cognitive and normative expectations, Luhmann 
(1985a), 17.  
22 Notice here another form of medial reflexivity. 
23 Luhmann (1985a), 26, n. 13. 
24 Luhmann: ‘It is the emergence of a social system which is made possible by a doubling of improbability, 
and which then facilitates the determination of its own behaviour.’ (1995: 117). See also Vanderstraeten (2002), 
78ff; Reemstma (2012), 264. Reemstma criticizes the centrality of ‘double contingency’ to Luhmann’s theory as 
resulting in a sociological theory which ‘presupposes freedom’ and thereby neglects the important social 
phenomenon of physical violence: ‘[C]an a person dammed to the gas chamber be described as free, having the 
choice to either wait patiently in line or to break for it and face immediate death?’, (ibid.). But, this overlooks 
Luhmann’s concept of the relation of physical violence to the evolution of law, in which he considers a close 
proximity of law to violence as leading to an over-concreteness and lack of abstraction which hinders further 
evolution (Luhmann 1985a, 117), and as impeding ‘the refinement of juridical semantics, the condensation and 
confirmation of experiences with new cases, and juridical attention to conceptual and dogmatic consistency.’ 
(2004, 263). It is for this reason that, to evolve, law must restructure its relationship with physical violence, to 
externalize it to the political system (Luhmann 1985a, 88). This, however, is something that happens over long 
course of evolution, and still envisages a role for the symbolic power of violence in the emergence of modern 
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The fundamental problem of double contingency for Luhmann is that it introduces such 
a level of complexity and contingency that social action can only be coordinated through the 
integration of expectations. In this sense, expectations of others must replace coordination 
through ‘actual communication which is time-intensive and therefore scarce’.25 Thus, where 
such complementary expectations can be established, they ultimately save time, increase 
possibilities, and allow for the evolution of further complexity.26 A relatively simple 
hypothetical might demonstrate this. For example, someone standing on the side of the road 
on a dark rainy night with their thumb held out at passing cars may do so in expectation that 
someone will stop to give him a ride. However, it is only if he can adequately anticipate the 
expectations of drivers as they approach him that he might save himself time and increase his 
possibilities. For example, if he expects that drivers expect he could turn out to be an axe 
murderer (just like in the movies), then he can try to look less sinister, take shelter, or start 
walking. Of course, it is not always easy to have such tact in the complexity of everyday life. 
Indeed, even in this relatively straightforward example there will be a range of expectations 
that could reasonably be expected: the hitcher may equally expect that a driver will expect 
him to provide welcome company on the car journey, or expect him to be vulnerable and 
therefore to help him, etc. But in day-to-day life, with a ‘plurality of people and with 
continuously changing relevance of situation to situation’, the problem of double contingency 
becomes much more complex and the need for the integration of expectations becomes even 
more acute.27  
According to Luhmann then, the function of the norm (‘and therefore law’28) is based 
on this problem of the complexity of expectations of expectations. In other words, through 
such integration of expectations, the full complexity of social life can be reduced in such a 
way as to allow evolution towards higher complexity. At this point, however, Luhmann 
makes another subtle but far reaching development of the concept of double contingency that 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
legal systems, which may be relevant today to questions about the emergence of an Islamic State which relies to 
a great deal on ‘lawfare’ as it arguably inches towards becoming a functioning nation-state, see Andrew F. 
March and Mara Revkin, ‘Caliphate of Law: ISIS’ Ground Rules’, in Foreign Affairs, April 15, 2015. 
25 Arato and Cohen (1992), 334. Cohen and Arato go on to criticize Luhmann for this, arguing that by making 
the validity of the norm so dependent on the impossibility of actual communication, Luhmann fails to ‘link 
mechanisms of real communication and consensus building’ to mechanisms of stabilization (334-336). This 
somewhat reflects Habermas’ discursive theory of law, but Habermas (as will be demonstrated below) also 
relies to a degree on the traction gained through expectations to provide starting points for discursive rationality, 
(1996), 4.  
26 This explains also the importance of ‘trust’ in Luhmann’s general sociological theory. As ‘confidence in 
one’s expectations’, trust is a communicative medium that reduces complexity and consequently allows for 
increased possibilities of action and experience, and therefore the increased complexity of the social system, 
Luhmann (1979), 4ff. 
27 Luhmann (1985a), 28.  
28 Ibid., 26.  
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he inherited from Parsons. In developing the systems theoretical concept of structure through 
selection,29 Luhmann argues that it is in the possibility of disappointment, and ‘not in the 
regularity of its fulfilment, that the reality reference of expectation proves itself.’30 In this 
respect, he draws on Galtung’s insights regarding the important distinction between 
‘cognitive’ and ‘normative’ expectations.31 Expectations are treated as cognitive, Luhmann 
argues, when they are ‘adapted to reality in the case of disappointment.’32 In contrast, 
normative expectations are not given up if someone acts against them. Instead they signify a 
determination not to learn from disappointment, and thus are ‘adhered to, even when 
frustrated’.33 For Luhmann, it is ‘here that the meaning of the ‘ought’ resides’34—thereby 
rejecting the traditional distinctions between facts and norms. The ‘guiding distinction’, he 
argues, ‘is not fact/norm but learning/not learning’.35 
Luhmann, therefore defines norms as ‘counterfactually stabilised behavioural 
expectations’.36 They are in this sense, ‘time binding forms’ that ‘project an expectation on 
the future’.37 Hence the function of the norm is the ‘absorption of uncertainty’38 (and this 
concept will become important to arguments to be advanced later in the thesis). This allows 
individuals to give meaning to a world that may often turn out to be disappointing. To go 
back to the hypothetical given already, the hitcher at the side of the road may not be 
successful in his attempt to get a lift, but he can expect that there ought to be a sufficient 
degree of generalized kindness to help him out, and may stand out in the rain to prove his 
point or look for ways to express his contempt at the drivers who pass straight by him in cars 
that clearly have room for more passengers. This allows him to give meaning to a 
disappointing reality.  
Such obstinacy points to another function of the norm that is even more important in 
the context of the present study. That is, the way in way in which the counterfactual aspect of 
the norm gives the individual or organization something to cling to and project against a 
                                                          
29 Ibid.,31. See also, Luhmann (1988a), 27-28: ‚‘The prospect of the disappointment of an expectation and 
thus, if one clings to the expectation, of a conflict, serves as a principle of selection by means of which 
generalizations can be tested.’  
30 Ibid., 32.  
31 See, Galtung, (1959). And in Galtung’s attribution of ‘clear time connotations’ to normative expectations 
(1959, 214), one can find the seed of the temproal dimension which proved ‘crucial’ to Luhmann’s theory of 
law (Chrsitodoulidis 2006, 125), and his general social theory (Kjaer, 2006, 67). 
32 Luhmann (1985a), 33.   
33 Luhmann (2008a), 20; see also, Luhmann (1985a), 33; (2004), 149. 
34 Luhmann (1985a), 33; Luhmann, (1995), 333. 
35 Luhmann (2008a), 20. 
36 Luhmann (1985a), 33. 
37 Luhmann (1993), 54. 
38 Luhmann (1988a), 20.  
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disappointing reality effectively primes the expectation as a basis of social evolution. The full 
implications of this in Luhmann’s general sociological theory will be explored in the fifth 
chapter,39 but for now it is worth noting how the norm as a counterfactually stabilized 
expectation allows for a ‘doubling of reality’.40 That is, by projecting a reality that is different 
from the ‘hard, factual reality’, counterfactual expectations allow the beholder to distinguish 
that hard reality and ‘observe it from the other side of the distinction’,41 and with that to open 
up further possibilities for social evolution; in other words, it might be said, to ‘imagine a 
better world’. 
As will be demonstrated in the next section, Luhmann squarely bases the function of 
law on this concept of the norm. This must be seen to be the ‘normative core’ of Luhmann’s 
sociological theory of law. While Luhmann’s sociology certainly made no attempt to change 
the world, and while he ruled out the possibility of the ‘mind participating in 
communication’,42 or other forms of ‘steering’,43 his concept of the norm at least recognizes 
the way in which disappointment ‘stimulates activities’,44 and the way in which such 
counterfactual expectations provide an alternative structure that can be projected against a 
disappointing ‘hard’ reality.  As such, even if things never turn out the way they are expected 
to, norms provide the basis of social evolution, and even in some cases ‘revolution’.45 
Moreover, despite fundamental differences in their theory of law and the legitimacy 
thereof, Luhmann’s concept of the norm as the basis of social evolution is also reflected in 
Habermas’ theory of law. Although he rejected Luhmann’s concept of the ‘time binding’ 
element of the norm and the function of law as ‘erasing the deontological dimension of 
normative validity’ that for him was guaranteed by discursive rationality,46 Habermas 
nonetheless  also conceives of counterfactual expectations as providing the ‘“must” of a weak 
transcendental necessity’ which forms the basis of the complex negotiation between facts and 
validity,47 and as therefore acquiring ‘immediate relevance for the construction of social 
order’.48   
                                                          
39 See Luhmann (1995), 292ff. 
40 Luhmann (2008a), 21. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Luhmann (2002b). 
43 Luhmann (1997b). 
44 Luhmann (1985a), 41. 
45 Brunkhorst (2014), 15ff. 
46 Habermas (1996), 49-50. See also Luhmann’s reply: The uncertainty of the future is the only real invariable 
of discourse theory’, Luhmann (1996a), 886. 
47 Ibid., 4. 
48 Ibid., 17. 
72 
 
Let me recap on the salient points about this concept of the norm. At a basic level, 
expectations serve as structure related to the problem of meaning-oriented human 
coexistence; the potential conflict and discrepancies of double contingency marks the 
reference to which norms have their function; norms allow for the possibility of non-learning 
in the face of disappointment and the ‘doubling of reality’ in such a way as to provide the 
basis of social evolution. These considerations are all relevant to the question about general 
norms which at least find formulation and recognition at some level in world society. The 
connection may not be immediately clear, as much of the problem of double contingency has 
been presented in the context of dyadic interaction, while these norms are pitched at the 
global level and thereby relate to a much higher level of complexity. However, the fact that 
these problems arise at a global level above more concretely defined communities does not in 
any way exclude them from the issue of meaningful communication in society to which the 
norm functions. Today, as a direct result of functional differentiation we live in a world 
society of ‘connective communications’, an ‘overall horizon of meaningful 
communication’;49 and ‘[m]ore communication’, as Sloterdijk points out, ‘means, first and 
foremost, more conflict.’50 
One of the most relevant aspects of such functional differentiation is the development 
of information and communications technology in the last thirty years, which can be said to 
have transformed ‘society as a whole’.51  In contrast to previous forms of communications 
technology, such as the telephone, radio or television, which supported only one-to-one, 
unidirectional communication, the development of the internet in particular exposes millions 
of people to an interactive medium, and gives them ‘a role to play’ on the global level.52  It is 
unclear whether Luhmann would have directed his attention to these developments had he 
lived longer,53 but there is no doubt of their impact on the emergence of world society as one 
communicative system. Now, more than ever, world society is a social system based on 
                                                          
49 Luhmann (2012), 86, 89. This of course is not to propose global equality or unity. According to systems 
theory, world society presents an incomprehensible unity that can only be observed in various ways. As such, to 
observe itself it must rely on communication distinctions at the level of second-order observation (ibid., 89-90). 
50 Sloterdijk, P. (2006): ‘Warten auf den Islam’, 10 Focus, 84.  
51 Karavas (2009), 463. 
52 Magnolo, Schultz and Verschraegen (2005), 351. 
53 Despite briefly addressing the subject towards the end of this life (Luhmann, 2012, 66), Luhmann generally 
viewed technology as the environment of communication, and thus not the proper subject for the sociologist. 
This is nicely summed up in his reported remark to Kittler: ‘Mr Kittler, it has always been like this since 
Babylon. When a messenger rides through the gate, people like you ask about the horse he is riding on and 
people like me about the message he is bringing with.’, translation [sic] provided by Karavas (2009, 465), with 
reference: Kittler, F. (1999): ‘Ein Herr namens Luhmann’, Bardmann, T.M. and Baecker, D. (eds.), Gibt es 
eigentlich den Berliner Zoo noch?, Konstanz: UVK, 183-185, at 185. 
73 
 
meaningful communication.54  As such, the problem of meaning-oriented communication is 
as alive at the global level (perhaps even more so) as it is at the level of any other more 
clearly defined social community. This is not to claim that norms will arise from some 
Archimedean point to acquire transcendental status across society. Normativity ‘has to do 
with how an expectation is processed within a system.’55 But, in world society as a social 
system, norms are often communicated at a more global level than the relatively closer social 
reference groups of nation-states or the self-contained regimes at the global level. 
To bring this problem of general norms further into focus one need only remember that 
many of those norms—such as, for example, the prevention of oil drilling in the Arctic, 
stopping forestation for palm oil, fairer terms of trade for local producers, or the prohibition 
of nuclear weapons, etc.—can all be construed as relating to the ‘most urgent problems’ of 
functional differentiation.56 It is in relation to the risks of functional differentiation that 
discrepancies and disappointments become apparent, and that counterfactually stabilized 
expectations arise. As stated by Luhmann, it is social contingency which is ‘indispensable’ to 
the formation of norms: ‘[w]ithin the domain of the self-evident (for instance, that it takes 
time to move through space), there is no formation of norms.’57 It is for this reason that 
Luhmann sees the increasing identification of the decisions of other people and organizations 
as the root cause of the ‘deviant circumstances’ of functional differentiation (i.e., ‘risk’) as 
leading to the increasing formation of norms.58 Necessitas non habet legem, as he says,59 and 
as long as the side effects of functional differentiation can be construed as ‘unnecessary’, 
then ‘it makes sense to oppose’, to ‘communicate one’s opposition’, and to demand that such 
dangers are avoided.60 Thus, for example, any deviant circumstances associated with nuclear 
weapons can be attributed to decision—Pakistan decides it needs them, while Norway 
decides it does not, etc.61 With this, the issue comes to be seen as a ‘world condition’,62 and 
                                                          
54 Luhmann (1982), 131. 
55 Christodoulidis (1998), 122. 
56 Luhmann (1982), 134. 
57 Luhmann (1993), 54.  
58 Ibid., xxix. Which only puts a tremendous strain on the modern legal system, ibid., 60-62. 
59 Ibid., 54. 
60 Ibid., xxix. 
61 Norway’s position on nuclear weapons has in fact become a little more complicated since the recent rise in 
tensions between Russia and NATO members, see ‘Norway Parliament Debate, March 12 2015’ (Unofficial 
translations of quotes on nuclear weapons policy and questions to the Foreign Minister), available at 
Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (PNND) website,  ‘UK, Norway and Japan 
parliaments – on a ban, the pledge and the role of nukes’, < http://www.pnnd.org/articles  >, accessed  12 
September 2015. 
62 Anders (1962), 505.  
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the basis of normative expectations to be expressed by protest movements,63 and in the 
applications for adjudication in the various legal systems of world society.64  
The formation of norms in response to such risks is only further compounded by the 
advent of world society as a communicative network spreading across the globe. Information 
and communications technology, which now includes everything from Twitter to the news 
media, allow for scandalization which in itself can ‘generate a norm’ that was not previously 
formulated at all.65 Moreover, the way in which such norms are primed for social evolution 
through their doubling of reality is capitalized through the same means of information and 
communications technology. The internet becomes an ‘essential medium’ in which the 
expression of such norms can be manifested and collated in a ‘given time and space’ and 
thereby impact upon institutions and organizations and general public opinion.66 
Telecommunications and information technology in this sense are seen to constitute a ‘global 
public sphere’, in which protest movements can rely on a medium of open communication 
and flexible logics to affect change.67   
Many of these developments are reflected in the increasing focus on norms in 
international relations literature, which, in opting for a ‘sociological perspective’, have 
departed from the traditional focus of that discipline on international politics.68 These 
approaches define norms as ‘shared expectations about the appropriate behaviour of actors 
with a given identity’,69 or as the ‘standards for how different actors “ought” to behave.’70 As 
such they are able to recognize the relevance of a wide range of norms, to be held by a range 
of actors, and to be projected at a range of actors.71 Furthermore they often focus on norms as 
reflecting an ‘attitude involving criticism of others’,72 and see them as particularly prevalent 
in response to perceived crises, such as in the areas of the environment and human rights.73  
                                                          
63 See for an overall qualitative survey of the period from 1945-2003, Wittner, (1995), (1998), (2003), and for 
protest data in the context of Germany see Prodat data collected by Rucht et al. that covers general protests in 
Germany from 1950 to 2002, available at WZB Berlin Social Science Centre website, ‘Documentation and 
analysis of protest events in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1950-1996 (PRODAT project)’,  
< www.wzb.eu/en/research/completed-research-programs/civil-society-and-political-mobilization/projects >, 
accessed 12 September, 2015.  
64 See for example, The Republic of the Marshall Islands v. The United States of America, et al. (Complaint 
for Breach of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons), filed 24/04/2014, United States District 
Court, Northern District Of California, San Francisco Division, Case No. 4:14-cv-01885-JSW. 
65 Luhmann (2008a), 33; see also Fischer-Lescano (2003).  
66 Castells (2003), 141. 
67 Magnolo, Schiltz and Verschraegen (2005), 351; see also, Van Aelst and Van Laer (2010). 
68 Katzenstein (1996), 2.  
69 Finnemore (1996a), 22-23; see also Katzenstein (1996), 2; Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), 891. 
70 Khagram, Rikker and Sikkink (2002), 13. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Hurrell (2002), 143.  
73 Khagram (2004), 11.  
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The reason international relations studies have focused on the importance of norms in social 
life at the global level is no doubt because their initial orientation is to the norm rather than 
law as such. That is, because they are not preoccupied with legal issues they are able to better 
abstract the norm from the legal process. However, the drawback of this approach is a lack of 
experience with the specific logics of the legal system that leads them to assume a relatively 
straightforward legalization of the social norms they identify as being so cogently formulated 
and recognized in other social systems or at the primary level.74 (I will return to this issue at 
the close of the sixth chapter). 
What is needed is an approach which is both orientated to the dynamic role of norms in 
society as well as the specific logics of the legal system. This delicate balance was struck in 
Luhmann’s earlier evolutionary approach to the function of law. It is therefore necessary to 
turn now to the concept of the function of law that Luhmann developed from these 
elementary considerations of the norm.  
 
3.3 The function of law as the congruent generalization of expectations 
 
The last section presented the problem of double contingency and emergent structures of 
counterfactually stabilized expectations as the basic functional reference point of law. It has 
nonetheless kept the law at arm’s-length in order to conceptually isolate the norm and to 
thereby better understand how it fits into Luhmann’s sociological theory of law. Now I can 
introduce law’s function in basic terms as providing ‘social support for contra-factual 
expectations’.75 A norm is ‘initially only a projection’76—this is exactly what is meant by its 
‘generality’ in the present study; it is initially only formulated and recognised at a more 
primary social level. However, there must be some more specialised mechanism to ‘supervise 
and channel the process of disappointments of expectation’,77 a ‘second level’ in which 
double contingency is absorbed into functional sub-systems.78 This is not simply to enforce 
the expectation (this will not always be possible), but in order to foster counterfactual 
expectations in the first place. In other words, the expectant individual who arrives at a 
discrepant reality must be equipped with potential recourse to some social process of the 
norm; otherwise she would not have the courage to expect with sufficient conviction to begin 
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with. There may be a number of social systems that perform this supporting role, but, in so 
far as they do, they are all tied in with the elemental function of the norm in relation to the 
absorption of uncertainty in the interests of meaningful communication in society. This 
means that they not only fulfil a function for society—that they ‘serve society’—but that they 
participate in ‘society’s construction of reality.’79 
Law is exceptional in this sense (and, as will be seen, such exception is vital to its 
differentiation). It provides social support for contra-factual expectations ‘in a way that no 
other system does’.80 This section will explore this function of law in further detail, not only 
to better map the dividing line between legal norms and more general social norms and to 
better understand what is gained and what is lost in the processing of norms through the legal 
system, but also to keep the thread of the basic functional reference point of law to normative 
expectations before moving on to explore the increasing differentiation of law in modern 
society.  
Luhmann’s concept of the function of law changed somewhat over the course of his 
career. In his earlier more open-systems theory approach, the functional specification of 
law—that is, its ability provide social support for contra-factual expectations in a way that no 
other system does—was seen as the basis of its morphogenesis and differentiation in 
society.81 In other words, law’s functional specification provided the basis for a self-
referential development of structure, and therefore the evolution of the legal system, albeit 
always as a structure of society and in tandem with society’s own evolving complexity. 
However, after Luhmann’s autopoietic turn law’s functional specification was deemed no 
longer sufficient to ensure the differentiation of the legal system (briefly stated, it always 
invites the search for functional equivalents, and cannot adequately determine legal 
communications—I will expand on this in the next section). Attention was shifted instead to 
the role of the ‘code’ of the legal system, as a system-specific form of communication.82 As I 
argued in the last chapter this has meant the concept of the function of law has receded into 
the background to some degree. It is therefore necessary to first section explore the earlier 
account of the function of law.  
Particularly in his earlier account, Luhmann decomposes the function of law into the 
three meaning dimensions which ‘emphasize the universality of the claim to validity’.83 That 
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is, the temporal, social and material dimensions. The temporal dimension can be said to be 
the most basic aspect of the function of law. It essentially involves the institutionalization of 
the time-binding form of normative expectations. Just as the normative expectation is 
projected against a disappointing future, law, as a system that ‘operates through provisions 
that are binding for the future’, is able to provide a medium which will transfer this 
normativity through time.84 Norms are thus stabilized against a disappointing future. This 
does not as yet, however, represent any substantial institutionalization of the norm. In this 
dimension, it simply involves selection of norms by the legal system. Not all normative 
expectations will make it into law of course, and Luhmann acknowledges that the sheer 
volume of normative projections in daily life goes beyond the capacity for integration into 
law as a social system.85 However, it is exactly this overproduction of normative expectations 
which is deemed to be of ‘fundamental relevance to the evolutionary theory of law’.86 It is 
only through the surplus of norms in society that law as a system is compelled to select, and 
selection is presented as ‘a mechanism by which law achieves structure and further 
differentiates itself as a system.’87 Thus, in determining which disappointments it will learn 
from and which it will not, the legal system is forced to rely on its own internal basis of 
selection, and through this is able to achieve increasing structural indifference and a 
‘narrowing of legal thought’.88  In this sense law can be said to make a ‘specific use of the 
normativity for itself’.89  
At the same time, the work of law only really begins at this point. As Luhmann says, 
‘[n]either consistency, nor freedom from conflict, nor even the functional specification of the 
normative structure’ are to be achieved through the temporal dimension.90 The expectations 
must be given ‘definition’ and ‘form’, and this is where the social and material dimensions of 
the function of law come into play.91 The social dimension relates to the mechanisms by 
which certain normative expectations are selected by law and guided to success. Drawing on 
anthropological accounts recognising the role of third parties in the development of law, 
Luhmann introduces the concept of anonymised third parties into his previous dyadic model 
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presented in relation to double contingency.92 Thus, with this development, rather than 
resorting to self-help, the disappointed party must look to the expected expectations of third-
parties which come to be represented by the institution. To put it bluntly, what is meant by 
the generalization of expectations along the social dimension is that ‘[a]n expectation is legal 
only if third parties normatively expect it.’93 
This marks an important point of abstraction for the development of law. In abstracting 
expectations from their concrete interactional setting to ‘the systemic context’,94 
institutionalization allows for expectations ‘to be generalised beyond the immediate 
interaction system and those who happen to be present.’95 Norms are thus stabilized by the 
co-expectancy of anonymous third parties. This is not simply to be associated with the 
institutionalization of the role of the judge, but can be identified at various points in the 
evolution of society, and in a range of institutions and organizations as co-expecting third 
parties. Institutional reduction does not depend upon ‘social coercion or even the 
determination of behaviour.’96 Rather its function is located in the ‘distribution of 
behavioural pressures and risks which makes maintenance of an accustomed social reduction 
likely and gives certain norm projections better chances in the short term than others.’97 
These behavioural pressures and risks easily accrue once accepted bases of behaviour are 
‘plainly agreed upon’,98 and institutional commitments are made beyond individual 
situations.99  
A final point to be made in relation to this social dimension is to point out that, 
according to Luhmann, the institutionalization for this dimension does not rest on factually 
realized consensus. Unlike Habermas, Luhmann considered factual consensus in functionally 
differentiated society as virtually impossible beyond the limits of small groups or other 
simple, short-term social systems. Thus, the institutionalization of norms is seen to require 
only an ‘economy of consensus’;100 as long as there is ‘an existing preparedness for 
consensus’, and that such is presented in certain moments by the actual experience of some 
people, then institutions can be established on the common presumption that nearly everyone 
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agrees—or even on the possibility that ‘nearly everyone presumes that nearly everyone 
presumes that nearly everyone agrees’.101 
The abstraction achieved through the social dimension is furthered in the material 
dimension of the function of law. In order to find full stabilization in law, normative 
expectations must be ‘immunised against a certain measure of contradictory facts and have to 
be capable of being linked to plausible cognitive expectations of disappointments’.102 To 
appreciate what is concerned here it is necessary to briefly note Luhmann’s Husserlian 
concept of meaning as a ‘surplus of references to other possibilities of experience and 
action’.103 This presents meaning as a thoroughly sociological concept, in so far that whatever 
is intended— that is, the focal point of intention—must ‘hold open’ the world as the horizon 
of possible experience so that the intentional reference can actualize itself as a selection, and 
thus as the ‘stand-point of reality.’104 This translates into the problem of double contingency: 
since there is no possibility of directly sharing in the consciousness of another, ‘expectation 
of expectations is only possible through the mediation of a common world to which 
expectations are identically attached.’105 Expectations in this sense are highly social; they do 
not appear individually, and they are not determined by nature.106 Nonetheless, their 
counterfactual stability depends upon achieving higher abstraction. They must be able to be 
linked with some overarching meaning beyond the immediate interactional context. For 
Luhmann, this is achieved by law in its facility to provide ‘principles of meaning’ which 
bundle together expectations, revise them with experience and release them on demand for 
selective actualization.107 Rather than seeking meaningful identification with every individual 
expectation, law provides ‘more abstract types which can be held constant and then function 
as generative rules for individual expectations.’108 A new dishwasher machine that due to 
faulty internal wiring gives its owner a violent electric shock, a defective car tyre that blows 
out for no apparent reason causing the driver to crash into another vehicle, or the storage of 
hazardous waste that accidently leaks into local wells and forces the municipality to spend 
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considerable money on a filtration system, are all very different fact patterns that may 
nonetheless garner expectations that attach to the same abstract principle of  strict liability in 
tort. In this way, legal meaning can be said to provide the ‘context of expectations’.109 This of 
course is a system specific reduction of factual experience, self-stipulated and internally 
selected by law. And again this has a strong evolutionary basis, allowing not only for the 
reduction of the complexity of social life, but also the evolved differentiation of the legal 
system through the ‘strengthening of a transmittable, cultural store of ideas.’110  
It is not necessary for the purposes of the study to devote further attention to 
Luhmann’s very difficult concept of meaning.111 What is more relevant about this material 
dimension in the context of the present study is the various levels of abstraction which can 
serve as the ‘externalised starting points for the expectation of expectations’.112 Here 
Luhmann identifies a scheme of four societal levels of abstraction in which expectations can 
be ‘bundled together’ and can be ‘more or less standardized’ in the context of law.113 These 
are: individuals, roles, programmes and values. Initially, individuals (anyone in respect of 
whom expectations can be fulfilled ‘by her and her alone’) are rejected as proving too 
concrete for the abstract identification of expectational nexes beyond the intimate group.114 
Roles are presented as much more successful in this respect. Because roles represent ‘unity 
that can be performed by many different human beings’, role-bound expectational 
identification is seen as securing the transferability of expectations from person to person, 
and thus allowing for a significant gain in abstraction.115 This works not only in the sense that 
we can expect from a role without knowing the person who fulfils the role, but also because 
disappointment in relation to performance will not spill over to discredit the role as a unity. 
Luhmann locates further possibilities for abstraction in the development of law in this 
context in relation to programmes, which are described as a ‘complex of conditions for the 
correctness of behaviour’, for example in the case of a surgical operation or the 
reconstruction of an automobile engine.116 By employing if/then schemes, which necessarily 
determine certain actions or effects of actions, such programmes allow for highly concrete 
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expectational nexes to be fixed to them (and, obviously the bifurcate mechanism of such 
programmes becomes an important scheme in modern legal systems).117 
Finally, there are values, which are ‘general, individually symbolized perspectives 
which allow one to prefer certain states or events.’118 Values appear at the other end of the 
spectrum from ‘persons’; they are seen as proving too indeterminate as a ‘starting point for 
the formation and integration of expectations.’119 As such, values cannot specify which 
actions should be preferred to others in conflicts with other values; they are therefore seen to 
face a ‘collision problem’ and as losing their ‘prescription value right at the moment it is 
needed.’120 Examples are given which are interesting in the context of the present study: 
peace, justice, protection of the environment, expression of solidarity, etc.121 However, 
Luhmann admits that ‘values are not without importance for the way in which expectations 
are anticipated.’122 Thus in communication about programs, for example, values are 
important in alleviating the necessary contingency of programs by offering departure points 
that are difficult to dispute because of their abstraction and basis in morality.123 But more 
importantly in the context of this study, values ‘serve in the communication process as a kind 
of probe in which one can test whether more concrete expectations are also at work.’124 Thus, 
‘peace’ as a value is far too abstract in itself to form the basis of normative expectations, but 
it might act as a probe for expectations about nuclear weapons for example, which may then 
even find a more definite starting point in a program, such as that ‘if nuclear weapons did 
cause disproportionate civilian casualties, then they would violate international humanitarian 
law.’125  
This points to the symbiosis of the different levels of abstraction in the increasing 
functional differentiation of society. A ‘developmental tendency becomes apparent’ in this 
respect when viewing each of the four levels of abstraction at once.126 With the increasing 
complexity of society, the various levels of meaning presuppose and determine each other 
reciprocally. For example, as shown above, values may alleviate communication about 
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programmes, and programmes may mediate the realization of values. Roles on the other hand 
become operational through programmes, and at the same time presume individuals who 
perform them. As society evolves towards higher complexity the symbioses between the 
various levels of meaning shift. Writing in 1972, Luhmann saw the move from hierarchical 
differentiation to increasingly complex modern society based upon functional differentiation 
as being structurally linked to a shift from the prominence of individuals and values to roles 
and programmes in the development of law. However, twelve years after that, in recognition 
of increasingly ‘emphasized individualism’, he imagines that values and individuals may 
‘pursue new kinds of symbioses’.127  
Undoubtedly the more important symbiosis though is the one envisaged between the 
three meaning dimensions of the function of law. It is only after detailing the temporal, social 
and material dimensions of the function of law separately that Luhmann summarizes them 
into one concept and presents the function of law more definitively as the ‘congruent 
generalisation of behavioural expectations’.128 The congruence here is between the selections 
made within the three dimensions. Thus, the function of law lies in the selection of 
behavioural expectations which can be generalised within all three dimensions at once. It is 
important to note how difficult this is to achieve. The different dimensions are of a 
heterogeneous kind, and there is no easy natural congruence of the temporal, social, and 
material mechanisms of generalisation.129 The improbability of this achievement takes on a 
central importance in the modern systems theoretical concept of the function of law. What I 
said at the beginning of the section about law providing social support for contra-factual 
expectations in a way that no other system does can now be stated in more detail: it is in the 
congruent generalization of behavioural expectations along the three separate meaning 
dimensions that law finds its functional specification.  
This has important consequences for the evolution of law as a social system in global 
society. The congruent generalization of normative expectations represents a ‘selection 
achievement for law’ that allows law to become increasingly self-referential and thereby 
furthers its differentiation and autonomy.130 However, increasing societal complexity irritates 
                                                          
127 Ibid., 319. Or as pointed out by Christodoulidis, the ‘uprooting of legal traditions from their Gemeinshaft 
context, as well as the reversal of this evolutionary trend in the area of Welfare State, is reflected in a mutually 
reinforcing renegotiation of values (certainty and justice), a shift in programmes (a retreat from conditional and 
an expanse of goal programming), and a re-materialisation of roles (from the all-inclusive legal personality to 
more concrete loci of attribution of rights and duties.)’, Christodoulidis (1998), 126. 
128 Luhmann (1985a), 77. Note here the subtle switch to ‘behavioural expectations’; in realizing this congruent 
generalization in the three dimensions, the function of law is differentiated from the function of the norm. 
129 Ibid., 74. 
130 Luhmann (1988), 27; see also Luhmann (2004), 268. 
83 
 
the further differentiation of law. Rapidly increasing complexity of society during the course 
of the modern age poses new kinds of problems and possibilities in all meaning spheres. This 
results in a constellation of ‘part-system-specific horizons of possibilities which cannot be 
integrated through common conceptions of belief or common external boundaries’:131 family 
life makes requirements that are incompatible with professional work, armies and hospitals 
are hardly justifiable in the economic sphere, etc.132 The dramatic increase in complexity 
stimulates the development of law which can cope with more possibilities, which is capable 
of absorbing them with selective procedures, and which both caters for the wealth of 
possibilities and their reduction.133 The expanded horizon of possibilities of experience means 
that what was previously seen as sacred or constant is now viewed as an area of choice that 
must be justified by decision making. 
Luhmann locates the structural change which establishes the ‘decision’ as the principle 
of law, or, in other words, ‘positive law’ in the advanced stages of functional differentiation 
in the nineteenth century.134 The validity of positive law should not be seen as being based on 
the idea that higher norms permit it, but simply because it is recognised as a selection: 
‘validity is in truth nothing other than the self-reference of law.’135 Here we arrive at the state 
of evolution of legal mechanisms that Calliess refers to when he talks of how ‘[s]uddenly 
things are very easy’ for the formation of a legal system.136 However it is also here where 
there is a clear shift in the symbiosis of the dimensions of the function of law. In the temporal 
dimension laws may be valid today which were not yesterday and which will possibly not be 
valid tomorrow. In the social dimension a diversely potentialised law becomes law for ‘many 
and different types of person’; it becomes more independent of the interactional context, and 
yet at the same time can be generally accepted.137 In the material dimension, there is no 
longer any need for a normative history, and many new types of behaviour may come to be 
subject to legal regulation.138 
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All of this necessitates a higher level of structural indifference for law, and this is what 
is achieved by reflexivity.139 The development of reflexive mechanisms means law comes to 
be increasingly based on itself, indifferent to the ‘symbolic implications of deviance’, and 
indifferent to morality.140 Nonetheless, the problems of legitimacy that arise in relation to 
such a high level of indifference require the increasing incorporation of cognitive 
mechanisms into what was primarily a normative orientated structure. Not only do 
participants have to learn to adapt to what has been decided and changed, but legitimacy 
requires that decision-makers must also be able to learn themselves.141 This is mainly 
achieved through the increased functional synthesis of law and politics.142  
Of course, this increasing incorporation of cognitive mechanisms into the basic 
normative structure of law becomes more pronounced with globalization according to 
Luhmann.143 The fact that many of those fields of interaction which constitute themselves at 
the global level (e.g., technology, economy and communications, news broadcasting, etc.) are 
primarily based upon cognitive expectational attitudes has changed law itself. In a passage 
that anticipates Teubner’s theory of societal constitutionalism, Luhmann argues that many of 
the ‘worldwide structural formations’ are able now to ‘govern’ regionally validated positive 
law, not in the form of a supra-positive law, but because of the way ‘the dynamism of global 
society establishes stimuli for learning’ and exercises ‘pressures toward learning’.144 This 
change toward in-built learning is seen as effecting ‘sublime shifts in the way in which law 
fulfils its function and is experienced as meaningful.’145 This does not mean that cognitive 
expectations take the place of the normative, or make them unnecessary;146 according to 
Luhmann, ‘the temporal security, normative and counterfactual stabilisation of expectation 
will remain a requirement of modern society’.147 However, in consideration of the very 
narrow basis on which the congruent generalisation of normative expectations is established, 
Luhmann ends with a question as to ‘whether normativity with all its admitted relevance to 
behaviour can carry the contact with structural developments of global society.’148 
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Later, in his conception of law as an autopoietic system, Luhmann came to see this 
paradox—normativity remaining a requirement of society, and the problem of law realizing 
this function at the global level—as perfectly appropriate for the ‘turbulent, global conditions 
of our times’ (i.e. in that it generates such a wealth of social activity in attempts to invisiblize 
it).149 This is certainly an important point to note in moving forward with this analysis. 
However, first it is necessary to consider in more detail what the development of the theory 
of law as autopoiesis meant for the concept presented in this section of the function of law as 
the congruent generalization of normative expectations. 
 
3.4 Function after the ‘autopoietic turn’ 
 
The preceding two sections of this chapter have highlighted the centrality of the norm to 
Luhmann’s theory of law and the functional specification of law in reference to the congruent 
generalization of expectations in the temporal, social and material dimensions. Questions 
remain as to how these concepts were affected by the autopoietic turn in Luhmann’s 
sociological theory. The chapter which Luhmann devoted to the topic of the function of law 
in his last book on law, Law as a Social System (2004 [1993]), has been noted for having 
‘largely abandoned’ the earlier focus on the normative stabilization of expectations.150 A 
more exact understanding needs to be developed about this now. This section will show that, 
while it is true that Luhmann later abandoned his earlier focus on the stabilization of 
normative expectations, the functional reference of law to such expectations remains 
nonetheless important in the overall architecture of his theory. What has happened is that the 
switch from structure to communication inherent in the move to a theory of law as an 
autopoietic system has put the focus more on the temporal dimension of the function of law, 
while the social and material dimensions have receded into the background to be replaced by 
‘code’. With the autopoietic turn, function alone is no longer deemed sufficient to 
differentiate the legal system, as it only invites the search for functional equivalents. Thus, 
the differentiation of the legal system is only achieved completely with legal coding. 
However, this qualification only opens up other interesting aspects to the function of law. If 
law becomes conspicuously unable to further congruently generalize behavioural 
expectations, or if the social costs of law’s time-binding function can no longer be borne (and 
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both of the these are speculated in Luhmann’s later autopoietic account of law), then it invites 
the observer to look for functional equivalents. This section will examine the function of law 
in Luhmann’s final treatise on the subject, before moving on in the next chapter to examining 
functional equivalents to global law beyond the nation-state in relation to the general norms 
presented in the introductory chapter.  
Luhmann begins his account of the function of law in Law as a Social System by 
asserting that the ‘question of the function of law is shunted onto two tracks depending on 
how the problem to which the question refers is defined.’151 The first, he presents as being at 
a more ‘abstract’ level, whereby law ‘deals with the social costs of the time binding of 
expectations’. The second is presented as the more ‘concrete’ concept of the function of law 
outlined in his earlier evolutionary approach: ‘the stabilization of normative expectations by 
regulating how they are generalized in relation to their temporal, factual, and social 
dimensions.’152 Luhmann therefore does not completely abandon his earlier concept of the 
function of law. At other points he considers it ‘complementary’ to his theory of law as an 
autopoietic system,153 and declares that what was said about the function of law as systemic 
stabilization of counterfactual expectations ‘does not need to be rephrased.’154 Nonetheless, 
in this later account of law he devotes very little attention to this more concrete concept of the 
function of law, and instead decides to pursue the first ‘track’ to examine the more abstract 
concept of law as it ‘deals with the social costs of the time binding of expectations.’ Why 
does he do that? And what ultimately does it mean for the concept of law’s functional 
reference to normative expectations that was so carefully explicated in the earlier account? 
The first thing that needs to be considered is the way in which the shift to a theory of 
social autopoiesis reduces the importance of functional specification in terms of system 
differentiation. The functional reference in the structural relationship between system and 
environment implied by the earlier, more open systems theory was later seen to place the 
motor of evolution on the wrong side of the system/environment distinction. With the 
autopoietic turn references to function recede to the background, and the difference between 
system and environment becomes the ‘departure point’ of a systems theoretical analysis.155 
Reflecting the implications of Maturana’s concept of the circular and reflexive dynamics of 
biological systems and Spencer Brown’s calculus of indication, systems are considered to be 
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structurally orientated to their environment in that they cannot exist without an 
environment.156 In other words, they constitute and maintain themselves by differentiating 
themselves from their environment, and they use their boundaries to regulate this difference. 
The self-referential implications of this existence would later lead Luhmann to the conclusion 
that ‘a system is the difference between system and environment.’157  
In contrast to the conception of law differentiated solely on the basis of its function as a 
structure of society, systems theory switches to the question of how operations produce the 
difference between the legal system and the environment, and the recursive application of 
such operations to themselves.158 On a conceptual level, the shift in focus from structure to 
process, and the identification of the communicative event as the basic element of society, 
reduces the importance of an incremental process of morphogenesis through self-reference on 
the basis of functional specification. Autopoietic systems, it is said, must perform their 
operations in the actual present and, with this the concept of structure is reduced to refer only 
to ‘how elements relate across temporal distance.’159  
Thus, a system is only concretized on the level of its elements. ‘Only there,’ says 
Luhmann ‘does it achieve a real temporal existence.’160 Again, the root of this lies in his 
adaptation of Spencer Brown’s calculus of indication. The purpose of drawing a distinction 
‘is to produce a difference, because only a difference between this and that makes possible 
the observation of this or that.’161 This drawing of the distinction is an operation that takes 
time. And because it is an operation that takes time, both sides of the distinction cannot be 
indicated at the same time.162 An important consequence of this conclusion is that systems 
operate in their own temporal horizon. Autopoietic systems constitute themselves through the 
recursive application of their operations to preceding operations. Thus, the recursive 
interconnection of operations ‘takes place in the present on the basis of currently available 
conditions and connectivity options.’163 In other words, ‘a system only exists as an actually 
ongoing operation for the time period between the preceding and the following operation.’164 
For the operation then, Luhmann explains, ‘there is accordingly neither a beginning, because 
the system must always have already begun if it is to be able to reproduce its operations from 
                                                          
156 Luhmann (1995), 17. 
157 Luhmann (2006), 38.  
158 Luhmann (2004), 78, ff. 
159 Luhmann (1995), 282. 
160 Ibid., 291. 
161 Kjaer (2006), 67. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Luhmann (2012), 266. 
164 Kjaer (2006), 68. 
88 
 
its own products, nor an end, because every further operation is produced with an eye to 
further operations.’165   
In application of these abstract notions to law, the function of law thus comes to be seen 
as involving ‘time binding’, and attempts to ‘anticipate, at least on the level of expectations, a 
still unknown, genuinely uncertain future.’166 In this sense, the reference to law as a ‘structure 
of symbolically generalized expectations’, which he developed earlier, is no longer simply 
about generalized instructions which are independent of given situations, but more explicitly 
relates to symbols representing something ‘which is invisible and cannot become visible’, 
i.e., the future.167  
Moreover, rather than rephrasing what was said about the temporal dimension in the 
earlier evolutionary account, attention is devoted instead to the ‘social costs’ which are a 
consequence of this time binding function. Here Luhmann briefly revisits the three meaning 
dimensions of law outlined in his evolutionary approach. ‘Law as a form’ he argues, ‘is 
related to the tensions between the temporal and social dimensions and which makes it 
possible to cope with them even under the conditions of an evolutionary rise of social 
complexity.’168 This is much the same as what has already been said in relation to the 
congruent generalisation of the dimensions. However, he qualifies the relationship between 
the three dimensions in relation to the social costs of time binding. ‘All social adjustments of 
law’ he states, ‘vary the factual, the ‘contents’ of the values legal and illegal, in order to 
maintain time binding and the character of consensus/dissent in a realm of reciprocal 
compatibility.’169 In other words, because the ‘factual dimension’170 is in constant flux in 
administering this ‘balancing act’ there ‘is no factual definition of law’.171 
To recap then, the autopoietic turn places emphasis on the system/environment 
distinction and the operational present, rather than any morphogenesis arising from functional 
specification, and this in turn leads to increased emphasis on the temporal dimension. 
Luhmann explains what much of this theoretical shift of focus means for the function of law: 
                                                          
165 Luhmann (2012), 266. Thus it is only an observer who can make out a beginning and an end by adopting 
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complexity to describe itself in the temporal dimension can it “postcipate” its beginning.’ The determination of a 
‘beginning’, an ‘origin’, or a ‘source’ therefore is only ‘a myth fabricated in the system itself — or an account 
by another observer.’ (ibid.). 
166 Luhmann (2004), 147. 
167 Ibid., 146. 
168 Ibid., 147. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Ziegert translated ‘sachlich’ as ‘factual’, whereas Albrow translated it as ‘material’, see for a note on this, 
Albrow (2014b), xxxv.  
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Contrary to the assumption of an earlier version of the theory of functional differentiation 
and specification, which was oriented around the advantages of the division of labour, 
orientation by function alone is not sufficient. This follows from the simple fact that the 
reference to a function is always an invitation to look for functionally equivalent 
alternatives, that is, to cross system boundaries.172  
 
Thus, function does not suffice for closing the legal system simply because it does not 
adequately differentiate the legal system from society. It is only the application of the code of 
legal/illegal as products of second-order observation of the legal system that secure the 
operative closure of the legal system in this sense.173  Furthermore, only such coding provides 
for the self-reproduction and universality of the legal system, in so far as its binary code (the 
unity of a distinction) can apply to all matters and can be irritated by every communication, 
quite independent of the motives of first-order observers.174 With the introduction of code the 
institutionalization and abstraction achieved by the social and material dimensions can recede 
into the background.  
These advances do not, however, render function entirely irrelevant in terms of a 
systems theoretical perspective of law. Even in Luhmann’s theory of law as an autopoietic 
system, functional specification remains ‘part of the truth’,175 and, together with coding, is 
presented as a necessary ‘achievement’ of the differentiation of the legal system. In a later 
account Luhmann even states that systems achieve operational closure ‘on the basis of their 
functional primacy’.176 In this sense, functional specification provides ‘distinctive point of 
self-reference’ that the systems network of recursive operations orbit around.177 Function and 
                                                          
172 Luhmann (2004), 93. 
173 It is here, in this focus upon the second-order of observation, that some small degree of similarity emerges 
between Luhmann’s autopoietic theory of law and Hart’s ‘descriptive sociology’ towards a concept of law based 
upon secondary rules of recognition, Hart, (1997), vi. This is of course not to equate the theories in any 
substantial sense. Luhmann distinguishes himself from the dogma of legal science by adopting a sociological 
position focused on the contingency of law, and rejecting as unacceptable the idea of a ‘legal source’ (this 
distinction is often overlooked in comparing the theories, see, for example, Arthur Jacobson, ‘Autopoietic Law: 
The New Science of Niklas Luhmann’, 87 Michigan Law Review, (1989), 1647, 1663). Nonetheless, the shift in 
focus on to the secondary observation of law can be said to represent some move away from a strict sociology of 
law towards the sociology of jurisprudence. What saves the broad sociological resonance of the theory in both 
respects is only the functional specification of law serving as a conceptual precondition of law’s use of coding in 
operative closure. 
174 Luhmann (2004), 102.  
175 Luhmann (1992), 1426.  
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coding are therefore said to ‘stimulate’ each other.178 Coding might provide a correlate for the 
universality of law, and may even generate its own conflict, but there still must be a 
projection of behavioural expectations on the legal system, and thus a specific engagement 
with a ‘legal’ problem. On the basis of normative expectations and ensuing controversies 
about the law, law is able to develop its ‘special instruments’.179 On the other hand, 
functional specification is sharpened up as the function of law is separated, for example, from 
the function of morality ‘which operates on a basis of a good/bad distinction.’180 Thus, just 
like before ‘law claims a specific use of normativity for itself’.181 However, this time, as an 
autopoietic system, it ‘not only regulates conflicts but also creates them’.182  
To repeat this important point: the shift to social autopoiesis does not render the 
concept of function irrelevant to social systems theory. This explains why when the function 
of law is discussed in the later Law as a Social System, for example, Luhmann refers the 
reader to the more ‘concrete’ concept he developed in this earlier book before moving 
quickly to determining what the function of law in the stabilization of normative expectations 
means for the differentiation of society and its legal system.183 It becomes part of the fabric of 
this later account of law.  
 
3.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has focused on Luhmann’s earlier functionalist account of law as an approach 
which offers a perspective on both the dynamic role of norms in society, as well as the 
specific logics of the legal system. This was necessary in order to move forward with 
constructing the problem of general norms at the global level. The concept of the norm as a 
counterfactually stabilized expectation which opens possibilities of further evolution has been 
presented in the context of world society connected through communications technology and 
defined by increasing attribution of risk to decision. Law has been presented as being 
orientated to these developments through its function in the congruent generalization of 
behavioural expectations. While this concept of function has faded into background with the 
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autopoietic turn and the general shift to the coding of law in world society, it has nonetheless 
remained part of the fabric of Luhmann’s later theory of law. The functional reference of law 
is a necessary step in its differentiation through coding, providing the distinctive focal point 
for the self-reference of the legal system. This maintains the central place of the norm in the 
systems theoretical concept of law; the theory’s ‘normative core’. 
If anything, the need for normativity only becomes more of a problem with the 
development of world society. As stated, Luhmann ended his earlier functionalist account of 
law by questioning whether normativity can maintain contact with the shift of evolutionary 
primacy to cognitive mechanisms in world society. Writing some twenty years later, in the 
‘new world order’ of the early 1990s, Luhmann was in ‘no doubt that the global society has a 
legal order, even if it does not have central legislation and decision-making.’184 However, his 
prognosis for the function of law at the global level was more sceptical than it ever was. On 
top of the problem of the need for an increasing incorporation of cognitive mechanisms into 
the basic normative structure of law, Luhmann also identified the problem of law’s functional 
incapacity to assume and process risk,185 as well the function of law being undermined by a 
dominating meta-code of inclusion/exclusion in the fragmented nature of world society.186 
As stated in the second chapter, systems theoretical accounts of law have transcended 
these problems by constructing law in the rarefied spaces of world society. However, one can 
equally maintain the central focus on the norm and the functional of law and use them to test 
the limits of law in the face of the problems of globalization. Luhmann himself did not take 
up the invitation to search for functional equivalents in relation to the problems for law in 
world society. The question as to why he did not will have to be bracketed for now—
however, it can be seen that his theory and method can be used to further construct the 
problem of norms which are formulated at a more primary level, but which go unrealized in 
law.  
The second chapter has focused on the limits of a global ‘private’ law. It will now turn 
its attention to ‘public’ international law. As it will be shown, that legal system has also 
become increasingly functionally orientated to norms arising at the global level. However, it 
will also be shown that this aspiring function is hindered by another lingering functional 
reference of the international legal system: the stabilization of a sovereignty doctrine that 
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continues to be structurally embedded in the functional differentiation and globalization of 
society.   
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4  General norms and the consensualism of international law 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Public international law has not been subject to the kind of functional analysis that Luhmann 
has conducted into law in the more general (or municipal) context. Luhmann himself argued 
that the primacy of the nation-state as a subject of international law has frustrated this kind of 
sociological analysis by obscuring the functional reference to the problem of double 
contingency and meaningful communication in world society.1 Even international lawyers 
admit that the predominant concern for the practical interpretation of positive law in a legal 
system that is consensual to the will of nation-states often negates an interest in the function 
of international law.2 Under such conditions, for example, the ‘real problem seems always to 
be less about whether international law should aim for ‘peace’, ‘security’, or ‘human rights’ 
than about how to resolve interpretative controversies’ that emerge between nation-states.3 
Moreover, when international lawyers do directly address the subject of the function of 
international law, it is often conflated or included with other issues to such a degree that it 
has, in the end, little to do with the function of international law that one might expect 
coming from the sociological perspective. Thus, Brownlie devotes the first chapter of his 
classic textbook to ‘The Function of Law in the International Community’, however, rather 
than a functional analysis of international law, what is presented is a review of the various 
conceptions of the nature of international law in international legal scholarship.4 Kelsen, on 
the other hand, entitles the third part of his Principles of International Law (1952), ‘The 
Essential Function of International Law’, yet it contains only a very narrow functional 
analysis, and is taken up instead by a justification for applying positivist methodology to 
international law.5 One can even find monographs with titles such as ‘The Function of Public 
International Law’ that are in fact only about ‘the effect that rules of public international law 
                                                          
1 Luhmann (1985a), 261, n. 101. There has been some limited structural-functionalist analysis of international 
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have on members of international society’ in either limiting or conferring the power to act of 
members of the international community6—something quite different from the function of 
law as stabilizing counterfactual expectations against an invisible future.7  
There is, however, Hersch Lauterpacht’s The Function of Law in the International 
Community (1933), which is said to be the ‘most important English language book on 
international law in the 20th century’.8 Admittedly that is only about the judicial function; in 
rebutting the presumption that the political nature of certain international disputes renders 
them unsuitable for adjudication, Lauterpacht argues that international judges can and should 
develop international law at every point by recourse to general principles and the 
interpretation of the moral purpose of international law. This is obviously much narrower, 
and otherwise quite different to Luhmann’s concept of the function of law.9 Nonetheless, 
Lauterpacht’s classic text can be interpreted as an early sign of the chrysalis of a more social 
concept of international law that would become more prevalent with time. In justification of 
his ‘constructive idealism’ in relation to the problem, as he saw it, of an international legal 
framework that is so consensual towards the will of nation-states,10 Lauterpacht argues that 
‘[n]o doubt it is true to say that international law is made for States, and not States for 
international law; but it is true only in the sense that the State is made for human beings, and 
not human beings for the State.’11 A Luhmannian formula might replace ‘human being’ for 
‘the problem of double contingency’, but it is clear that what is being grasped at here is the 
idea that the function of international law is no different from that of the law of any other 
society.12 
This position has been echoed by Philip Allott’s ‘social idealism’.13 Allott is notable 
amongst international legal scholars for addressing the issue of the function of international 
law ‘most explicitly’.14  He first approaches the issue in the negative sense, by arguing that an 
international legal system that functions only in respect of the sovereign independence of 
nation-states is only the international law of ‘unsociety’; that is, in the sense that it negates 
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‘the common interest of human beings in their collective survival and prospering’.15 The ‘true 
function of law in the international community,’ he argues, ‘is precisely the same as the true 
function of law in any human society’,16 which he reads, more on intuition rather than 
sociological analysis, as ‘the self-constituting of all forms of society.’17  
These functional accounts of international law reflect the general development of 
international law since 1945. After the war, international lawyers began to expand the scope 
of law beyond the subjectivity of nation-states, not only in advancing concepts of 
‘transnational law’ as encompassing the ‘actions or events that transcend national 
boundaries’,18 but in reimagining international law as the ‘common law of mankind’,19 as a 
legal framework of ‘co-existence’,20 and in broadening the concept of ‘international 
community’ to posit a more primary subject of international law that is independent of the 
will of nation-states.21 Moreover, rather than being driven by purely utopian aspirations, this 
development of international law—in so far as it was seeking to overcome the formalism of 
classic international law and to address the evolving complexity of international and global 
society—was symptomatic of more general social trends which were equally reflected in the 
turn to reflexive law at the domestic level.22 The ‘sociological approach’ of the New Haven 
school, for example, which led the turn away from formal rules to focus instead on law as 
process, argued for the abandonment of the traditional approach to international legal 
personality and for the inclusion of a broader social category.23 Ultimately these approaches 
led to increasingly broad statements of the function of international law as, for example, 
‘identifying common interest, and providing a means for attaining these’,24 or ‘the application 
of a conceptual apparatus or framework … to the concrete problems faced in the international 
community.’25 
World society has changed radically in the past 100 years, and the developments appear 
increasingly taxing for classical international law. Within a relatively brief time period 
international law has gone from dealing with issues of interstate comity which could be easily 
answered with a Westphalian framework of sovereign equality and independence to issues 
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involving the threat to the international community as a whole; to issues which simply cannot 
be left to the presumed independence of nation-states.26 Thus, despite the classical 
foundations which predisposed the international legal system to consensualism towards the 
interests of independent nation-states, international lawyers have sought to reconfigure 
international law in such a way as to better answer the problems that present themselves with 
globalized society.27 The high water-mark of this, as will be explored below, is the 
construction of an international constitution that, in response to the increased appearance of 
de-territorialized problems and global interdependence, asserts a withering of state 
sovereignty and a shift to an orientation instead to ‘fundamental’ global values and norms.28 
It is therefore a logical step to ‘cast a side-long glance’ at public international law as a 
functional equivalent to the problem of general norms at the global level. This also has the 
advantage of reflecting the ‘crucial’ role of the nation-state in the global normative order.29. 
However, before I move in the next chapter to the more specific and empirical examination of 
international law’s performance in respect of certain general norms, I wish to use this chapter 
to introduce the international legal system in a more general and theoretical manner, and to 
discuss some of the underlying conditions which bear relevance on international law’s 
functional capacity in relation to general norms. Ultimately, what this chapter hopes to do is 
bring to the fore the paradox of international law: that although that legal system has been 
increasingly orientated to world society as a social system since the end of the Second World 
War, the historical foundations of the international legal system, nonetheless, continue to 
orientate international law towards a sovereignty doctrine which conflicts with the realization 
of generalized norms arising at the global level. This conclusion may appear pedestrian; little 
different, for example, from Koskinniemi’s argument that international law has become a 
dialectic between apology and utopia. However, using systems theory and functional method, 
the chapter hopes to show that the conflict is not one of ideologies, but rather functional 
references: that the original functional reference of international law to world society was 
established through its stabilization of the emerging sovereign nation-state as a pillar 
supporting the shift to functional differentiation, and that this entrenched structure continues 
to interfere with the realization of international law’s functional reference to generalized 
norms at the global level. 
                                                          
26 See Declaration of President Bedjaoui, 268, para. 15, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ 
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To reach this conclusion the chapter will employ a tripartite scheme to explore the 
underlying conditions of the international legal system. The first section will examine 
international law’s relationship with politics. It will argue that international law’s lack of 
structural coupling with a centralized political system is a consequence of the successful 
functional synthesis of law and politics achieved within the nation-state, and that this 
condition detracts from international law’s legitimacy in positivizing general norms at the 
global level. The second section will look at a continued problematic relationship between 
international law and physical violence. This too will be presented as consequence of the 
sovereign independence of the nation-state which ultimately frustrates the development of the 
legal autonomy which is necessary for the positivization of general norms, and as a 
conspicuous invite of the search for functional equivalents for the realization of global norms.  
The third section will present the sovereignty doctrine which is central to international law as 
segmentary differentiation of the global political system that not only underwrites these 
conditions, but which remains structurally related to the functional differentiation of world 
society. This tripartite is completely arbitrary, and there will be inevitable conceptual overlap 
between each of the factors. Nonetheless, hopefully this reductive method will be enough to 
present a snapshot of the complex underlying conditions of the international legal system, 
before moving on to a more empirical analysis of international law in the next chapter.  
 
4.2 The structural coupling between international law and politics 
 
International law’s ‘antagonistic relation to politics’30 has been a perennial theme for 
international legal scholars. The prevalent view that that international law has no autonomy 
from the power structures of international society stimulates much of international legal 
scholarship.31 Writing in 1989, for example, Koskenniemi presents the spectrum of scholastic 
concepts of international law under four categories in terms of ‘how they differ in respect of 
their approach to the law/politics delimitation.’32 This includes a sceptical approach which 
doubts the law/politics distinction at the international level (but which therefore fails to take 
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account of law’s normativity);33 a rule-based approach which identifies law with formal rules 
and considers everything else ‘politics’ (but which fails to show why its own interpretation of 
the rule is ‘unpolitical’);34 the policy-based approach which presents a more porous 
distinction between law and politics at the international level (but which must ultimately 
grasp at natural law principles to avoid uncritical apologism);35 and an ‘idealistic’ approach 
which distinguishes law from politics on the basis that law is a ‘scientific truth which is 
verifiable to the actual living conditions, needs and interests of peoples’,36 (but which, in 
doing so, inevitably appears ‘political’ itself).37 
In recent years international lawyers have reflected the increasing societal 
fragmentation at the primary level and developed a more nuanced approach which navigates 
all these pitfalls. First they have sought to adopt ‘an intermediate position, one that maintains 
the distinctiveness of the legal order while managing to be responsive to the extra-legal 
setting of politics, history and morality.’38 This has been postulated as a recognition, on one 
hand, that international law necessarily ‘involves the pursuit of social ends through the 
exercise of legitimate power’ and is thereby an ‘aspect of the broader political process’, and, 
on the other, that international law retains a sufficient degree of normativity that ‘the rules 
must be accepted as a means of independent control or that effectively limits the conduct of 
the entities subject to law.’39 Since then, however, international law is supposed to have 
entered its ‘post-ontological era’, whereby it has achieved the maturity to move beyond 
questions of whether international law is ‘law’ or simply ‘politics’, and to address what are 
seen as the pertinent questions as to the effectiveness or fairness of international law.40 This 
can be seen to have provided the basis of a range of approaches which now embrace the 
conflation of international law and politics; for example, an approach that accepts, and even 
focuses on, the ‘politics of international law’ as a ‘grammar’ essential to the practice of 
international law. The politics of international law then becomes ‘what competent 
international lawyers do.’41 In this professional milieu, even concepts of international legal 
positivism are reconstructed in a way that acknowledges that there can be no simple 
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distinction of law and politics, as the old ‘rule-based’ approach would have it, but which 
make attempts instead to  ‘to celebrate the role of politics in international reality.’42 
Thus the observation of law’s antagonistic relation with politics hardly offers a 
refreshing insight into international law. There is, however, something new to be added in 
this respect by engaging a sociological perspective which views a ‘certain synthesis between 
the political and legal functions’ as being indispensable to the evolution of modern society.43 
The upshot of this functional synthesis for the legal system is an openess to the normative 
complexity of society and the provision of an external source of authority to support its 
legitimacy in accommodating a greater range of norms. While it is not possible to map in 
detail the co-evolution of law and politics at the national level it is nonetheless useful to 
briefly consider key aspects of this co-evolution and to juxtapose it with the evolution of the 
international legal system. This juxtaposition is important because it highlights how the 
entrenched coupling of the legal and political systems at the national level very much 
determined the character and shape of the modern international legal system. This section 
will therefore begin by briefly recounting Luhmann’s functionalist account of the co-
evolution of law and politics at the national level, before considering the way in which the 
evolution of international law has been both different but connected to the co-evolution of the 
legal and political system at the national level. Rather than engaging in a lengthy analysis of 
the co-evolution of law and politics though, it will reduce analysis to the development of the 
function of law through various forms of societal differentiation.44 Generally speaking these 
are: segmentary differentiation, stratificatory differentiation and functional differentiation.45  
Segmentary differentiation relates to the principle by which ‘society is structured into 
various equal, or at least similar, part systems’.46 This is commonly associated with primitive 
society, and would include, for example, families, tribes, villages, etc. This ‘form of 
differentiation is the one most prone to be being organized in terms of territorial 
                                                          
42 d’Aspremont and Kammerhofer (2014), 7. 
43 Luhmann (2004), 165.  
44 Ibid.  
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delimitations’,47 or to be ‘distinguished on the basis of either descent or residential 
communities, or a combination of the two.’48 
Stratifactory differentiation relates to differentiation in terms of rank and the creation of 
a hierarchical social order. As Luhmann puts it, it allows for ‘dissimilarity in rank between 
subsystems’.49 This form of differentiation enjoyed primacy in the period from Classical 
Antiquity to at least the early Middle Ages.50  However, it is still reflected in aspects of 
society today, such as in the Indian caste system, in patriarchal society, and in those societies 
that are still largely stratified in terms of class. Moreover, hierarchical differentiation also 
remains instrumental to the productivity of modern organizations.51  
Functional differentiation refers to the differentiation that occurs when specialized 
communications accrue around the ‘special functions to be fulfilled at the level of the society 
itself.’ 52 On one hand, each system is differentiated out through its function and coding. On 
the other, the functions have to be fulfilled equally and society does not give primacy to any 
one system. Functional systems are therefore ‘alike in their dissimilarity.’53 We have seen 
already the example of the functional specification of the legal system in the stabilization of 
normative expectations. Other examples include an economic system that secures ‘want 
satisfaction within enlarged time horizons’,54 a religious system that can give foundation to 
meaning ‘whenever a detour is taken via paradox’,55 etc. The gradual change from 
segmentary to functional differentiation is generally seen as a basic feature of societal 
development.56 According to Luhmann the primacy of this form of differentiation ‘developed 
since the late Middle Ages and was recognized as disruptive only in the second half of the 
18th century.’57 The first date will prove significant to the argument presented below in this 
section.  
These are the three forms of differentiation through which the co-evolution of law and 
politics can be read. Luhmann did later add centre/periphery differentiation58 which allows 
for asymmetric relations between different social spheres, for example, centres within tribal 
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52 Luhmann (1977), 35.  
53 Luhmann (2013a), 13. 
54 Luhmann (1977), 35.  
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58 Luhmann (2013).  
101 
 
structure or the difference between cities and rural areas within the nation-state.59 This also 
can be identified in relation to the early international relations in the form of 
citizen/foreigner, as well as international relations between the first and third world,60 and is  
arguably also related to the ‘global city’ with all its attendant crises.61 This form of 
differentiation will be only presented as relevant to the present analysis in that it allows for 
the transcendence of the principle of segmentation,62 for example in the equal differentiation 
of sovereign nation-states which are also arranged in a first and third world basis.  
As Luhmann says, there is no theoretical justification for this catalogue.63 And, in so far 
as they do correspond to reality, the forms of differentiation do not hand over neatly with 
historical development but instead may overlap and at times even regress to earlier the 
primacy of earlier forms.64 Moreover, while one form of differentiation may typically gain 
primacy once it is ‘tried and tested’ by societal evolution, various forms will always coexist 
and work in symbiosis. Thus, even in modern society which gives primacy to functional 
differentiation, segmentary differentiation plays a role, for example in the differentiation of 
families or nation-states, while stratification exists in class systems. As I explore below, the 
complex integration of the forms of differentiation in the constitution of world society bears 
and important relevance to the development of international law. Finally, the presentation of 
the co-evolution of the legal and political systems through the prism of these three forms of 
differentiation is admittedly reductive of the non-linear complexity of the evolution of the 
modern nation-state.65 Nonetheless, the aim here is to present a basic picture of the structural 
relationship between law and politics in the context of this complex of differntiation. 
To begin with, in primitive society which gave primacy to segmentary differentiation 
there was little functional synthesis between law and politics. Rather, the regulation of 
disputes under such a form of differentiation was so heavily conflated with the organization 
of power that the functional specification of a either a legal or a political system could not 
develop properly. Here the dominating principle of kinship meant that in legal disputes 
adjudicators could rarely overlook who the direct and indirect participants were in relation to 
ancestors, property or reputation.66 As such there was no real possibility of conceiving of law 
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as a contingent normative structure, and therefore no concept of legal ‘validity’. Law could 
only move beyond this to forms of conciliation in the late phases of archaic societies which 
were ‘familiar with a certain extent of political organization’ and with the differentiation of 
political-administrative roles and the establishment of decision-making procedure.67 
However, as long as ‘the function of arbitration and satisfaction can only be realised in close 
dependence on the social structure and distribution of power contained within it’, the 
potential development of law towards higher complexity remained limited.68 
The problem was solved to some extent with the shift to stratifactory differentiation in 
pre-modern high cultures. The hierarchical ordering of society in terms of an ‘above’ and a 
‘below’ allowed for the ‘societal primacy of the political function centre.’69 The development 
of the political system in turn facilitated the increasing institutionalisation of procedure, tasks 
could be distributed in accordance with those ranks, and ‘an asymmetrical communication 
structure with directive capacity at the top’ could be established.70 The establishment of an 
apex which was superior in power to all the individual forces of the city-state meant that 
normative decisions could be enforced, and with this courts and the role of the adjudicator 
developed beyond the supervision of the ritual and led to the increased abstraction of legal 
doctrine.71 The institutionalization of anonymised third parties guaranteed a certain degree of 
independence in adjudication and allowed for decisions based more through orientation to 
norms and encouraged a higher degree of verbalisation and reflection on the law. 
Furthermore, judicial semantics became more refined and condensed with increasing 
adjudication before the courts.72  
The church in particular provided a model of political and legal organization for 
European states in the high Middle Ages.73  However, according to Luhmann, the continued 
dependence upon relatively concrete social reality and a dominating religious horizon 
endowed law with too many ‘symbolic and expressive functions’ and ultimately meant that 
political rule could not yet usurp responsibility for the establishment and change of law.74 
This changed again, however, in the late Middle Ages, with the Reformation and the 
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increased renouncement of political affiliation with the Holy Roman Empire. This marks a 
pivotal point in the emergence of the modern nation-state as a unity of law and politics.75 
However, it also must be read in the more general context of the shift from stratificatory to 
functional differentiation that was occurring around that time. The fragmentation of society 
into functional spheres, each different in their functional specification and yet alike in 
claiming universal authority, led to an explosion of possibilities of expereience that could 
only be realized to a limited extent, and thus to ensuing problems of shared meaning and 
consensus.76 Yet, at the same time, hierarchy came to be increasingly experienced as 
contingent and the legitimacy of representation was questioned.77 Through some tumultuous 
evolution the political system—that is, parliamentarianism and ‘consensus by means of 
rationally ordered discussion’—emerges as the best equipped to deal with this problem. 78 
Whether or not it remains so today, politics appeared the best solution under the conditions 
arising from the shift to functional differnetiation. Although parliamentary representation 
could not take the place of hierarchy and its summit, Luhmann considers this development as 
the only means of creating the ‘the fiction of the general will’ in functionally differentiated 
society.79   
These developments necessitated a more entrenched form of functional synthesis 
between law and politics than was achieved in previous societies. The increased experience 
of contingency and dissolution of previous authority results in calls for either ‘rule of law’ or 
‘right of resistance’, and ultimately leads to the unity of law and politics in the ‘state’.80 On 
the one hand, the rule of law legitimates the administration of the political system. On the 
other, law is endowed with an authority to change and to respond to the increased societal 
complexity through its coupling with the political system. This arrangement manifests itself 
in legislation to an increasing extent. Thus, positive law develops when the political system 
‘usurps the decision regarding law and then deals with the societal system as a whole as its 
environment and source of information, pressures, stimuli for norms, in short as an 
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excessively complex area of selection.’81 These lines of development led to the conditions for 
the full positivization of law: the channelling of normative projections which aim at legal 
validity along the political route; the centralization and regulation of political conflicts 
centres, where political fronts could organize themselves to ‘simultaneously mirror general 
societal contradictions’, without descending into violence, and; the variability of programmes 
that facilitates the opportunistic treatment of ‘values’.82 
According to Luhmann, these developments are perfected with advance of the 
constitution. It was not until the end of the eighteenth century, and notably ‘at the periphery 
of Europe’ (i.e., in North America), that the form was ‘invented which guaranteed the 
structural coupling between the legal and political systems.’83 Constitutions both restrict the 
influences of law and politics on each other while at the same time increasing possibilities for 
both systems.84 This arrangement allows for the exclusion of corrupting influences from the 
respective systems;85 a filter through which external stimuli can be channelled into the 
system. On the other hand, it opens up more possibilities for the legal system to realize the 
varying normative decisions of the political system, while the legitimating effect of 
legalization opens up more possibilities for the political system.86 These conditions are co-
dependent: constitutions allow for an immense increase in mutual irritability by ‘limiting the 
corridors of contact to the respective systems.’87  
After the autopoietic turn, Luhmann came to define this arrangement whereby a 
‘system presupposes certain features of its environment on an ongoing basis and relies on 
them structurally’, as structural coupling.88  Structural coupling achieves a number of things 
for the system, beyond the externalization of the systems foundational paradox—as, for 
example, when law is able to acquire legitimacy through its structural coupling to politics 
through a constitution.89 Structural coupling also allows the system to be open to the 
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environment while, at the same time, maintaining the historical structures of the system. 
Rather than transforming the operatively closed system into an open, or ‘trivial’, system,90 
structural couplings are said to ‘trigger irritations’ within the system; that is, the recognition 
of environmental stimuli which depend on the ‘form of perception’ that is particular to the 
system.91 This makes it easier for the system to ‘focus irritability and prepare, in the ambit of 
possibilities, for what may happen.’92 But, this does not lead to the system merging with the 
environment in any way. Because self-reference depends upon the system being able to use 
the difference between itself and the environment within itself, the channel to environmental 
stimuli achieved with structural coupling only furthers the systems differentiation.93  
How has international law reflected the structural coupling that has been achieved by 
politics and law at the national level? The most direct answer to that question is contained in 
the statement that: ‘[t]he character of modern international law, and its transformations, 
depend upon the structure of the modern nation State system.’94 However, this is a rather 
negative formulation; it states only what is lacking, and does not spell out what kind of 
structural relation international law has built with the political system. Obviously though 
international law has not been able to achieve a similar kind of structural coupling with a 
centralized political system that is capable of representing world society. If one looks at the 
history of international law,95  one can obviously finds a different evolution that is parallel to 
the co-evolution of law and politics within the modern-nation-state.  
While there may be some evidence that relations between Greek city-states96 were 
characterised by an early form of the law of nations,97 or that such took hold with the concept 
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of jus gentium developed by Roman jurists,98 most agree that ‘only from the late Middle Ages 
is it possible to find consistent traces of international legal order.’99 According to Grewe, the 
complex factors that led to the emergence of the modern international legal system can be 
located with a temporal triangulation of the emergence of Christendom as a ‘community of 
faith’ in Europe in the high Middle Ages, its subsequent dissolution in the Reformation in the 
late Middle Ages, and the demarcation of peace in Europe in 1648.100 It is worth 
remembering here Luhmann’s argument about the shift to functional differentiation: ‘In the 
early seventeenth century the process starts’ and is ‘made visible by religious wars, by 
economic fluctuations, and geographic and scientific extensions of world views.’101 
This reflects the popular view of the Peace of Westphalia as the ‘majestic portal’ 
through which modern international law emerged.102 Despite the complexity of the evolution 
of international law, and the ‘mythic’ status the Peace of Westphalia has acquired in the 
international legal system,103 there is no doubt that the peace treaties of Münster and 
Osnabrück in 1648 which ended the Thirty Years War were a pivotal moment in the 
development of international law. The advent of sovereign and equal states, more than any 
other historical development, made international law a ‘necessity’.104 But viewed through the 
prism of differentiation theory, this ‘necessity’ takes on a new colour and can no longer be 
simply explained as the necessity of regulation of inter-relations between newly emerged 
sovereign and independent nation-states. Rather, it can be construed as solution to the broader 
problems that emerge with the shift to functional differentiation that gave rise to nation-state.  
Something that is often overlooked in this context is the link also between the 
development of international law by Spanish scholars in the sixteenth century and the global 
activities of Spanish conquistadors in the Age of Exploration. Many scholars credit Vitoria 
with first distinguishing international law as ius inter gentes: a concept of a universal 
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international legal community encompassing the globe.105 Thus, notice, there is a definite 
move away from Greek distinctions of citizen and barbarian, and a move towards more 
inclusion. The relationship is not coincidental. Christian theology was instrumental here, but 
so too was another globalizing functional system. As Vitoria argued that human beings were 
sociable in nature,106 Spanish conquistadors were held to be entitled to have dealings with the 
indigenous people of the Americas and to engage in commercial activities there.107 And of 
course, it is not only Vitoria who can be connected to the expansion of the economic system 
reflecting the shift to functional differentiation; Grotius, the ‘father of international law’,108 
was quite literally in the employ of the Dutch East Indies Company,109 and had developed his 
own concept of ‘societas humana’ to this end.110 
This presents an alternative relationship between international law and the structural 
coupling of law and politics achieved within the nation-state. That is, the relationship 
between international law and the functional synthesis of law and politics within the nation-
state is not simply to be explained as a necessary supra-legal framework to govern the 
relations between independent sovereign states, but rather can be related to the shift to 
functional differentiation of society which stimulated that functional synthesis of law and 
politics within the nation-state. What international law achieves here is the guarantee of the 
autonomy of the nation-state as a framework allowing for the differentiation and global 
expansion of functional areas (a national economy, national science, etc.). This would mean 
that international law is tied in with the functional differentiation of society through the 
sovereignty doctrine. What is problematic about this is that state sovereignty, as a ‘complex 
aggregate of practices’ remains a prevalent feature—and some would say it only 
‘intensifies’—in globalized society.111 This would suggest that, despite international law’s 
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increasing functional reference to highly generalized norms at the global level since 1945, the 
legal system, nonetheless, retains another reference to the larger social system, i.e, a 
functional reference to the functional differentiation of the larger social system through 
providing a legal framework of state sovereignty.  
As will be explored further in the third section of this chapter, these conflicting 
functional references—i.e., reference to the larger system through stabilization of global 
norms versus reference to the larger system through state sovereignty—result in a difficult 
paradox for the international legal system. For the remainder of this section, however, I wish 
to explore what it means for international law’s relationship with politics, and ultimately what 
it means for the development of international law in respect of general norms. So far as 
international law maintains a functional reference through sovereignty doctrine, it cannot rely 
on any structural relationship with a political system over and above the political systems of 
sovereign nation-states. That is to say, it cannot achieve the kind of functional synthesis with 
politics that has been achieved at the national level. Its function has ossified in another 
direction. It therefore has not achieved the legitimacy that national law has achieved through 
its coupling with the political system, nor has it been able to open the channels to normative 
complexity in the way that domestic law has through this structural arrangement. 
There are many ways in which modern international law has reflected this tension 
between the lack of structural coupling to a political system at the global level and the 
increasing need for the stabilization of norms arising at the global level.  I would like to focus 
on one very recent example of this in international legal scholarship and practice, namely 
international constitutionalism. This development not only demonstrates how international 
legal scholarship has sought to overcome this lack of functional synthesis with the political 
system to represent general norms that emerge in a globalized society, but it also reflects the  
paradox of the conflicting functional references in international law to world society as a 
social system and to the sovereign independent nation-state. I will call it ‘international 
constitutionalism’ in contrast to ‘global constitutionalism’,112 because although it shares with 
latter a concern with the constitutionalization of a ‘global, polyarchic, and multilevel 
governance’,113 it must be distinguished on the grounds that it pays less attention to the 
legitimacy problem in a functionally differentiated society. This is important because it 
allows international constitutionalists to reach for even more general norms than are typically 
included in Teubner’s model of the self-contained regime.  
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International constitutionalists cite globalization and the subsequent ‘hollowing out’ of 
national constitutions as necessitating a ‘compensatory constitutionalism on the international 
plane’.114 As the nation-state struggles to guarantee public goods in the way had traditionally 
done so, sovereignty is eroded and it becomes necessary to provide full constitutional 
protection on the various levels of governance in global society and for international law to 
move much further in the ‘direction of an individual-centred humanized system’.115  On one 
hand such ‘constitutionalization’ is seen to be already taking place, on the other 
‘constitutionalism’ is presented as the framework for further normative debate in response to 
the problems of global society.116 But the pivotal question is, considering the lack a 
centralized political system at the global level, on what framework is such an international 
constitution to be configured? 
Some have drawn on the United Nations Charter in this respect as the constitutional 
document of international law, as ‘a constitution of the international community at large’.117 
However, this no longer enjoys wide support. The UN Charter can easily be seen to reflect 
the ‘distribution of power after the Second World War’,118 and hardly allows for the 
‘disciplining of politics’ in the way that is required for the successful structural coupling of 
the political and legal system.119 More to the point for many international consitutionalists 
who wish to see the incorporation of highly generalized norms of global society, the UN 
Charter does not adequately codify ‘enough of what is fundamental for the functioning of the 
international legal order’.120 But, with no other possible institutional representation of the 
global community in sight it becomes ‘preferable and inevitable’ to draw instead upon the 
‘most fundamental’ norms and values of global society themselves to represent the 
international constitution.121  
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Thus, many international constitutionalists point to the ‘fundamental structural and 
substantive norms’ of the international legal order as a whole, 122 and ‘public interest 
norms’,123 such as ‘international human rights’,124 ‘climate protection’125 and global 
‘sustainable development’126 as the ‘ratione materiae’ of an international constitution.127 
Whether these are global values or global norms does not seem to matter much.128 If they can 
be seen to ‘relate to global goods’ and ‘reflect the common assumptions and shared attitudes’ 
of global society, then they can, and should, form the basis of the international constitution.129 
Nor are international constitutionalists deterred much by apparent ‘anti-constitutionalist 
trends’ such as the fragmentation or the relativization of normativity.130 Rather, they are 
prepared to draw relevant ‘normative conclusions’ from such trends.131 The existing law is 
seen to be ‘far from fragmented’, and even where it is international constitutionalists 
recognize potential in ‘partial constitutions’ for the consitutionalization of more general 
norms.132 Soft law, on the other hand, is seen as potentially allowing non-state actors to 
‘intervene’ in the international legal system and as possibly paving the way for ‘hard 
commitments on the level of international constitutional law.’133  
As a necessary consequence, international constitutionalists present a normative 
hierarchy as existing within a hitherto horizontal international legal system and within the 
increasingly polycentric global society. Thus, the norms that they point to as the rationae 
materiae of the international constitution are seen to have a ‘special hierarchical standing’ 
within international law.134 Not only are the norms enshrined in multilateral treaties 
considered to empower third parties because they serve ‘global community interests’,135 but 
international constitutionalists point to the recognition of peremptory norms as trumping 
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conflicting treaty136 and customary norms,137 and thereby define those norms as 
‘constitutional law in the formal sense’.138 
Thus, not only do international constitutionalists imagine that international law is able 
to realize highly generalized norms of global society, but they actually base the authority of 
the international legal system to do so on such norms themselves. This represents one of the 
most ambitious attempts to overcome international law’s consensualism and its lack of 
structural coupling with a centralized parliamentary representation to thereby accommodate 
general norms reflecting a global public interest.139 It can be presented as 
constitutionalization because law’s structural reliance on norms is seen as a way of bolstering 
law’s legitimacy; law acquires its legitimacy from representing interests of the global 
community, global public goods such as international human rights, climate protection and 
sustainable development. In systems theoretical terms international law’s paradox is 
externalized to the norms which are recognized and formulated at some more general social 
level beyond law and the consensualist framework of the international system. In the absence 
of centralized parliamentary representation at the global level, international law structurally 
relies on another source of ‘general will’.   
However, the problem with this schema is that it does not adequately confer legitimacy 
on international law in the way that international constitutionalists suppose. Effectively what 
is proposed by international constitutionalists is the paradox that the legitimacy of 
international law in positivizing general norms lies in its positivization of those norms. But 
this is a difficult paradox to unfold. Thus, the legitimacy of such a proposed international 
constitution has been widely questioned, for example, in terms of a perceived erosion of the 
‘interests and cultural values of the third world’,140 as promoting an ‘image of a European 
nation-state’,141 as bestowing an ‘aura of legitimacy on global governance’,142 or as in more 
pointed terms as relying ‘conditions not given’,143 or as a project that can ‘no longer be 
fulfilled by means of a legitimacy chain’.144 As Krisch points out, it was already questioned 
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on the national plane, whether ‘foundational constitutionalism is a fitting vision for diverse 
societies in which consensus is elusive even on the most basic, procedural level’, and further 
points out that, with the ‘more diverse and contested the social space is, the less attractive 
seems the idea of freezing the political order in a seemingly neutral consensus.’145 Despite 
then the increasing generalization of norms and values at the global level, the norms, by 
themselves, cannot seem to confer the legitimacy the legal system needs to realize them.146  
Ultimately, international constitutionalists continue the trend of Lauterpacht, who as a 
natural lawyer committed to overcoming the consensualism of sovereignty doctrine, and with 
no political system to which he could rely on as authority for a more general normative 
framework, effectively proposed that international lawyers ‘should rule the world’.147 But 
more than this, it reflects the general condition of the international legal system being caught 
between remaining open to a functionally differentiated society with all its normative 
consequences, while at the same time having no mandate or even a spectre of illusion by 
which it can legitimately answer those normative questions. Try as they might, international 
constitutionalists are unable to overcome the limits of state sovereignty and its central place 
in international law. 
These problems arise because of the lack of the kind of structural coupling between 
international law and the political system at the national level. There are no sustainable 
institutional equivalents at the global level and general norms in themselves do not provide 
the solid grounding that is needed for such an arrangement. International law remains 
structurally coupled to an international political system that is made up of the units of 
independent sovereign nation-states and the function of this coupling is not to accommodate 
general norms but to provide a legal framework allowing to maintain that sovereignty. Now I 
will turn to another condition, and to another form of differentiation in world society: the 
hierarchical ordering of nation-states on the basis of symbolic power of armed force.   
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4.3  International law and the threat or use of armed force 
 
Another aspect of the structural coupling of law and politics is also relevant here. Law’s 
structural coupling to the political system helped to domesticate and externalize its necessary 
relationship with physical violence. This bears directly upon international law’s relationship 
with armed force. It may appear excessively ‘realist’ to abstract international law’s 
relationship with armed force to an elemental relationship between law and physical violence. 
International lawyers generally rebut any claims about the unenforceability of international 
legal norms leading to its irrelevance, by pointing to the growing recognition that law cannot 
be defined by sanctions.148 But the aim of this section is not to address issues of behaviour 
and enforceability. The functionalist perspective shifts ‘the centre of gravity of the problem 
of law enforcement from behaviour to expectations.’149 Again ‘the function of the norm is not 
aimed at guiding motives’, and norms ‘do not promise conduct that conforms to norms’.150 
However, norms do ‘protect all those who are expecting such conduct’,151  and, as seen, the 
function of law is one of providing a ‘precondition for the stable projection of norms.’152 This 
is part of the reason why the domestication of physical violence is widely considered to be 
essential to the development of law in society.153 Law’s failure to domesticate physical 
violence means that ‘normative expectations cannot be practised without a side-glance at 
their enforceability’.154 This is not to say that normative expectations will automatically cease 
under such conditions. Rather it needs to be emphasized that the statement about the ‘side-
glance at enforceability’ should be placed next to Luhmann’s other statement about the 
search for functional equivalence involving a ‘sidelong glance at other possibilities.’155 In 
other words, if law’s proximity to violence undermines the accommodation of general norms, 
then this only invites the search for functional equivalents. Moreover, the discussion of 
international law’s relation to the threat or use of armed force will be relevant to the 
discussion of nuclear weapons in later chapters. 
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At an abstract level, the problem for law, and much of society, relates to the ‘high 
structural independence of physical violence’ as a power basis.156 Physical violence merely 
depends on superior strength, and not ‘status, role contexts, group memberships, distribution 
of information or concepts of value.’157 Through such indifference, and coupled with the 
physical nature of the human being, violence is always universeably useable and can hardly 
be eliminated as a possibility in communal life. Law thus has to domesticate violence and 
then externalize it, and again this is only achieved with the co-evolution of the legal and 
political systems.  
According to Luhmann’s evolutionary account, law’s proximity to violence in primitive 
society was such that arbitration and satisfaction could ‘only be realized in close dependence 
on the social structure and the distribution of power contained within it.’158 At this stage of 
societal development law was about self-help, and according to Luhmann, this ‘necessarily 
impeded the refinement of juridical semantics, the condensation and confirmation of 
experience with new cases, and juridical attention to conceptual and dogmatic 
consistency.’159 It only became possible to overcome this barrier to further development once 
‘politics took control of physical force and promised peace.’160 Again this progressed through 
stratificatory differentiation. The shift to unity perceived in the difference of ranks and the 
establishment of a competition-free position for the description of the world at the apex of the 
hierarchy meant administrative institutions could be differentiated out and enforcement 
measures could be easily supposed to be the will of the whole.161 The problem of physical 
violence, however, could only be fully solved with the shift to functional differentiation and 
the structural coupling of law and politics which placed the political concentration of 
decision-making regarding the use of force in the hands of the state. Once violence exercised 
in the name of law could be referred to the will of the political sovereign then it was 
sufficiently externalized from legal communications, while at the same time the political 
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system could refer to due process of law so that the nation-state’s use of violence did not 
appear arbitrary.162  
This is an admittedly brief treatment of the topic of violence as it figures in Luhmann’s 
evolutionary theory of law,163 but hopefully enough to bring into focus the problem 
international law’s relationship with physical violence. Physical violence is formally 
permitted under international law in two circumstances. The first relates to when the United 
Nations Security Council exercises its right to use force under its ‘Chapter VII’ powers.164 
Under the Charter the Security Council is charged with ‘primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security’,165 and endowed with authority to 
‘determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’. 
On determining such a breach of the peace, and after pacific measures proving inadequate, 
the Council may take ‘such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to restore 
international peace and security.’166 
Despite this formalization though, the problem is that since 1945 there have been many 
instances of force being used in flagrant violation of the Charter. While these typically do not 
reach the scale of international wars witnessed in earlier modernity, the use of force with 
impunity in the international sphere hangs over and dilutes the legality of those instances 
where the use of force can be effected through the Security Council and the UN Charter. 
Nation-states, if they are powerful enough, can always threaten to act unilaterally167 (as was 
the case in relation to Iraq in 2002).168 This puts the Security Council in a difficult position. If 
it acquiesces and rubber stamps what it cannot stop it keeps law shackled to the power 
structures in the international society which block its further development. If it seeks to 
express its disapproval it will fall asunder the likely veto of the powerful state, or even worse 
may simply be ignored. If it declines to take any action and turns its back on the problem the 
law will appear either irrelevant or arbitrary. Under these conditions the most appealing 
option may well be to hammer out a compromise resolution and attempt to cast any 
subsequent disagreement as a question of semantics thereby preserving the façade of 
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legality—which is what eventually happened in 2002 with UNSC Resolution 1441 
determining Saddam Hussein’s failure to comply with disarmament obligations.169  
It is difficult to overlook the influence of the power structures of international society 
upon the Security Council’s deliberation on the use of force under international law,170 and 
this undoubtedly undermines the prospect of expectations being practised without a ‘side-
glance’ at their enforceability. The analogy of the ‘police in the temple of justice’ is a fitting 
one.171 Even in those instances where there has been sufficient international consensus to 
exercise the use of force under Chapter VII—for example, Afghanistan,172 Haiti,173 Iraq,174 
Libya,175 Rwanda,176 Somalia,177 The Former Yugoslavia178—there is little evidence of due 
process of law.179 With scant provision for due process in the Council’s ‘provisional’ rules of 
procedure180 (more definite rules cannot be agreed upon) international law has been unable to 
expunge the reference to violence and thus achieve a higher degree of self-reference of legal 
communication. Under these conditions the indeterminacy of Security Council Resolutions 
can be such that one nation-state can read it as authorizing ‘regime change’ for example, 
while others read it as authorizing only much more limited basis of intervention.181 
However, it is undoubtedly in those instances where there is an omission to resort to the 
use of force under the Chapter VII when there is consensus in the ‘international community 
as a whole’ to do so that international law’s failure to domesticate physical violence is most 
evident.182 The classic case is now one in which the actions of one state constitute a threat to 
international peace and security and thereby become the subject of a colère publique of the 
international community, yet the Security Council fails to take action because the offending 
state enjoys power of veto on the Council, or is sufficiently connected to ensure such a veto. 
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In such cases facts can always be questioned and appeals can always be made to further 
peaceful measures and mediation so that political interests underlying the veto do not have to 
be declared before the Council. Nonetheless, the failure of international law to domesticate 
physical violence is only made all the more conspicuous in such cases when they are 
preceded by instances of a similar fact pattern (i.e., actions of one state constituting a threat to 
international peace and security and a colère publique of the international community), and 
yet the Security Council is still unable to take action under Chapter VII; the case of Libya183 
and Syria provides a recent example of this contradictory practice.184  Such instances 
highlight the problem that like cases cannot be treated alike, and that the application of law 
depends not on the legal system, but upon power structures that lie beyond it. It is perhaps an 
exaggeration to argue, as Glennon does, that contrary state practice in this respect amounting 
to an instance of non liquet for the international legal system (a non-decision of law).185  
However, the inconsistency certainly points to the problems that are revealed with non-
liquet—that law cannot be understood as a closed universe that ‘refers to itself’, and in which 
‘pure juridical argumentation can be practiced even under extreme social tensions’;186 that 
law cannot manage the paradox of the system.187 
I will return to this problem in a more poignant form in the next chapter. Suffice to say 
at this point that the Chapter VII provisions entitling the Security Council to resort to the use 
of force in the interests of international peace and security clearly do not represent a 
domestication of physical violence by international law. The general impunity of states 
resorting to violence outside the framework of the Security Council and the selective and 
inconsistent manner in which the Security Council has exercised its right under the Charter to 
use force in response to breaches of international peace and security poses a problem for the 
differentiation and further evolution of international law.  
Self-defence, as the second means by which use of force is permitted under 
international law, provides little further hope in this respect. Article 51 of the Charter declares 
the ‘inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs.’ The 
essence of this provision, as Dinstein says, is ‘self-help.’188 In other words, a state has an 
‘inherent right’ under international law to act unilaterally in responding to unlawful force.189 
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This ‘essence’ of self-help in the inherent right to self-defence suggests comparisons between 
international law and the law of archaic societies.190 Thus, Kelsen points out that ‘in primitive 
law the individual whose legally protected interests have been violated is himself authorized 
to proceed against the wrongdoer with all the conceivable means provided by the legal 
order.’191 Under such an arrangement every individual effectively takes the law into their own 
hands,192 and because ‘[n]either the establishment of the delict nor the execution of the 
sanction is conferred upon an authority distinct from the parties involved or interested’, 
Kelsen viewed the legal order as ‘entirely decentralized.’193 As such, writing at the end of the 
Second World War, Kelsen remained unconvinced by the ‘just war’ thesis, i.e., that 
international law had successfully domesticated physical violence. Instead he emphasized 
that what is forbidden now is a war of aggression rather than a counterwar ‘waged by the 
state defending itself against the aggressor.’194 From this he concluded that ‘general 
international law can be interpreted in the same manner as a primitive legal order 
characterized by the restitution of blood revenge (vendetta).’195 
Of course self-help has not been entirely eliminated from highly differentiated legal 
systems at the national level either. It exists there as a right for an individual to use such force 
as they believe necessary to protect themselves from imminent use of unlawful force upon 
them. As Malanczuk points out, however, it has ‘become the exception rather than the rule, 
whereas in international law it has remained the rule.’196 One might even say that, in 
international law, self-help ‘has been honed to an art form.’197  
The fact that self-defence constitutes a failure to replace an external reference to 
violence with the self-reference of law is signposted by the positive reference in Article 51 to 
the ‘inherent right’ of self-defence in response to an armed attack. The concept of self-
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defence, as Anghie says, is thus something that ‘precedes the law’.198 It is a right which is 
antecedent and exterior to law, and in practice this has meant that ‘whatever self-defence 
requires’ is impervious to law.199 Koskenniemi too makes this point—though somewhat 
inadvertently and in contradiction to his claimed preference for legal formalism—when he 
argues in support of the World Court’s ambivalent decision in Nuclear Weapons Opinion that 
‘[t]he same reason that justifies the rule about self-defence also justifies setting aside its 
wording if this is needed by the very rationale of the rule – the need to protect the state.’200 
But from a systems theoretical perspective this is to admit a third value into binary coding of 
the legal system, and therefore something that undermines the legal system’s closure. 
There of course have been advances in ‘legalizing’ the concept of self-defence in recent 
years. The World Court, for example, has made some attempt to prescribe what an ‘armed 
attack’ is (or rather, what it is not) under international law, and has developed the rule that 
resort to self-defence must be ‘necessary’ and ‘proportionate’.201 However, the Court has 
equally avoided many questions regarding the scope and nature of self-defence under 
international law, such as whether armed attack can be committed by non-state actors,202 or 
whether there is a right to pre-emptive self-defence under the Charter or customary law.203 
Moreover, as Kennedy points out the ‘international legal standards of self-defence of 
‘proportionality’ and ‘necessity’ are so broad that they are routinely invoked to refer to the 
zone of discretion rather than limitation.’204 Ultimately, a ‘fundamental disagreement’ 
regarding the scope of self-defence persists.205  
The overly broad, and ultimately consensualist, nature of the right to self-defence under 
international law is particularly problematic from the functionalist perspective which shifts 
the focus from behaviour to expectations. To see this one need only compare the situation at 
the international level to a more elemental social basis within the autonomous and operatively 
closed legal system at the nation-state level. Thus, the victim of an unprovoked assault on a 
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London street, for example, is hardly going to look foolish if they fail to take the law into 
their own hands (in fact they might look foolish if, after a ‘cooling-off’ period, they do so 
take the law into their own hands). While the victim of such an attack can hardly expect that 
the perpetrator will in fact be apprehended and punished for the offence, they can, 
nonetheless, look to others to have their expectation that such ought to be the case confirmed. 
They can look to a range of institutions to find such co-expecting third-parties—from those 
bystanders who bear witness to the assault, to police who receive the complaint of the crime, 
to government agencies such as the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority, to courts and 
other legal institutions if a defendant is ever identified, etc. This is the achievement of a 
sufficiently autonomous legal system that has adequately domesticated physical violence. 
Now compare this with the international level. The nation-state that does not take the 
law into their own hands and reply with at least equal force to an armed attack, but waits 
instead for justice will certainly look foolish—and dangerously so. It is not only that the lack 
of a supreme authority and a centrally organized penal mechanism necessitates self-help, but 
that segmentary differentiation of the international system amounts to a prisoner’s dilemma 
where one must display a show of force to avoid appearing weak or like a ‘sitting duck’.206 
Finally, the argument may be made by some that there has been significant 
domestication of violence with the evolution of international criminal law and the 
establishment of international criminal tribunals in recent years. Admittedly the emerging 
distinction between civil and criminal law in the late eleventh century207 was an important 
moment in the evolution of law at the municipal level.208 Similarly, the morphogenesis of 
international criminal law at the end of the Cold War is obviously an important moment in 
the evolution of international law.209 However, the development of international criminal law 
cannot be said to reflect the degree of domestication of violence that has been achieved 
within the boundaries of the nation-state. The first two international criminal tribunals—the 
International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)— were after all established by the Security Council 
under the very Chapter VII provisions which deal with the use of force.210 Their jurisdiction 
is thus limited by the Security Council, and can be said to heavily reflect the ‘reality of 
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international politics’.211 Furthermore, although the International Criminal Court (ICC) was 
created by multi-lateral treaty, it too has been unable to transcend the reality of international 
politics.212 The limited ratification of the Rome Statute,213 together with its reliance on the 
problematic principle of complentarity,214 means the ICC also suffers a ‘crippled’ 
jurisdiction.215  
International law’s problematic relationship with physical violence is probably nowhere 
more conspicuous that it is in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion of the International 
Court of Justice.216 Although the Court could not make a decision on the illegality of nuclear 
weapons, it was aware that nuclear weapons constitute the apex of physical violence in world 
society; it acknowledged the ‘profound risks’ associated with such weapons;217 that the 
‘destructive power of nuclear weapons cannot be contained in either space or time’;218 that 
the radiation released by a nuclear explosion would affect health, agriculture, natural 
resources and demography over a very wide area’;219 that nuclear weapons therefore ‘would 
generally be contrary’ to humanitarian law.220 Still the Court could not come to a more 
definite decision on the illegality of such weapons. It should not be overlooked in this respect 
that the five permanent members of the Security Council (P5) are the five largest stock-pilers 
of nuclear weapons.221 As Luhmann says, ‘the power of physical violence is not based on the 
effects which it has evoked and their subsequent effect, but the opposite is true: it is based 
upon generalisation as a symbol which facilitates the avoidance of further use.’222 Ultimately 
this is what the framework of ‘mutually assured destruction’ rests upon, but international law 
has not been able to domesticate this symbol of violence and it has achieved relatively little 
autonomy from the underlying power structures it represents. From here one can see the full 
problem of the arrangement which places the ‘police in the temple of justice.’223 It means that 
arbitration and satisfaction can only be realised in close dependence on the distribution of 
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power within society and in frustration of the further development of juridical semantics and 
juridical self-reference. 
 
4.4 State sovereignty as segmentary differentiation 
 
I can now turn attention to a third factor that had to be bracketed in the previous discussion of 
international law’s structural coupling: the centrality of the doctrine of state sovereignty to 
international law. The doctrine of the equality of sovereign nation-states can be said to be 
‘one of the central postulates in the theory and practice of international law.’224 Writing in 
1758 Vattel declared, ‘[a] dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small republic is no less a 
sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom’.225 Today, the doctrine finds positive 
formulation in Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter: ‘the Organization is based on the 
principle of the sovereign equality of all its members.’ It is repeatedly expressed in the 
declarations and resolutions of the General Assembly226 and in the judgments of the 
International Court of Justice.227  
From the perspective of international law, what is important is not simply sovereignty 
as the exercise of authority over dominion, but also the equality of nation-states. Nation-
states are ‘political entities equal in law, similar in form’.228 Thus both qualities, sovereignty 
and equality, are connected for international lawyers; the equality of nation-states is 
‘explained as a consequence of or as implied by their sovereignty.’229 However, what once 
may have been essential in establishing the peace in Europe in the late Middle Ages, and 
which may have facilitated the expansion of the international legal system in the post-
colonial era,230 now frustrates the realization in international law of many general norms 
which arise in a globalized society. In this respect, sovereign equality is not simply about 
power over dominion or parity of esteem, but also the presumption of the independence and 
the impunity of the nation-state. It found its high water mark with the formulation in the 
                                                          
224 Suganami (1992), 221 
225 de Vattel (2008), 75.  
226 See, for example, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/25/2625.  
227 Most recently, for example, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening), 
ICJ Reports 2012, para. 57. 
228 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1949, 
174, 177-178. 
229 Kelsen (2000), 34.  
230 Anghie (2004), 37ff. 
123 
 
Lotus case of a residual negative principle, that nation-states are free to do whatever is not 
expressly prohibited by international law.231 However, it still operates today, and where it 
does it may conflict with the realization of any norm more general than the interest of the 
independent sovereign nation-state. As Kennedy says: [w]hen UNHCR knocks on the door of 
a sovereign and asks that a refugee  be admitted, the response will be not only rooted in 
sovereign power but also in legal privilege—the privilege to exclude, to define those one will 
admit, to defend and fence the national territory. Despoiling the rainforest is not only an 
economic decision; it is also the exercise of legal privilege.’232 
It is for this reason that international constitutionalists argue the ‘erosion of 
sovereignty’,233 that they redefine sovereignty as ‘responsibility’,234 and perceive a shift from 
‘states’ rights to states’ obligations’.235 They strive to reinterpret sovereignty as subsidiary to 
general norms and values,236 and rely on constitutionalism as a limit to the sovereignty of 
nation-states,237 because they perceive sharply what a challenge it will be for international 
law to incorporate the general norms of globalized society within the classic doctrine of 
sovereignty intact.  
The problem with this approach, however, is not simply that the turn away from 
consensualism may cause international law to lose its appeal for many nation-states,238 but 
that sovereignty doctrine may be more entrenched than many realize. There is plenty of 
evidence that ‘[d]espite repeated suggestions of the ‘death’ of sovereignty—or its 
irrelevance—its normative basis within international law remains.’239 This only fits with 
more general sociological conclusion that ‘the emergent order after 1945 did not result in a 
diminution of sovereign power’.240 But from the perspective of differentiation theory, it may 
                                                          
231 S.S. Lotus, (France v Turkey), Judgment, PCIJ Series A no 10, ICGJ 248 (PCIJ 1927), Permanent Court of 
International Justice (hereafter the 1927 Lotus case). 
232 Kennedy (2008), 849. See also Nordhaus (2006, 92ff) and Krisch (2014) on the problems sovereignty 
doctrine causes for the attainment of global public goods. 
233 Peters (2009a), 182. 
234 Peters (2011), 5; see also for similar view Etzioni (2005); Feinstein and Slaughter (2004). 
235 Peters (2009b), 398.  
236 Peters (2006), 587.  
237 Kleinlein (2912), 90. 
238 Krisch (2014), 39-40. 
239 Crawford (2012), 13.  
240 Thornhill (2012), 426, 410; see also Kjaer (2013, 782). Building on the previous comment on Thornhill’s 
concept here, Thornhill argues that far from restricting national sovereignty, transformative absorption of 
international norms formed a vital cornerstone in the rise of the power of the nation-state (2012, 421). But it is 
important to point out that, as is clear from the examples he gives, what is being asserted here is only 
international law as it is understood in the nation state (see his Murray v Schooner example). Reading the 
evolution of international and transnational law from the perspective of the sovereign nation state and focused 
on questioning ‘the idea that transnational law is a phenomenon of recent advent’ (2012, 426), Thornhill misses 
some of the important ramifications of globalization on international and transnational law, such as moving 
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be that sovereignty doctrine has played a functional role in supporting the shift to functional 
differentiation on the primary level. 
Sovereignty can be recognized as a form of segmentary differentiation.241 This is what 
Luhmann means when he speaks of ‘the segmentary differentiation of the political subsystem 
of the global society’.242 The global political system is differentiated into ‘units, which are 
equal and functionally similar to one another.243 This clearly reflects the doctrine of 
sovereignty in international law, and is an example of segmentary differentiation that has not 
been replaced by the shift to functional differentiation.244 In fact international law can be said 
to reflect an example of the noted possibility of ‘all three types of differentiation in 
simultaneous operation’.245 Not only is there segmentary differentiation through sovereign 
equality, but there is stratifactory differentiation in terms of permanent membership and veto 
power in the Security Council, nuclear weapons stockpiles or economic might, and this all 
takes place in a normative universe driven by functional differentiation.246 Much like the rest 
of the global world, it is thus ‘characterized by a plural level of structure formation with 
several indistinct, but interwoven logics all of which operate simultaneously.’247 
It was suggested in the first section of this chapter that there is a structural relationship 
between this segmentary differentiation and the primacy of functional differentiation. As 
stated, sovereignty can be explained in functionalist terms as a means of underwriting the 
concrete territorial boundaries to provide the framework for the confidence and consensus 
necessary for the shift to functional differentiation.248 This form of segmentation then is a 
way of protecting this, ensuring those concrete boundaries are not violated. However, there 
appears to be much broader structural relation between the forms of differentiation than 
this.249 Sovereign equality not only provided the concrete boundaries within which the 
political system could emerge, but also provided a foundational framework for other 
functional systems which, unlike the political system, have been able to explode their 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
from relatively less challenging questions about jurisdiction issue arising from incidents on the high seas to the 
legality of a potential threat to society as a whole. 
241 Albert and Buzan (2010), 318ff; Albert, Buzan and Zurn (2013), 14; Munch (2013), 71; Luhmann (2013a), 
96; Waltz, (1979), 95; Krasner (1988). 
242 Luhmann (1997a), 72. 
243 Viola (2013), 113.  
244 Luhmann (2012), 96; see also Kjaer (2011b), 3  
245 Albert and Buzan (2010), 319; Albert, Buzan and Zurn (2013), 3, 6.  
246 And this is not to mention all the various forms of internal differentiation (Stetter, 2013, 139) in 
international organizations, including the nation-state.  
247 Kjaer (2014), 1.   
248 Luhmann (1977), 44; Luhmann (1985a), 259. 
249 It is a wonder that Luhmann, fully aware of the coexistence of these two forms of differentiation, did not 
devote more attention to exploring their symbiosis. Munch has a valid point when says that ‘Luhmann deals too 
little with this tension between functional and segmentary differentiation’ (Munch 2013, 76). 
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territorial boundaries and expand to the global level. As Kjaer argues, functional systems, 
such as the economy, science, the mass media, sports and education, ‘gradually free 
themselves from their internal reliance on stabilisation mechanisms which rely on territorial 
and stratifactory forms of differentiation’.250 Moreover, one might add that this also reflects 
Polanyi’s argument, for example, about the role of the nation-state in the expansion of the 
market economy.251 
This builds upon the argument about the emergence of international law with the shift 
to functional differentiation. The point, however, is that it is not simply international law that 
emerges with the shift to functional differentiation, but rather that sovereignty as a form of 
segmentary differentiation on the global level emerges with functional differentiation. Again, 
the Peace of Westphalia is significant, but may be just a convenient marker for the 
development.  Grewe claims the modern usage of the term first appeared in Bodin’s Les Six 
livres de la République of 1576 to denote ‘an essential element of the modern theory of 
sovereignty’.252 Anghie, on the other hand, argues that sovereignty doctrine emerged through 
Vitoria’s attempts to address the problem of ‘cultural difference’ as the basis of a ‘just war’ 
against any aboriginal Indians hostile to Spanish presence.253 Others credit Grotius with being 
the first to substantially develop the principle of sovereign equality.254 Thirty years before the 
Peace, Grotius became renowned for his treatise de Mare Liberum which presented the 
territorial limitation of sovereignty as the positive law of nations, and thereby rejected 
English and Spanish claims over the oceans255—again this can be tied to the functional 
differentiation of the economic system.256  Subsequently this very idea ‘was given concrete 
expression in the Peace of Westphalia’.257 Furthermore, just three years before the Peace, 
Hobbes published Leviathan suggesting the nation-state as an ‘artificial man’, a thesis that 
also proved hugely influential to jurists at the time.258  
Wherever the emergence of sovereignty doctrine is to exactly located in the complex 
factors occurring in the late Middle Ages, it is clear that sovereignty doctrine represents a 
                                                          
250 Kjaer (2011b), 4. 
251 Polanyi even locates the Peace of Westphalia at the base of this, Polanyi (2001), 7. 
252 Grewe (2000), 166. Cf. Thornhill (2011c), 94: ‘It was only around 1600…. that jurists began even 
tentatively to define German princes as possessing ‘universal and superior’ powers in a territory.’ 
253 Anghie (2004), 16, 24. 
254 Grewe (2000), 119; Efraim (1999), 64.  
255 Steinberger (2000), 504.  
256 Grewe (2000), 260. This territorial limitation of sovereignty was perfectly in the interests of the Dutch 
Republic which had relatively little natural resources or territory, but depended instead on global commerce. 
Indeed, Grotius’ influence proved to have an ‘astonishing’ effect on the development of the global economic 
system, see Luhmann (2013a), 76.   
257 Bull (1992), 75. 
258 Viola (2013), 114.  
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segmentary form of differentiation that emerged parallel to the more primary form of 
functional differentiation. From this perspective the continued relevance of sovereignty in 
transnational society is hardly surprising. Either the functional relation between the 
segmentary differentiation of the global political system to the functional differentiation of 
the larger social system became so entrenched in the shift to modernity that it remains a 
flawed specialization of the social system, or—more likely—that such segmentary 
differentiation continues to maintain a functional relationship with the primary form of 
differentiation in world society. A more precise statement would require significant empirical 
research, which, though important, is not necessary for constructing the problem further for 
the present study. This section comes to a rest with the conclusion that although state 
sovereignty frustrates the greater accommodation of highly generalized norms in international 
law, such segmentary differentiation must be seen as part of a complex of forms of 
differentiation that today constitutes world society.  
  
4.5 Conclusion 
 
According to Luhmann, ‘[i]t is the form of differentiation that clearly determines which 
structural couplings are established by a society for linking its functioning systems’, and it is 
for that reason that the structural coupling which link the legal system with the political 
system, for example, does not develop until an advanced stage of functional differentiation on 
the primary level.259 Luhmann’s further observation about this brings this chapter into 
perspective: ‘As long as societies are differentiated segmentally (e.g. tribally), there seems to 
exist only the general mechanism of structural coupling of law and violence’.260 International 
law cannot be simply compared to primitive law, however. It is a thoroughly modern legal 
system of immense structural complexity. International law appears primitive because of its 
clear functional reference to the segmentary differentiation of nation-states and because of its 
proximity to the symbolic power of physical violence in international relations.  Yet, the legal 
system is deeply structurally embedded with the functional differentiation which propels the 
globalization of society. Moreover, international lawyers increasingly strive to develop the 
legal system in functional reference to highly generalized norms which arise at the global 
level.  
                                                          
259 Luhmann (2004), 385. 
260 Luhmann (2004), 386. 
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Whether international law will ever be able to cut through this Gordian knot remains to 
be seen. However, this chapter has countered the idea that globalization involves a necessary 
‘erosion’ of state sovereignty. Sovereignty doctrine must be seen as a persisting ingredient of 
the complex of world society. Moreover, it cannot be assumed that the problems arising from 
the tension between sovereignty and global public goods arise from a purely ideological 
basis, and that it will therefore be subject to change with a shift in attitude in a globalized 
society. Instead the structural relationship between sovereignty as segementary differentiation 
and the primary functional differentiation of society suggests that those problems will only be 
overcome when evolution replaces functional differentiation with another primary form of 
differentiation.  
This chapter has aimed to present, on the theoretical level, the underlying structural 
challenges that international law faces in positivizing highly generalized norms. Within this, 
it has strived to bring to the fore the paradox of relating to the larger social system through 
two conflicting mediums: direct accommodation of highly generalized norms and support of 
functional differentiation through sovereignty doctrine. This theoretical premise is useful to 
keep in mind as the next chapter will turn to a more empirical investigation of international 
law’s accommodation of general norms.   
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5  International law as a solution to the problem of general norms? 
 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
The usual starting place for measuring the scope of international law is the established 
sources listed in Article 38 of the 1945 Statute of the International Court of Justice:1 treaties 
as ‘international conventions establishing rules expressly recognized by the states’; 
international custom, ‘as evidence of a general practice accepted as law’, and; ‘the general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations’.2 The wording of the article reflects a 
considered attempt to make an international judiciary acceptable—even appealing—to 
nation-states,3 and it can therefore be said to endorse, to some extent at least, ‘an exclusively 
state-centred understanding of public international law, based in the principle of a consensus 
driven commitment to peaceful relationships among states.’4 To mitigate this consensualism, 
and to accommodate the norms arising at a more general level, international lawyers have 
strived, through various means, to ‘develop the boundaries’ of these established sources.5 As 
this introductory section will show, however, these efforts have been exhausted in recent 
years by the scale of the proliferation and generalization of norms at the global level. To keep 
up with these developments, international lawyers have been forced to introduce new sources 
to international law, new internal distinctions of the legal system. It will be argued, however, 
that these developments cannot adequately dissolve the paradox that is exposed in the hard 
cases where general norms are in acute tension with state sovereignty. In order to zero-in on 
the limits of international law in respect of general norms, this chapter will therefore be taken 
up with empirical analysis of some of those hard cases of international law.  
                                                          
1 Waldock (1962); Virally (1968); Brownlie (2008). 
2 Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945 also includes as a ‘subsidiary means’ of 
law ascertainment, ‘judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various 
nations’. However, this subsidiary means has had little use in practice, Golmann (2012), 336. Nonetheless, there 
seems to be widespread agreement that Article 38 is not exhaustive, but ‘only reflects the state of international 
legal doctrine at the time of its creation’, (Fastenrath, 1993, 322). The ICJ itself confirmed this view by 
recognizing unilateral acts as sources of international law not mentioned in Article 38, Nuclear Tests Case 
(Australia v France), ICJ Reports 1974, 253, para. 46. 
3 They were originally established by the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), the ‘first standing 
international tribunal to decide disputes between nation-states’, and were readopted after the Second War when 
the Permanent Court was wound up and replaced by the International Court of Justice (Thirlway 2014, 120). 
4 Zumbansen and Calliess (2010), 262. 
5 Kennedy (1987), 3.  
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The consensualism of the legal order is reflected in the privity of contracting parties 
which underpins the primary source of treaties for international law. Treaties are based on the 
principle that international conventions establishing the rules are ‘binding upon the parties 
and must be performed in good faith’,6 otherwise known as pacta sunt servanda.7 They 
cannot bind any nation-state other than the signatories.8 Ultimately, pacta sunt servanda is 
the legal institutionalization of nothing more than the ‘freedom to choose obligations’.9  
Thus, as Onuma argues, the pacta sunt servanda rule itself is ‘vague’ and ‘does not guarantee 
that normative expectations of each party will be realized through this rule in a stable and 
reliable manner.’10 From a Luhmannian perspective, the achievement of this form of legal 
institution in fact relies upon restriction to a relatively narrow reference group (‘not at the 
level of the whole society’), and upon the exclusion of  a large realm of third parties ‘whose 
expectation have no institutionalising relevance and can, therefore, be ignored.’11 Indeed, this 
has been the problem which many international lawyers—especially those concerned with the 
legal recognition of general human rights norms—have expressed in respect of treaties as a 
source of law.12 Treaty law, as Lijnzaad argues, is unsuitable for such purposes ‘because of 
the liberty it traditionally leaves states and the consequences this has for the quest for 
universality.’13  
International lawyers have nonetheless developed the use of multilateral treaties to 
overcome these problems and to expand the basis of this established source of law in tandem 
with societal developments. As a multiplication of the contractual network, multilateral 
                                                          
6 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 26. 
7 The principle that all promises, regardless of the formalities, are binding was something which was 
developed in twelfth century cannon law (Berman, 1983, 245-250) and was introduced into the modern law of 
nations as a means of as means of facilitating the collapse of the surpanational authority of Christendom and the 
emergence of the sovereign nation-state (Turori, 2012, 1027). However, the cannonists were aware of the 
dangers of unlimited consensualism and therefore introduced the concept of causa: ‘in order that morality might 
be safeguarded, it was not only necessary that the promissor should have an object, but that this should be 
reasonable and equitable.’ (Söllner, A. (1960): ‘Die Causa im Konditionen- und Vertragsrecht bei den 
Glossatoren, Kommentatoren und Kanonisten', 77 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechisgeschichle, 212-
247, cited in Berman (1983), 247). It might be argued that jus cogens is a separate attempt to introduce similar 
causa in the context of international treaty law, see Articles 53, 64 and 66(a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention of 
the Law of Treaties and below, next section). 
8 See German Interests in Polish Upper Selesia, PCIJ Series A., No. 7, 28; see for further nuances of the rule, 
Fitzmaurice (2002).  
9 Luhmann (1985a), 58. 
10 Yasuaki (2002), 315. 
11 Ibid., 59. Indeed it could be argued that while such legal institutionalization adequately achieves 
generalization along the temporal dimension, it does not do so on any significant scale along the social (in the 
sense of achieving generalization beyond a narrow class of expecting individuals), or in the material dimensions 
(in the sense of achieving a ‘context of expectations’ that can be generalized beyond a broad range of given 
situations). 
12 See, for example, Fitzmaurice (1953); Redgwood (1993). 
13 Lijnzaad (1994), 109.  
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treaties have proved effective for creating ‘regimes’ on the basis of focal points of 
cooperation,14 and a number of general norms have been realized in law through this 
mechanism, including the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (1948), the four Geneva Conventions (1949), the International Covenant on 
Economics, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (1970) (‘NPT’), the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984), the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (1997), the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (1998), amongst others.  
The source of customary international law, on the other hand, is generally defined as 
being comprised of two elements: a ‘material element’ of nation-state practice and a 
‘psychological’ or ‘subjective’ element—often referred to as ‘opinio juris’—as acceptance of 
such practice as obligatory.15 The dependence on usage here (the source has been compared to 
the ‘gradual formation of a road across vacant land’16) is problematic from the perspective of 
the function of norms: the conceptual proximity to factual reality hardly supports the virtual 
reality of normative projection.17 This is not mitigated by the subjective element. Attempts to 
identify the presence of opinio juris will inevitably draw inferences from the practice of 
nation-states.18 Thus, custom has been criticized for being conservative of rules already in 
force and apologetic of existing power structures in international society,19 as a façade for 
political20 or cultural bias.21 More importantly though, the failure of this source of 
international law to adequately separate facts and norms has made it ‘not very attractive’ to 
those concerned with securing the greater legal institutionalization of human rights norms.22 
                                                          
14 Keohane (1984). See also, Krisch (2005), 378. 
15 Lauterpacht (1996), 193; Thirlway (1972), 46; Brownlie (2006), 6. The approach of the International Court 
of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v Netherlands), ICJ Reports 1969, 
is commonly pointed to as an example of textbook methodology, emphasizing the emergence of customary 
norms from State practice and opinio juris, where the latter is conceived as psychological concomitant of that 
practice, see, for example, Meron (2005), 819; Schlütter, (2010), 126. 
16 de Visscher (1957), 149. 
17 Indeed it is for this reason that, in modern national legal systems, it has typically become subordinate to a 
centralized legislature which ‘may by statute deprive customary rules of legal status’, Hart (1997), 45. See also 
Guzman and Meyer (2008), 197. Of course, according to the functionalist perspective adopted in this study, the 
function of law cannot be made directly contingent on facts in the way is formulated in customary international 
law. Indeed, this goes to the heart of Luhmann’s disagreement with Habermas regarding the function of law, see 
Luhmann (1996a). 
18 Koskenniemi (2005), 441; D’Amato (2009), 907.  
19 Byers (1999), 37-131. 
20 Koskinniemi (2005), 442-449. 
21 Yasuakai (2002), 24; Anghie (2005), 36.  
22 van Hoof (1974), 114. 
131 
 
Again though, international lawyers have worked hard from the inside to mitigate these 
problems with custom. In this respect they have sought to develop a ‘deductive approach’ 
which downgrades the state practice element, and instead deduces opinio juris from ‘general 
principles’,23 or ‘fundamental values of the international community as a whole’.24 This 
approach has even been reflected to some extent in the practice of international courts,25 and 
particularly international criminal courts and tribunals.26 
Despite these advances, however, the pace at which globalization is altering the 
normative landscape in world society is increasingly exhausting the potential that can be 
gained from stretching the traditional sources. The use of multilateral treaties in securing 
human rights or environmental protection, for example, has been limited by the common 
practice of  nation-states making reservations to multilateral treaties. Thus, even when 
reservations conflict with the object and purpose of the treaty, the only options are either for 
the reserving nation-state to remain bound to the treaty except for the provisions relating to 
the reservation, or that the attempted reservation nullifies the reserving nation-states assent on 
the whole, so that it is no longer party to the agreement.27 The use of a deductive approach to 
customary international law, on the other hand, seems to have reached its limits within the 
bounded jurisdiction of the international criminal tribunals. The approach has come in for 
criticism for diverting ‘attention away from rigorous tests of pedigree to uncertain and 
controversial moral principles’,28 and as leading to a ‘naturalism’ that is ‘unable to reflect the 
                                                          
23 Meron (1989), 68. 
24 Tomuschat (1993), 303; (1999), 334; Schlütter (2010), 39. See also Kirgis who argues that the twin 
elements of custom are not to be regarded ‘as fixed and mutually exclusive but as interchangeable’ (1987, 149). 
According to his model, the question of how much practice will substitute an affirmative showing of opinio 
juris, and vice versa, will depend upon the nature of the customary rule being asserted. The more that it involves 
fundamental norms, the more the practice element is downgraded and opinio juris elevated. For a similar 
perspective adopting Kirgis’ sliding scale to Dworkin’s interpretivist concept of law, see Tasioulas (1996); Cf. 
Beckett (2001), for a critique of this approach.  
25 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States), Merits, ICJ 
Reports 1986, para. 185; Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v United 
States of America), ICJ Reports 1984, para. 111; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, para. 157. 
26 Tadic (1995), IT-94-1-AR72, paras. 96-99; see also, Furundzija (1995), IT-95-17/I-T; Celebici (1996), IT-
96-21-T; Kurunac (1996), IT-96-23-T; Kupreskic (2000), IT-95-16-T 14, para. 527; see Schlütter (2010), 220. 
27 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, Article 19; see also Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of its Forty-ninth Session (1997). For a discussion of the problems of reservations on 
multilateral treaties in respect of human rights norms, see Goodman (2002). These difficulties have led some to 
suggest that multinational treaties do not work in contentious areas of ‘international public goods such as the 
protection of fisheries, the reduction of atmospheric pollution, and peace.’ According to Goldsmith and Posner, 
for example, these are ‘multilateral prisoner’s dilemmas’ rather than coordination exercises, in which nation-
states cooperate only on a bilateral basis, watch what their partners do, and negotiate for ‘alternative terms’ 
when they perceive the agreements as undermining their parochial interests, (2006), 84. 
28 Koskinniemi (1990), 1949. 
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realities of international relations’.29 Certainly it has been undermined by general 
contradictory practice in international courts.30 
Moreover, general principles—the source listed in Article 38 which appears ideal for 
realization of general norms—has not lived up to the promise of realizing ‘fundamental or 
suprapositive norms which lie at the basis of the whole human society’.31 Nor have they 
become the ‘most important and influential source of international law’ in a globalized 
society where the ‘world’s interdependence increases’.32 General principles remain of 
‘limited scope’ in international law.33 In the narrow application they have enjoyed, the 
principles involved are invariably drawn from municipal jurisprudence’,34 and are restricted 
to principles which are trivial in nature, i.e, those principles which are ‘so universal and well 
established that the judge relying upon them does not think it necessary to adduce precedents 
for their proof’;35 thus, for example, the principle of ‘reparation’,36 the ‘right of passage’,37 or 
the ‘freedom of maritime communication’.38 Again, they constitute another source of 
international law that fails to reflect the virtual reality of the counterfactual expectations 
which are pitched against ‘hard reality’, and which have been seen to form the functional 
reference point of law from the sociological view point.39 
These problems must be located at the basis of the emergence of ‘soft law’ as a source 
of international law.40 The term is open to various interpretations, 41 but generally refers to 
                                                          
29 See Simma & Alston (1992), 96.  
30 As will be seen in the final section of this chapter, elementary considerations of humanity and other general 
norms did not negate the requirement of state-practice in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion even in the 
light of opinio juris that dwarfed the ‘inconclusive’ references relied upon by the international criminal tribunals 
in their deductive approach to customary law (Schlütter, 2010, 233).   
31 van Boven (1982), 107; Mosler (1995), 516. 
32 Bassioni (1990), 769. . Indeed it was apparently the intention of the drafters of the Statute of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice that the inclusion of such a source of international law would help to avoid a non 
liquet in the event that treaty and custom provide no answer, Thirlway (2014), 111; Schlütter (2010), 75; Mosler 
(1999), 516.  This of course was Lauterpacht’s hope for the role that general principles as ‘obvious maxims of 
jurisprudence of a general and fundamental character’ would play in the development of international law which 
is otherwise constrained by consensualism towards the will of nation-states, Lauterpacht (1970), 69. General 
principles did not however allow the court to avoid non liquet in the Nuclear Weapons opinion, see below 
section 5.3. 
33 Schlütter (2010), 74; Koskenniemi (1990), 1948; Shaw (2014), 94. 
34 Koskenniemi (1990), 1950. 
35 Virally (1968), 145. However, see the separate opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), ICJ Reports 2010. (‘Pulp Mills’ hereafter). 
36 Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow, jurisdiction, PCIJ, Reports, Series A. No. 9, July 26th, 1927. 
37 Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v India), merits, ICJ Reports 1960. 
38 Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Albania), merits, ICJ Reports 
1949. 
39 General principles can be said to be more reflective of values than norms. And this again underlines what 
has been said about values being ‘so abstractly formulated that the relationship between different values cannot 
be fixed permanently’, Luhmann (1985a), 69; (1995), 317-318. 
40 Many textbooks now list soft law under the heading of ‘other possible sources’, see Malanczuk (2007); 
Cassese (2005); Shaw (2014); cf. Crawford (2012). 
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any non-binding instrument or provision that is not of itself ‘law’, but which proves so 
instrumental in the framework of international legal development ‘that particular attention 
requires to be paid to it.’42  Although the concept is not without its critics,43 it has undeniably 
become increasingly prevalent in international legal communications.44 Soft law instruments 
may be ‘formative of the opinio juris or State practice that generates new customary law.’45 
At the same time, soft law may prove foundational to the adoption of important multi-lateral 
treaties, as is the purported case with the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights which 
preceded the 1966 Conventions.46 Moreover, international courts have referred to the 
‘guidelines and recommendations of international technical bodies’ in determining the proper 
standards to be observed by parities in implementing obligations.47 Indeed the extent to which 
the development of international law now relies on soft law has led some to present it as 
‘functionally equivalent to hard law’—although this is not taken up from a sociological 
perspective.48  
The question of soft law as a functional equivalent to international law is an interesting 
one,49 however, rather than assuming soft law to be a functional substitute to hard law in 
reference to the basic problem of the stabilization of normative expectations, it may be more 
useful to consider whether it’s function lies in a distinction and second-order internal coding 
of the legal system that allows it to unfold the paradox of increased reference to general 
norms and persisting consensualism towards the atomistic interests of sovereign states. In this 
sense the distinction soft law/hard law could be seen as another binary code, another internal 
boundary which the legal system can transgress.50  
Much more could be said about that, yet, whatever the reasons behind its emergence, 
soft law has proved of little use in hard cases—those cases where an acute need for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
41 Boyle (2014), 119. 
42 Shaw (2014), 83.  
43 The inclusion of such non-binding instruments within the framework of international law has been criticized 
by those of a more positivist bent, who view it as amounting to nothing but ‘non-law’ (Weil, 1983, 413), as 
being ‘redundant’ (Klabbers, 1996, 167), or as ‘incoherent’ (D’Amato, 2009, 899). 
44 According to Cassese, the concept was first introduced by diplomats for ‘reasons of expediency’, and have 
only since slowly been adopted by jurists, Cassese (1988), 172.  
45 Boyle (2014), 119. See, for example, the ICJ’s reliance on General Assembly resolutions to this effect in the 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), Merits, 
Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, para. 188 
46 Boyle (2014), 120.  
47 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) ICJ Reports 2010, para. 62. 
48 Rather the point seems to be whether soft law should be included as ‘law’ if it if it ‘looks like international 
law and basically functions like international law’, Goldmann (2012), 346-348.  
49 Although the soft law’s primary virtue—its flexibility and ‘the promise of constant revision and update’ 
(Calliess and Zumbansen 2010, 274)—may prove problematic for generalization along the temporal dimension.  
50 Luhmann, (2004), 284. 
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accommodation of general norms is in direct contention with the sovereignty and 
independence of the nation-state. In those cases, international law will be seen to reach for 
another internal distinction. This chapter will look at the plight of general norms in two 
notorious hard cases of international law: expectations of the peremptory status of human 
rights vis-à-vis the sovereign immunity of nation-states, and expectations of the prohibition 
of the threat or use of nuclear weapons vis-à-vis the security interests of independent nation-
states and the precarious scaffolding of mutually assured destruction. These are the cases that 
test the limits of the public international legal system.  
 
5.2 The peremptory status of human rights norms 
 
Towards the end of Law as a Social System, in addressing the increasing ‘normative 
institutionalization of value commitments’, Luhmann points to a trend whereby ‘one not only 
has to extend one’s own values to include the values of other (in the interests of the poor, the 
disadvantaged, the hungry, the ‘third world’), but one must also join in these demands in 
order that others commit themselves to these values as well.’51  Such a normative expectation 
of normative expectations, he argues, ‘lies largely beyond the established juridical world of 
forms and is also directed against the law.’ 52 However, this phenomenon of a highly 
globalized society is reflected in international law like it is in no other place. Despite its 
consenusalist foundations, the ‘Messianic structure’53 of contemporary international law 
makes a bold announcement of such normative expectations of normative expectations while 
at the same time presenting them as something that remains nonetheless eternally postponed. 
The doctrine of peremptory norms, or jus cogens as many international lawyers refer to them, 
is a definite symptom of the paradox of the international system. Thus, it can be claimed, on 
the one hand, that human rights ‘surely’ belong to the jus cogens’,54 while, on the other, no 
one can say exactly which human rights norms enjoy such peremptory status;55  thus one can, 
for example, say without fear of contradiction, ‘You are not really an international lawyer if 
                                                          
51 Luhmann (2004), 468.  
52 Ibid., 469.  
53 Koskenniemi (2003), 111. 
54 See the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka in the South West Africa case (Ethiopia v. South Africa; 
Liberia v. South Africa), Second Phase, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1966, 298. For the claim that all human rights 
are jus cogens see Neylon and Parker (1989), 441ff. 
55 Bianchi (2008), 492.  Although see,  the Restatement of the Law (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States 167 § 702 (1987), which includes only as jus cogens prohibitions against genocide, slavery, 
murder, torture, inhuman or degrading punishment, prolonged arbitrary detention, and systematic racial 
discrimination. 
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you do not understand, and cannot deploy and make use of the doctrine of jus cogens’56, 
while others can equally describe it as an ‘empty box’,57 a vehicle that ‘does not often leave 
the garage very often’,58 or as ‘an insubstantial image of a norm, lacking flesh and blood’.59  
From a doctrinal position at least, it can be said that normative expectations of the 
universal peremptory status of human rights represent a conspicuous example of highly 
generalized norms which are adequately formulated and recognized on some primary level, 
but which are inadequately realized in law. This section will therefore examine how 
international law has dealt with this concept in practice to gain a better understanding to what 
extent this norm has found positivization in the international legal system. It will be shown 
that while national and regional courts acknowledge the theoretical concept of such a 
normative hierarchy, they invariably rely upon their own internal legal order in adjudication, 
rather than relying upon or developing jus cogens in any practical sense. Where courts are not 
able to avoid the issue through reliance upon such an internal and autonomous legal order—
and this includes international courts—they will be shown to rely upon a distinction between 
substantive and procedural law to filter off the paradoxical question of jus cogens. This 
practice will be analysed from a systems theoretical perspective. 
The doctrine of jus cogens  in international law has its antecedents in the natural law of 
pre-modern world of course, and classical publicists such as Grotius, Vattel and Wolff drew 
on the concept of jus scriptum in Roman law to posit that certain norms permitted no 
derogation because they were derived from a ‘higher source’.60 It was not until the inter-war 
period of the twentieth century, however, that the concept really began to gain importance in 
international law, and found its way into positive legal reference. In this context, the notion of 
peremptory norms was first discussed as an option in positive law by Verdross, purely in the 
context of operating as a limitation on the freedom of contract which nation-states enjoy in 
making treaties.61 Sixteen years later, Lauterpacht, acting as Special Rapporteur to the 
International Law Commission in its preparation of the Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
submitted to a draft provision suggesting that a treaty is void if its performance involves any 
violation of the ‘overriding principles of international law’, the ‘ordre public international’.62 
                                                          
56 See ‘Jus cogens: a social construct without pedigree (“If judges say so then it must be true”)’, Dr. Jean 
d'Aspremont, Professor of International Law, University of Manchester, video available at 
http://law.mc.edu/law-centers/international/calendar/spring-2015 
57 Abi-Saab (1973), 53. 
58 Brownlie (1988), 110. 
59 D’Amato (1990), 1. 
60 Criddle and Fox-Decent (2009), 335. 
61 Verdross (1937). 
62 Lauterpacht  (1953), 93. 
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This was reflected in the adopted Convention, which now constitutes the only existing 
positive reference to jus cogens in international law:  ‘a treaty is void if it conflicts with a 
peremptory norm of general international law’, which is defined as a ‘norm accepted and 
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted’.63 However, the adopted provision gives little substance to the 
original suggestion of a normative hierarchy in international law, and has been of limited 
application in practice (how likely is it for nation-states to conclude treaties which explicitly 
commit to obligations to torture, commit genocide, institutionalize slavery, and occupy a 
foreign nation-state, for example?).64 Since the 1960s, however, this positive reference to 
peremptory norms has become the basis of more far-reaching claims for jus cogens. The 
concept really began to gather more substance with developing countries arguing for de-
colonization, claiming norms of self-determination, or the prohibition of racial discrimination 
and apartheid as such peremptory norms.65 It was not long after this that the concept began to 
emerge that human rights in general ‘belong to jus cogens’.66 This idea has been developed, 
with many holding human rights,67 and environmental protection,68 to fall into such a 
category of peremptory norms today. 
The concept has been developed in a substantial manner in some of special jurisdictions 
at the international level. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, for example, 
has referred to the concept in its jurisprudence several times.69 Moreover, a robust concept of 
jus cogens has proved important to international courts and tribunals in carrying out their 
mandate in punishing the ‘most serious crimes of concern to the international community’.70 
Perhaps the most generous judicial exposition of jus cogens to date is that contained in the 
judgment of the ICTY in the Furundžija case, where the tribunal held that held that “as a 
consequence of the jus cogens character of the prohibition of torture, every State is entitled to 
investigate, prosecute and punish or extradite individuals accused of torture, who are present 
in a territory under its jurisdiction.”71  
                                                          
63 See Articles 53, 64 and 66(a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties. 
64 Bianchi (2008), 491; Vidmar (2013), 2. 
65 Cassese (2005), 199. And in this sense, jus cogens also became part of a ‘global political economy’, see 
Stephan (2011). 
66 Supra, n. 54.  
67 See for example, Orekhelashvili, (2006), 53-54;  Shelton, (2007) 167-173. 
68 Kornicker-Ulhmann (1998). 
69 See for example the case of Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory 
Opinion, InterAmerican Court of Human Rights (ser. A) No. 18 (2003). 
70 Preamble of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
71 Prosecutor v. Furundžija, IT-95-17/I-T (1999), para. 156.  
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Beyond this, however, one has to be careful in describing the international legal system 
as having successfully institutionalized jus cogens. Many of the examples which are 
commonly cited by scholars as evidence of such a development often need to be qualified for 
having limited application. In respect of national and regional courts that are called upon to 
decide a case involving jus cogens, for example, what one typically finds on analysis is that 
the court will pay lip service to the concept of such a normative hierarchy in international 
law, yet ultimately rely on the central authority (e.g., parliament) of the more local and 
autonomous legal system.  
Thus, for example, in a case that brought the hierarchy of norms in the international 
legal order sharply into focus, the European Court of First Instance (CFI) declared that it 
would, in principle, be empowered to review the lawfulness of the resolutions of the United 
Nations Security Council in regard to its observance of jus cogens.72 On the face of it, this 
seems a bold assertion of the hierarchy of norms in the international legal order, but it should 
not be exaggerated. Firstly, the court did not in fact apply such a qualification, as jus cogens 
were determined not to have been in issue in the case.73 Secondly, the CFI also came to the 
conclusion that jus cogens could in fact be derogated from by the Security Council when that 
body establishes that a global state of emergency exists and when the measures were 
proportionate—a level of policy overriding those peremptory norms―from which no 
derogation is possible.74 Most importantly, however, the decision of the CFI was reversed by 
the ECJ, who deftly avoided the complexities of peremptory norms in the international legal 
system by limiting their jurisdiction to the ‘internal and autonomous legal order of the 
Community’.75 The ECJ concluded that it had exclusive jurisdiction to review only the 
lawfulness of the Community act, in light of ‘fundamental rights and the rule of law deemed 
integral to the general principles of Community law’.76 As a corollary, it was, in the words of 
the Court, ‘not, therefore, for the Community judicature, under the exclusive jurisdiction 
provided for it by Article 220 EC, to review the lawfulness of such a resolution adopted by an 
international body, even if that review were to be limited to examination of the compatibility 
of that resolution with jus cogens.77 
                                                          
72 Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council and Commission 2005, ECR II-3649, para. 226. 
73 Ibid., para. 286. 
74 Ibid., paras. 274, 284, 289. 
75 Case C-402/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the 
European Communities, 3 Sept. 2008. 
76 Ibid., paras. 281-283. 
77 Ibid., para. 287. 
138 
 
This approach of retreating into the autonomy of a ‘municipal’78 jurisdiction when 
faced with this question of jus cogens has also been relied upon by national courts—and this 
is what happens even in those cases which are commonly held up as examples of national 
courts referring to such peremptory norms. The decision of the House of Lords in the case of 
Pinochet (No.3),79 for instance, is often cited as an example of a national court reaching out 
for the supra-national principle of jus cogens in its adjudication of an international legal 
question.80 Admittedly, references to jus cogens do pepper the separate opinions of several of 
the Law Lords. 81 None of this throws much light on how peremptory norms should operate in 
the case, however.82 In fact, the discussion of jus cogens ultimately plays no real part in the 
ratio of the decision.83 Although the Lords agreed that the prohibition of torture constituted a 
peremptory norm of international law allowing for no derogation, the mainspring of the 
decision not to grant immunity to the former head-of-state was provided by the incorporation 
of the 1984 UN Convention on Torture into English national law, by way of the 1988 
Criminal Justice Act.84 In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court has dispelled much of the 
controversy surrounding the effect of peremptory norms in English law; while recognizing 
that torture is prohibited by jus cogens, the House of Lords explicitly denied that such could 
operate to remove the immunity granted to foreign officials, except where as in Pinochet the 
authority to deny such immunity stems from an Act of Parliament.85 
In the United States, on the other hand, the issue has been brought into contention 
through the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which grants U.S. courts jurisdiction over causes where 
a foreign national sues for a tort ‘in violation of the law of nations’.86 It is generally presumed 
by members of the academy that norms belonging to jus cogens will automatically qualify it 
as a norm of the ‘law of nations’ for the purposes of ATS.87 However, the practice of courts 
                                                          
78 The term ‘municipal‘ was used by the Advocate-General to describe the Community legal order vis-à-vis 
the international system in his submitted opinion. See Advocate-General (AG) Maduro‘s opinion: Case C-
402/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European 
Communities, 16 Jan. 2008, para. 21 
79 R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.3) (1999) 2 All 
E.R. 97 (hereafter Pinochet). 
80 See, for example, Kadelbach (2006), 23. 
81 See Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Pinochet (3), 198; Lord Millett, Pinochet (3), 275.  
82 For a criticism of the Lord‘s employment of jus cogens in the case see Bianchi (1999), 237; Fox (1999), 
688. 
83 Shelton (2006), 316. 
84 Pinochet, 692. In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court has dispelled much of the controversy surrounding 
the effect of peremptory norms in English law, see Jones v Saudi Arabia 2006 WLR below.  
85 Jones v Ministry of Interior Al-Mamlaka Al-Arabiya AS Saudiya (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) 2006 WL 
1546647 (hereafter, Jones v Saudi Arabia), para. 31.  
86 Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, now codified in the U.S. Code § 1350. 
87 Orakhelashvili (2008), 123; Swan (2001), 91; Goodman and Jinks (1997), 495. 
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has done little to confirm this, and, in fact, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
the case of Sosa expressly rejected the concept of jus cogens as criterion for application of the 
ATS.88 Moreover, although it has had numerous opportunities to do so, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has failed to mention jus cogens in its adjudication on ATS, and has in this context 
consistently presented a dualist international legal order, suggesting at all points that it would 
defer such authority to Congress.89 
These cases at the regional and national level show how the courts are able to avoid 
developing jus cogens in any substantive legal sense by retreating into more adequately 
differentiated legal system. In recent years, however, there have been a number of cases 
which have brought the peremptory status of the norm into contention in such a way as to 
expose the fundamentals problems of the institutionalization of the doctrine. The basic format 
of these cases typically involves litigation on the basis that a nation-state has violated 
peremptory norms, but in answer to which it relies on the customary law of sovereign 
immunity to avoid such a suit. It is important to note that the violation of human rights norms 
in these cases has already occurred, and that it is no longer a question of preventing such 
specific violations. The tension thus lies in a conflict between norms taking precedence as jus 
cogens over the customary law of according immunity to a sovereign nation-state.  
Invariably what happens in such cases of a direct conflict of jus cogens with a 
fundamental principle of the consensualist legal order is that the claim based on the 
superiority of jus cogens is denied on the basis of procedure. In 2002, the ICJ avoided 
adjudication of jus cogens in the Arrest Warrant case, stepping over the Respondent‘s 
preliminary argument that the peremptory character of crimes against humanity should 
prevail over a plea of diplomatic immunity.90 The same year, this question was further 
explored in the Armed Activities case.91 When the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
                                                          
88 Alvarez-Machain v United States, 266 F3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2001), 1050. In another case the Circuit court held: 
If violations of jus cogens committed outside the United States are to be exceptions to immunity, Congress must 
make them so.’ Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992), 719. 
89 Most recently in the Kiobel case, the Supreme Court failed to make reference to jus cogens and asserted a 
presumption against extraterritorial jurisdiction, claiming: ‘If Congress were to determine otherwise, a statute 
more specific than the ATS would be required.’ Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum, 1659, 135 S. Ct. (2013), 
1669. See also Argentine Republic v Amerada Hess Shipping Co., 488 U.S. 428, 109 S. Ct. (1989), 435-38; and 
the decision of the Supreme Court in Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 124 S.Ct. (2004), which argued 
that federal courts should be careful not to open the door to any violation of international law that was not 
strictly conceived by the eighteenth century framers of the statute. See also for an astute reading of adjudication 
in this area, Adams (2001), 268-270. 
90 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, ICJ Reports 
2002, 3. That may however have been a result of the parties having narrowed the Court‘s jurisdiction on the 
merits. See however for criticism Diss. Op. Judge ad hoc van den Wyngaert, para. 28. 
91 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, ICJ Reports 2006. (Hereafter Armed Activities) 
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instituted proceedings against Rwanda citing grave violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law, Rwanda contested the Court’s jurisdiction on the basis of its 
reservation to Article IX of the 1948 Genocide Convention.92 The Democratic Republic of 
the Congo reached for jus cogens to argue that such a reservation was null and void. The 
Court, however, rejected the argument, stating that the rule of state immunity is procedural, 
and that the status of jus cogens ‘cannot of itself provide a basis for the jurisdiction of the 
Court to entertain that dispute.’93 A year later, the Court again availed itself of the same 
procedural mechanism in a similar case of conflict between jus cogens and state sovereignty, 
citing a ‘fundamental distinction between existence and binding force of obligations arising 
under international law and the existence of a court or tribunal with jurisdiction to resolve 
disputes about compliance with those obligations.’94  
This practice of distinguishing between substantive and procedural rules and denying 
jus cogens on the basis of the latter has culminated in the recent decision of the ICJ in the 
Jurisdictional Immunities case.95 There, in dealing with an Italian claim that Germany was 
subject to the civil jurisdiction of Italian courts for violation of peremptory norms committed 
during the Second World War, the Court appeared to take the opportunity to ‘push jus cogens 
back to the realm of Article 53 of the VCLT’, where it has only a narrow application in 
respect of treaties.96 Thus, it was noticeable that the Court was not even prepared to state that 
the prohibition against the murder or enslavement of civilian non-combatants in occupied 
territory constituted rules of jus cogens.97  Instead, the Court held that, even ‘assuming’ such 
norms were jus cogens, there would be no conflict between them and the rules of state 
immunity.98 ‘The rules of state immunity,’ it declared, ‘are procedural in character and are 
confined to determining whether or not the courts of one state may exercise jurisdiction in 
respect of another.’99  
This approach has also been reflected in the jurisprudence of courts at both the regional 
and municipal levels. In respect to the former, the Al-Adsani judgment of the European Court 
                                                          
92 Article IX provides: ‘Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or 
fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for 
any of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the 
request of any of the parties to the dispute.’ 
93 Armed Activities, para. 64.  
94 Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) ICJ Reports 2007, supra, n. 75, para. 148. 
95 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy, Greece intervening), ICJ Reports 2012. (Hereafter 
Jurisdictional Immunities). 
96 Vidmar (2013), 3. 
97 Jurisdictional Immunities, at para. 93. 
98 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
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of Human Rights, for example, employs this distinction of procedural and substantive rules to 
resolve the contention of jus cogens and sovereign immunity.100 Whilst the Court noted the 
growing recognition of the overriding importance of the prohibition of torture, it could not 
from that deduce ‘acceptance in international law of the proposition that States are not 
entitled to immunity in respect of civil claims for damages for alleged torture committed 
outside the forum State’.101 In the absence of any contrasting, formal authority for such an 
exception to jurisdictional immunity, the Court said that it was not prepared to deduce such a 
procedural effect from vague provisions of jus cogens in international law.102 
National courts have also relied upon this practice of drawing a distinction between 
procedural and substantive law to avoid the conflict between state sovereignty and jus 
cogens. The distinction was employed by the House of Lords in Jones v Saudi Arabia in 
2006, holding that state immunity is a procedural rule and that to ‘produce a conflict with 
state immunity, it is therefore necessary to show the prohibition of torture has generated an 
ancillary procedural rule by way of exception to state immunity.’103 Lacking the kind of 
parliamentary statute that was present in Pinochet, their Lordships found no such ancillary 
procedural exception to state immunity.104  This approach of rejecting the ‘procedural effect’ 
of jus cogens to displace the law of state immunity has furthermore been followed in the 
judgements of other national courts including Canada,105 Poland,106 New Zealand,107 and 
Greece.108 
This way of dealing with jus cogens has, nonetheless, divided legal scholars. Many 
accept as unproblematic the argument that there is ‘no logical conflict’ between substantive 
and procedural rules.109 Hazel Fox, for example, argues that ‘[r]ules pertaining to jurisdiction 
are procedural and do not go to substantive law, and therefore any denial of the capacity of 
peremptory norms to confer jurisdiction do not then contradict the substance of such norms, 
                                                          
100 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, EC-R App. 35763/97 (Merits), 123 ILR 24, 147. 
101 Ibid., para. 66. The Al-Adsani decision was reiterated by the European Court of Human Rights in the 
decision of inadmissibility of 12 December 2002 in the Kalogeropoulou v. Greece and Germany case, No. 
59021/00. 
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103 Jones v Saudi Arabia, Lord Bingham, paras. 24-34; Lord Hoffman, para. 45. 
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but merely diverts any breach of it to a different method of settlement.’110 Others, meanwhile, 
are prepared to accept the greater relevance of such a practice of denying jus cogens on 
procedural grounds, but accept the distinction as necessary in the international legal system. 
Dugard, for example, argues that denying jurisdictional immunities in such cases would 
involve the court in ‘molecular law-making that goes beyond the legitimate judicial function.’ 
Only states, he added, can undertake such ‘law-making’ in the international legal system.111  
Many others disagree with the practice entirely, and see it as detrimental to function of 
international law. In his dissenting opinion in the Jurisdictional Immunities case, Judge 
Cançado Trindade expresses his firm opposition to, what he terms, the ‘posture of stagnation 
in respect of jus cogens whenever claims of State immunity are at stake’.112 State immunity, 
he argues, is not a right but a privilege which should not be upheld in a way that leads to 
manifest injustice. He therefore dismisses the ‘widespread’ practice of distinguishing 
between procedural and substantive rules in this regard as an ‘undue methodology’.113 For 
him, it constitutes an avoidance of the representation of fundamental ‘values’ in law.114 
Others have also expressed their dissatisfaction with the distinction between substantive and 
procedural rules employed in the cases to rule out jus cogens, as ‘unsatisfying’,115 ‘utterly 
theoretical’,116 as ‘excessive formalism’,117 or as being ‘illusory and lacking any real 
meaning’118. Common to all these complaints is a frustration with the lack of any avenue of 
redress in the international legal system for violations of the most fundamental norms.119  
It is not necessary to enter into this debate. From the systems theoretical perspective 
other more interesting insights come to the fore. First, what the application of the 
procedural/substantive distinction by courts to the jus cogens question achieves is an 
invisiblization or unfolding of the paradox that jus cogens is a symbol of: that such a general 
norm is a problem that is to be solved by law and yet that cannot be solved by law in a 
consensualist legal order. According to Luhmann, the paradox is ‘made invisible by 
generating criteria.’120 But more than this, not only is this distinction procedural/substantive 
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more ‘utterable’121 than the legality/illegality of jus cogens, but it allows for the application 
of another binary code ‘to be applied to the proceedings themselves.’122 Legal procedure is 
well known to provide the ‘vanishing point of the analysis of the legal system’.123 It 
constitutes an important evolutionary achievement which allows an escape from the 
introduction of further ‘values or supervalues’, and thereby to maintain the basic binary code 
‘intact’.124 As a binary code itself, it does not need external references; it already contains 
such as the ‘other side’ of the distinction, and thus gives itself ‘permission to operate without 
having to take recourse to higher values.’125 Thus, through the application of this binary code 
of substantive/procedural law to the problem of jus cogens, law is able to unfold the paradox 
and thereby continue reproducing itself as a ‘never-ending story, an autopoietic system that 
produces elements only in order to be able to produce further elements.’126 
Secondly, it might be said that the way in which international and regional courts have 
relied upon procedure in response to the jus cogens question has achieved a certain degree of 
uncertainty that may nonetheless help law to fulfil its function in respect of such normative 
expectations of the peremptory status of human rights norms. The necessary generalization of 
such norms along the social and material dimensions of the function of law is not so 
problematic here. In respect of the former, the limitation of exclusion to procedural grounds 
means the court, as institutionalized third parties, still bears witness to- and co-expects such 
norms (or at least provides the illusion of such consensus). In respect of the latter, in 
excluding claims on procedural grounds, courts do not deny, and at points explicitly 
recognize, that norms, like the prohibition of torture or genocide, belong to the category of 
jus cogens.127 Of course, the generalization of those normative expectations along the 
temporal dimension appears somewhat more challenging, as critics of the practice of the 
procedural/substantive distinction in respect of jus cogens clearly view it as ‘unsatisfying’.128 
However, it must be recognized that the uncertainty introduced here through the use of 
procedure may be enough to stabilize those normative expectations in the temporal 
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dimension. The use of procedure, as Luhmann says, augments the basic binary code of the 
legal system with an internally generated third value, ‘namely the value of uncertainty of the 
value attribution’ of the basic binary code. 129 And this is exactly what has been achieved by 
courts applying the procedural/substantive distinction to the jus cogens question. Some see it 
as a denial of justice; others see it as merely diverting the question to a different means of 
settlement—and both are right. What this achieves is the presentation of a ‘not yet’ finding.130 
The court holds itself out as possibly—under different circumstances in the future—
upholding the peremptory status of those norms. So far as this works, it not only fulfils law’s 
function in respect of those norms, but it also feeds the autopoiesis of the legal system (again, 
function and coding are connected131). The law uses uncertainty in this way to avoid a cul-de-
sac, to offer further opportunities and to encourage further participation.132 
There is no doubt, however, that those courts which rely on procedure in this manner to 
unfold the paradox presented by jus cogens are ‘skating on thin ice’. Observations that the 
court’s approach to jus cogens is ‘utterly theoretical’ or ‘illusory’ can always be painted as 
coming from an outmoded natural law position, and so on, but they do, nonetheless, highlight 
the danger of the court incorporating an external rejection value in adjudicating the issue of 
jus cogens. This points to an issue with procedure that Luhmann raises; when the use of 
procedure reaches a point where lawyers begin to question whether it does not in fact 
constitute a ‘violation of the prohibition of the denial of justice.’133 This is not to say that 
such a point has been reached by courts in dealing with the hard cases of jus cogens. The 
above points demonstrated how sophisticated law can be in maintaining a functional 
reference to general norms within a consensualist international framework (which only 
highlights how difficult it is to construct the problem of general norms). It may be worth 
empirical examination to determine, in fact, how much the uncertainty generated by the 
procedural/substantive code in respect of jus cogens adequately stabilizes normative 
expectations of such peremptory norms. However, such a laborious task need not be 
undertaken here, for there is one case where the World Court explicitly violated the 
prohibition of the denial of justice in reference to a general norm, and thus, where the 
problem clearly invites the search for functional equivalents beyond law. It is to that which I 
now turn.  
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5.3  The prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons 
 
The principle of non liquet (literally ‘its not clear’) has undergone ‘long evolutionary 
process’ to emerge in modern legal systems as an absolute a prohibition of the denial of 
justice.134 Its point of origin is said to lie in Roman law, where, in the face of either factual or 
judicial doubt, the magistrate was entitled to defer the decision until further information was 
available or to refer the decision to the emperor.135 It was only with the developed autonomy 
of law and complexity of society that more pressure came to bear on the court itself to 
provide a decision in response to each action brought before it. In the Middle Ages this often 
necessitated recourse to ‘God’s judgment’, as the divination of the judge, or even trial by 
ordeal.136 With the progressive rationalization of society from the thirteenth through the 
sixteenth centuries, the judge, as a removed institutionalized third party with technical 
expertise in the law, increasingly assumed responsibility for determining what the law should 
be. This need for a legal decision only became more pronounced with the development of 
legislative authority and crystallized as an absolute rule with the positivization of law in the 
nineteenth century.137  
Today these developments are codified in the Swiss legal code, for example, which 
provides: ‘In the absence of suitable legal dispositions, the judge pronounces according to 
custom, and, in the absence thereof, according to such norms as the judge himself would lay 
down, were he called to act as a legislator.’138 The French Civil Code goes even further, 
declaring that ‘a judge who refuses to decide a case, on the pretext that the law is silent, 
obscure, or insufficient, may be prosecuted as being guilty of denial of justice.’139 Likewise 
such a principle is widely reflected in common law systems, which have accommodated, as 
Reisman says, ‘the extremes of both Blackstone and the institution of “judge-made” law.’140 
Traditionally, international law was able to reflect this general evolution of law and 
present itself as a complete legal order by relying on the ‘residual negative principal’ that 
found its classical statement in the Lotus case: ‘whatever is not expressly prohibited by 
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international law is permitted’.141 This bolstered Kelsen’s conviction that non liquet in 
international law was ‘logically not possible’. For him, so long as there is ‘no norm of 
conventional or customary international law imposing upon the state (or any subject of 
international law) the obligation to behave in a certain way, the subject is under international 
law legally free to behave as it pleases.’142  
This line of thinking may have staved off questions about the completeness of the 
international legal system for some years. However the advent of global society and the 
consequential explosion of transnational normative expectations quickly called this residual 
negative principle into question. Things came to a head in the early 1990s when the question 
as to the illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons in international law was put to the 
World Court in The Hague by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA). The case involved, on the one hand, the expansionist tendencies 
of the political, scientific, and military systems ossifying in a precocious scaffolding of 
‘mutually assured destruction’ that no would choose to interfere with lightly.143 One the 
other, it involved global expectations (that are highly resistant to disappointment) that an 
indiscriminate class of civilian non-combatants should not become the victims of armed 
conflict.  
After some procedural difficulties involving the specialized nature of organs of the 
United Nations,144 the Court, in recognition of the ‘fundamental importance’ of the issue, 
admitted the request by the UNGA for an advisory opinion.145 The case was subject from the 
outset to a great degree of public interest. Fifty-nine nation-states submitted statements to the 
Court, and it estimated that the Court received well over three million signatures from people 
around the world voicing their expectations as to the inherent illegality of nuclear weapons. 
The extent of this is expressed by judge Weeramantry in his dissenting opinion: ‘Strong 
protests against nuclear weapons have come from learned societies, professional groups, 
religious denominations, women's organizations, political parties, student federations, trade 
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unions, NGOs and practically every group in which public opinion is expressed. Hundreds of 
such groups exist across the world.’146 
The Court determined at the outset that its ‘real objective is clear: to determine the 
legality or illegality of the threat.’147 It gave consideration in this respect to the view that 
nuclear weapons could not be compatible with international humanitarian law, due to the 
range of destruction of such weapons being unable to discriminate between combatants and 
civilians. ‘Such weapons’, they noted, ‘would kill and destroy in a necessarily indiscriminate 
manner, on account of the blast, heat and radiation occasioned by the nuclear explosion and 
the effects induced’.148 The court also noted that none of the nuclear weapons states had even 
argued that nuclear weapons could be employed in a tactical fashion to avoid civilian 
casualties and therefore avoid breaching a fundamental rule of international humanitarian 
law. Despite declaring for those reasons that nuclear weapons ‘seem scarcely reconcilable’ 
with the law of armed conflict for, the Court did not however feel that it had ‘a sufficient 
basis for a determination’ on the question of whether such weapons could in fact be deployed 
tactically in such a way as to avoid running afoul of international law.149 The Court 
furthermore felt constrained by the ‘fundamental right’ of every nation-state to resort self-
defence that is contained in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This also led them 
could to note that ‘the policy of deterrence’ had been adhered to for many years by 
‘appreciable section of the international community’.150 That was obviously something the 
Court felt uneasy in tempering with.151 
All of these factors, however, led the Court to observe that it ‘could not reach a 
definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons’.152 In the 
end, the Court, by seven votes to seven with the President’s casting vote, declined a legal 
decision:  
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[I]n view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its 
disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in 
which the survival of a state would be at stake.153  
 
This emphasizes much of what was said about the centrality of state sovereignty and the 
extra-legal and ambivalent character of self-defence. But more importantly, it was a non-
liquet.154 It was up to the judges in their separate and dissenting opinions to explain the 
lacuna. President Bedjaoui considered it to be such an ‘exceptional event’ that he abandoned 
his usual reticence to issue declarations or separate or dissenting opinions.155 He remarked in 
this respect about how the world had changed since the Lotus case; about how ‘globalization’ 
had necessitated a move away from an international law of cooperation to one of ‘co-
existence’.156 Moreover, Judge Bedjaoui explicitly connected ‘the emergence of the concept 
of international community’ and the development of jus cogens with ‘progress in the 
technological sphere, which now makes possible the total and virtually instantaneous 
eradication of the human race’.157 Thus, for him the ICJ was in a much more difficult position 
than the Permanent Court that decided the Lotus case in 1927. The ICJ, he argued, was 
confronted with a much more important question, and was thus ‘far more circumspect than its 
predecessor’ in its judgment. Therefore, he felt, the Court could not follow the residual 
negative principle in the Lotus case, but instead had to assert a new counter principle that 
‘what is not expressly prohibited by international law is not therefore authorized.’158 
Others commented more directly on the issue non liquet.  Vice President Schwebel 
considered it ‘an astounding conclusion to be reached by the International Court of 
Justice.’159 Neither ‘predominant legal theory’, nor the precedent of the Court admitted such a 
holding of non liquet, he argued.160 Judge Higgins was in no doubt that the ‘formula chosen is 
a non liquet’, and reminded the court that there are ‘useful devices’ which ‘preclude the Court 
from pleading non liquet in any given case’.161 Lauterpacht’s ghost evidently haunted the 
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members of bench.162  Several of the judges clearly had in mind his view that the necessity 
for courts to decide every case submitted to them is not imposed on them by any ‘express 
provision of positive law’, but comes instead from ‘an a priori assumption of every legal 
system.’163 As stated, Lauterpacht relied on customary international law and general 
principles to establish an internal legal basis compelling adjudication,164 and argued that the 
‘prohibition of non liquet constitutes one of the most undisputedly established rules of 
positive international law as evidenced by an uninterrupted continuity of international arbitral 
and judicial practice.’165  
Lauterpacht’s position has not enjoyed universal acceptance amongst international 
lawyers, however. Julius Stone, for example, disagrees with the proposition that the concept 
of modern law logically demands the prohibition of the denial of justice.166 For him there is 
no ‘ontological’ necessity for such a rule, but that it only results from its formal inclusion in 
positive law.167 He also questioned whether there was in fact a customary basis for the 
prohibition of non liquet in international law as Lauterpacht contended,168 and argued such a 
rule was unsuitable for international law ‘in the existing conditions of the world’ as it would 
confer a ‘law creating competence of the court over states’.169  
Indeed, this position could be said to be reflected in the plenary opinion of the Court, 
and is certainly reflected in some of the separate opinions of judges who either did not view 
the opinion as a non liquet, or argued that the opinion was the most acceptable solution in 
light of the circumstances. Thus, Judge Shahabuddeen, adopting the residual negative 
principle of the 1927 Lotus court, argued that in order to amount to a non liquet, it would 
have to be shown that there is a ‘gap’ in the applicable law, but as there was no applicable 
law, as he saw it, to the case of nuclear of weapons, he concluded that ‘[t]here is no non 
liquet.’170 Finally, Judge Vereshchetin saw it as necessary to admit such a ‘grey area’ into the 
law in light of the circumstances.171 For him, the prohibition of non liquet was not so pressing 
in an advisory opinion, and in his view the case presented a ‘good example of an instance 
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where the absolute clarity of the Opinion would be ‘deceptive’ and where, on the other hand, 
its ‘partial indecision’ may prove useful.’172 
Though widely viewed as controversial, the Court’s non-decision has generally been 
well received. Most admit that it amounted to a non liquet, but consider the Court’s silence as 
prudent. In defence of the opinion, Bodansky, for example, considers the Court’s failure to 
provide a decision as something that would ‘over time build confidence in the Court’s 
judicial role.’173 Thus, it is the ‘law-creation’ aspect of a prohibition of the denial of justice in 
an international legal system with neither compulsory jurisdiction nor accountability of the 
judiciary that Bodansky worries about. Nor does he see the non liquet as especially 
problematic. He questions, for example, if one cannot ‘self-consistently claim that an action 
is neither prohibited nor permitted?’.174 To demonstrate his meaning he presents the 
hypothetical of a tennis game where ‘rules defining when a ball is ‘in’ or ‘out’ need not make 
one term the negation of the other, and thus may leave open the third possibility, namely that 
a ball is neither in nor out.’175   
Koskinniemi also considers the Court’s opinion to be appropriate in respect of the 
circumstance, presenting the ‘silence of law’ as the ‘voice of justice’.176 He argues that the 
application of the harsh binary legal code in this case is too blunt in relation to both the 
complex military and political implications of nuclear weapons as well as the emotional and 
moral dilemmas involved.177 Pointing to the complexities of the self-defence nuclear 
umbrellas, Koskenniemi argues that reducing the issue to either a binary position of legal or 
illegal would be tantamount to expecting ‘a politician to commit suicide together with large 
parts of the population in deference to this kind of absolute rule?’.178 On another level, he 
defends the Court’s silence in the Nuclear Weapons Opinion as ‘leaving room for the 
workings of the moral impulse … against the killing of the innocents.’179 Application of the 
harsh either/or character of the binary legal code in this instance, he argues, would have 
‘instituted a public, technical discourse for the defence of the killing of the innocent’, and 
would thereby ‘have broken the taboo against the use of any nuclear weapons.’180 For him, 
the languages of ‘the passions and fears that are involved in a dispute’ can hardly be reduced 
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into juridical language without something fundamental being ‘lost’,181 and he even goes so 
far as to castigate the attempt at litigation of such a prodigious issue as ‘European attempts to 
discipline what is not European’.182  
A very different conclusion is reached if one applies Luhmann’s functionalist account 
of law to the opinion. From this perspective, one can see that Bodansky’s analogy to a tennis 
game where the ball can be ‘neither in nor out’ is inappropriate. Whilst the potential 
difficulties might well be borne in respect of a game of tennis, they cannot be so easily taken 
on with law. Expectations, as explained in the third chapter, are a crutch for meaning in a 
world of double contingency, and their stabilization is at the very basis of the evolution of 
social systems. The formulation is crude, but using his analogy, if law was to become such a 
game of tennis with ambivalent rules, it would simply lead to the evolution of a new game, a 
functional substitute in respect of the ‘players’ expectations. 
Likewise Koskinniemi’s conclusions about the silence of law being the voice of justice 
in this case are equally problematic from a functionalist perspective. His argument that law 
would be reductive of the complexities involved and would ultimately result in an 
abomination of the lifeworld is thoroughly unsociological, anti-Luhamnnian, even anti-
Habermasian. It is the function of law to reduce complexity, and this is not to claim anything 
essential about law. If law does not achieve this, alternative social structures will emerge as a 
result.183 Moreover, it may well be that a legal decision on the issue would have broken the 
taboo against the use of any nuclear weapons and that something would have been lost in 
translating the language of emotions into the language of law, but this says nothing about the 
more general problem of meaningful communication in world society, and law’s functional 
reference thereto.  
The problem with the World Court’s advisory opinion in the Nuclear Weapons case, 
however, is much more serious from the viewpoint of the theory of social autopoiesis. For 
Luhmann, the necessity for courts to decide every case that is admitted before them is not 
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simply an ontological one of the perfection of a gapless legal system—that is much too static. 
Rather, it is a necessity of autopoietic differentiation, and ultimately of the function of the 
legal system. For Luhmann the prohibition of the denial of justice is a necessary consequence 
of the ‘operative closure of the system and its detachment from any direct participation in the 
environment.’184 Because ‘systems are real’—in the sense that they cannot observe their own 
blindness, and in the sense that they thus differentiate themselves out through the continuous 
re-entry of the difference between system and environment185—the ‘state of the system 
cannot be treated in the way in which it appears as a state of the world.’186 Thus, the system 
puts itself under the pressure of reducing environmental complexity; under the pressure of 
having to decide.187 
For Luhmann it is the law itself that prohibits the denial justice, and not the rules of 
particular jurisdictions.188 Of course, because legal system must be ‘arranged as universally 
competent and at the same time capable of making decisions’, this necessarily results in an 
positive rules within particular jurisdictions.189 Thus, the provision of the French civil code, 
for example, is a result of the evolution of law as an autopoietic system. Moreover, it is the 
courts which are seen to bear a special responsibility for this. As Luhmann repeatedly states, 
‘[c]ontracts need not be concluded and statutes need not be passed, but courts have to decide 
every case submitted to them.’190 In practice this means that courts operate within a 
triangulation of obligation, freedom and limitation.191 Courts are obligated to decide every 
case admitted before them, and this includes even ‘hard cases’ where it is impossible to state 
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who is in a legal or illegal position.192 According to Luhmann, if the law cannot be found in 
such cases, ‘it must be invented.’193 
This only points to the ‘paradox of decision’, however, and the freedom courts have in 
making decisions. Here Luhmann draws upon von Foerster’s statement that ‘[o]nly those 
questions which are in principle undecidable, can we decide’,194 and Shackle’s observation 
that, for choice to be real, the future must be changeable within limits—that is, it must be 
both sufficiently open to be subject to change over time, and yet, at the same time, it must be 
sufficiently closed that actions in the present will have a determined effect in the future.195 
This leads Luhmann to a radical conclusion from the perspective of traditional jurisprudence. 
The obligation to decide, together with the paradox of decision, results in significant freedom 
for the judge. Because the decision is ‘not determined by the past’, and because it instead 
‘operates within its own construction, which is only possible in the present’, the decision 
‘assumes the past as immutable and the future as changeable and it, therefore, turns around 
the relationship of determination.’196 According to Luhmann, much of the ritual and decorum 
of judicial proceedings, right down to the ‘pomp of entries and exits of judges’, is to 
invisiblize this paradox of the decision.197 
Finally, limitation of this freedom is achieved through ‘organization and the 
professionalization of judicial competence.’198 Organization represents an evolutionary 
achievement in its unique ability to carve out a zone of hierarchy in a functionally 
differentiated society—I will return to this in the next chapter. In respect of the judiciary, 
organization and professional collegiality means that ‘judges deal with their caseloads’, and 
that any errors they make ‘must be kept within the limits of what is ‘juridically passable’.’199 
This is what Luhmann means when he speaks of the ‘triad of obligation, freedom and 
limitation’, that ‘produces law’.200 But why did this triad not operate in the World Court’s 
opinion on the nuclear weapons question? There was an obligation for the Court to decide the 
question, so far as it must, like any other social system, reproduce itself as an autonomous 
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system, distinct from its environment. There was the freedom conferred by any decision 
paradox, and the typical ‘useful devices’, as Judge Higgins pointed out,201 to invisiblize the 
paradox. And there was the limitation imposed by the professional organization; the ICJ itself 
is an international organization, with a constitution, hierarchy, judges with careers and 
salaries, etc.  
However, the reasons the triad of obligation, freedom and limitation did not ‘produce 
law’ in this case must be located in the structural problems of international law that were 
pointed out in the last chapter. Ultimately, international law’s entrenched structural 
connection with sovereignty doctrine, and thus with the deeper structural relationship 
between segmentary and functional differentiation in modern society, means that the triad of 
obligation, freedom and limitation is somewhat skewed for international law. While the 
obligation may have been operationalized by globalization and the Court’s increasing 
functional orientation to general norms—here the admitted question about the illegality of 
nuclear weapons—the freedom of the Court was severely limited by underlying conditions of 
the international legal system. First, sovereignty doctrine not only meant the Court was 
unable to draw on the legitimacy of structural coupling with a centralized political system at 
the global level, but also that the Court was unable to deny the ‘inherent’ right of self-defence 
that, in all its characteristic ambiguity, was so heavily implied in the nuclear weapons 
question. Moreover, the problems with international law’s failed domestication of physical 
violence were also insurmountable here, as the Court was faced with the apex of physical 
violence in world society, with all its symbolic value in international relations. Beyond this, 
the precocious scaffolding of mutually assured destruction and the complexity of technical, 
military and scientific communications also restricted the Court’s freedom.202 Finally, even 
the aspect of limitation was particularly acute in this case, as the Court was limited not only 
by the autonomous organization of the Court, but also pressure put on judges from their 
respective nation-states organizations—particularly problematic for those judges from 
nuclear weapon states.203  
                                                          
201 Nuclear Weapons, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Higgins, para. 38. 
202 The Court has been criticized for the limited use it has made of scientific evidence, Plant and Riddell 
(2009), 5; White (1996), 534-537. However, the Court has recently begun to make more use of court-appointed 
experts in this respect, see, for example, Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan: New Zealand 
intervening), ICJ Reports 2014. See also on tentative signs of a ‘new practice’ on the part of the Court in 
attributing more weight to factual evidence gained through intra-Institutional fact-finding, Del Mar (2011). 
203 See, Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui, ‘Good Faith, International Law, and Elimination of Nuclear Weapons: 
Keynote Address’, May 1, 2008, at p. 6, available at LNCP website, ‘World Court Project’,  
< http://lcnp.org/wcourt/ >, accessed 19 September 2015. 
155 
 
These factors underpin the Court’s failure to decide the question admitted about the 
illegality of nuclear weapons, and thus, led to the violation of the prohibition of non liquet. 
What are the ramifications of this from the systems theoretical and, more importantly, from 
the functional-structuralist perspective? In one sense it seems the Court has failed to manage 
the paradox of the system, whether one defines this as the paradox of the undecidable 
decision or as the foundational paradox of the self-referential system. The paradox as 
Luhmann says is the ‘holy shrine of the system’, a ‘deity in many forms: as unitas multiplex 
and as re-entry of the form into the form, as the sameness of difference, as the determinacy of 
indeterminacy, as self-legitimation’.204 In another sense, it constitutes a failure of the 
international legal system to secure its operative closure, and thus its differentiation out from 
the environment. Whereas in the case of the jus cogens question, the Court was able to 
employ a second-order internal code on the basis of a substantive/procedural distinction, the 
difficulties of the nuclear weapons opinion were such that the court was forced to introduce 
an exterior value. It was, in other words, forced to rely on conditions from the environment, 
and not from other operations and structures generated within the legal system. However, the 
problem of non liquet is not simply one of the admittance of an external value such as raison 
d’état or conditions of expediency, for example. Rather, it is the admission of a ‘rejection 
value’, that is a ‘third value that negates the binary code as the basis of choice.’205 This not 
only exposes the paradox of the system and leads to its ‘disintegration’,206 but—and this is 
the important point for the thesis—it negates the function of law in reference to the problem 
of the norm in question.  
By incorporating an external rejection value into law through the non liquet, the World 
Court failed to maintain the uncertainty about the norm of the prohibition of nuclear weapons 
it had thrived on before. The non liquet answered a definite ‘no’ to the normative question 
about nuclear weapons. But this was not the kind of ‘no’ that would cause expectations of the 
prohibition of nuclear weapons to learn in the face of disappointment—that is, an attribution 
of the value ‘legal’ to nuclear weapons. Rather, it answered ‘no’ in the sense that 
international law would not, indeed cannot, apply its code to this question. It is this definite 
‘no’ that blocks the stabilization of those norms in law along the temporal dimension. 
How can we know that the social system will ‘look’ for a functional substitute at this 
point? 
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205 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (2004), 84, n. 65, citing Luhmann (1992c). Emphasis added. 
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Coding obviously depends on functional specification. That is, the code must 
correspond to the system’s function, ‘it must be able to translate the viewpoint of the function 
into a guiding distinction.’207 Codes, in other words, are ‘in so far-as-abstractions’.208 They 
are only valid in so far as ‘communication chooses their domain of application’.209 For the 
legal system this means that a need for a distinction between legal and illegal must be 
communicated—the system can generate its own conflicts but it needs irritation from the 
environment also. The differentiation of the legal system depends upon the ‘specification of 
expectations which maintain the autopoietic process of reproduction.’210 However, the 
relationship between coding and function is reciprocal. Function also depends upon coding. 
Function requires coding to safeguard the ‘continuation of autopoiesis’ and to prevent the 
system from ‘running aground’.211 This is no longer simply about the autopoiesis of the 
function system. Rather it is about the autopoiesis of society. Thus, function systems only 
acquire ‘universal relevance’ for certain problem-references in society when they are 
‘specialized according to the operations of a determinate code’.212 In terms of norms as a 
problem-reference, this means that the legal system acquires universal relevance for the 
problem-reference of the stabilization normative expectations because it is specialized 
according to the operations of the determinate code it constructs internally. This may be 
legal/illegal, it may be substantive/procedural; from society’s perspective the form is 
contingent—in relationship to society, the ‘various codes of various function systems are 
functional equivalents’, in that they each ‘serve as guiding distinctions for the recursive 
reproduction of special (social) function systems.’213 Thus, the communicated failure of the 
World Court214 to apply the code to the question of nuclear weapons leads to the loss of law’s 
universal relevance to the problem-reference of normative expectations of the prohibition of 
nuclear weapons. This is the proper invite to the observer to begin looking beyond law for 
functional equivalents to the problem. 
The case is unique because it did not apply the residual negative principle of the Lotus 
judgment. It did not, in other words, stabilize normative expectations of the independence of 
the sovereign nation-state. In that sense it left room for, even promoted, the formulation and 
                                                          
207 Luhmann (2000b), 186. 
208 Luhmann (1989b), 38.  
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214 The communication here is something else that is secured by the Court’s organizational form, see below, 
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recognition of the more general norm of the prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons at the primary level. However, law did not provide the ‘second level’, the channel 
through which the disappointment of that expectation could be processed either. The norm 
was left intact as a generalized formulation by the opinion. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
The concept of the ‘shift of evolutionary primacy from normative to cognitive mechanisms’ , 
which was proposed by Luhmann, does not suggest that cognitive expectations take the place 
of normative expectations in world society.215 Claims of a ‘historical shift’ to a ‘knowledge 
society’ in which cognitive decision-making premises replace pre-existing normative 
premises are often exaggerated.216 Clearly increased functional differentiation at the global 
level also leads to increased normativity.217 Moreover, if the norms proliferating at the global 
level are to be cognitivized, the mechanisms must be in place to subject them to ‘learning 
pressures’.218 Otherwise, they continue to emerge in the social structure as norms.  
This is relevant to the appraisal of the Nuclear Weapons opinion. The requests by the 
WHO and the UNGA for an advisory opinion by the Court gave form and recognition to 
expectations of the prohibition of nuclear weapons, as did the Court’s decision to admit the 
request for such an advisory opinion. The failure of the Court to decide the illegality of 
nuclear weapons in no way revoked or muted the recognition that the norm had received in 
the process leading up to the conclusion of the opinion. Nor was the norm subject to any 
cognitivization that forced it to adapt to learning in the face of disappointment. Without such, 
it can be reasonably assumed that the antinuclear norm continued to function as a 
counterfactually stabilized behavioural expectation; that the Realitätsverdopplung of the 
normative projection continued its course, stimulating possibilities for further social 
evolution. 
The employment of a distinction of private/public law at the transnational level has 
proved useful for generating insights. It can be stated with confidence that the kind of 
ambitious model of global law beyond the state which Teubner proposes will not 
accommodate the antinuclear norm. There is no provision for the positivization of such a 
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prodigious norm within the framework of such a model of law, and this is certainly an 
example where the critique about societal law and constitutionalism’s marginalization of the 
nation-state is most relevant. Locked within a complex of an international hierarchy of the 
symbolic power nation-states, the inherent right of segmentarily differentiated political units, 
and the dark-side of functional differentiation, any solution to the problem of this general 
norm must be more inclusive of international entities. Nonetheless, the accommodation of 
this norm is clearly beyond the limits of public international law also. Had the International 
Court of Justice availed itself of the devices it typically relies on in the face of paradox, such 
a conclusion would not be so evident. But the Court could not do so. This was a case where 
globalization (here meaning not only functional, but segmentary and stratifactory 
differentiation) outpaced law.  
Neither private nor public law provides a solution of the problem of such a general 
norm. Now the problem can be constructed as the dissonance between the formulation and 
recognition of an antinuclear norm in world society and the failure to accommodate such a 
norm in law. This is the proper invite for the observer to look for functional equivalents 
beyond the law.  
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6 Social movement organizations and general norms 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Having properly constructed the problem of generalized norms in reference to law, and 
having found that law fails to accommodate at least one such generalized norm, the thesis 
will shift its focus to a search for functional equivalents beyond law. It should be stressed 
again that the purpose of the functional method of analysis is not to establish cause and effect 
relationships, but rather to gain insights through comparing causalities.1 The reader should 
also be reminded that the aim of the functional method is not necessarily one of setting out a 
blue print for possible solutions to the problem, but, assuming that the problem has already 
been solved, can also aim to identify existing problem-solutions that lie buried beneath the 
‘illusion of normality’.2 In this way the functional method aims to explain the normal as an 
achievement of social evolution.  
Before thus identifying functional equivalents beyond law for antinuclear norms, 
however, it is worth briefly revisiting the topic of the role of expectations in the social 
system. In the second chapter it was stated that double contingency and the need for the 
integration of expectations prove instrumental to the emergence of social systems. After 
Luhmann’s autopoietic turn, expectations come to play a role at an even more elemental 
level: they structure communication. Communication, as a tripartite unity of information, 
utterance and understanding,3 is only ‘made possible, so to speak, from behind, contrary to 
the temporal course of the process.’4 That is, because each of the three stages of 
communication involves selection,5 communication is ‘bidirectional’6 and thus only ever 
really takes place when ego distinguishes between the information and utterance as 
selections. For example, if alter says to ego even the simplest statement, such as, ‘It’s a full 
moon tonight!’, then, to understand, ego must make a distinction between what has been 
                                                          
1 Luhmann (1995), 53. 
2 Ibid., 114. 
3 Ibid., 43. 
4 Ibid., 41. 
5 Luhmann conceived of communication instead as a ‘selective occurrence’, (1995), 140. First, every 
communication must involve a selection of information, as a cleaving out of ‘the world of things’, that which is 
seen as relevant to the interaction, Luhmann (1995), 139. Secondly, there has to be some utterance of the 
information, and this too involves a selection from a repertoire of possibilities in terms of both the reason for 
imparting the information, and the form of expression to be adopted. Finally, for communication to take place 
there must be a further selection in understanding, Luhmann (1995), 142. 
6 Stichweh (2000b), 10. 
160 
 
selected as information and the reason and manner for its utterance. It can be seen from this 
simple example that understanding is ego’s selection; he might conclude that alter is making 
small talk, suggesting it might be a good night to hunt, or aiming to drive without headlights. 
Further, the example shows how, even though all communication necessarily involves 
consciousness, the selection at each stage depends on existing social structures. Thus, alter’s 
comment to ego would be quite different if it was made, say, between nurses in a psychiatric 
hospital than between lovers setting out on an evening stroll.  
Communication then only takes place when ego projects her distinction between 
information and utterance to alter (e.g., ‘I thought the “lunar effect” was bunkum?’). It is here 
that expectation plays its most elementary role in social structure. Because communication 
runs counter to temporality, ‘one must attend to anticipation and the anticipation of 
anticipations’, and it is this which, according to Luhmann, ‘gives the concept of expectation a 
central place in all sociological analyses.’7 Expectations are therefore not purely located in 
the realm of consciousness, but form the basis of social systems.8 In the flash-point of 
anticipation and event, they provide both a learning capacity for system behaviour and 
condense and stabilize operations. As Luhmann says, ‘[e]xpectations come into being by 
constraining ranges of possibilities. Finally, they are this constraint themselves.’9 For 
example, expectations may cause colleagues to sit in different positions around the table at a 
board meeting, and with practice this becomes a fixed expectation. This then is the elemental 
basis from which expectations support the differentiation of social systems. Social systems 
‘use expectation as structures which control the process of reproduction of communications 
by communications.’10  
Moreover, this brings another important sociological aspect of expectations into view—
which is relevant to the social structure that will be identified as a functional substitute in 
reference to the problem of general norms. Luhmann presents decision as ‘equivalent in 
meaning to an expectation.’11 That is, one can only speak of a decision ‘if and insofar as the 
                                                          
7 Luhmann (1995), 143. Beyond Weber, for whom instrumentally rational action is ‘determined by 
expectations’ (Weber, 1968, 24) and Galtung who developed the role of expectations in his peace research (see 
Galtung, 1959 and Galtung, 1996, 62), other sociological approaches have focused on expectations as social 
structure. For accounts of expectations leading to ‘inequitable power and prestige’ structures, see Moore (1985); 
Correll and Ridgeway (2006). For accounts focused on how performance evaluations are influenced by 
expectations, see Berger, Cohen and Zelditch (1966); Foschi (1972). 
8 Luhmann (1995), 289.  
9 Ibid., 292. 
10 Luhmann (1985b), 117.  
11 Luhmann (1995), 295. 
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slant of meaning an action has is in reaction to an expectation directed to that action.’12 In 
other words, an action can only be construed as a decision if it is directed towards an 
expectation and can be identified by means of that expectation. In this way expectations can 
be incorporated into the meaning of undecidable decisions as a contextual reference. In the 
case of conflict or deviation, the expectational reference can be ‘reactivated’ to give meaning 
to a decision.  Luhmann gives the comic example that, ‘[o]ne skips brushing his teeth after 
dinner because the taxi has already arrived and he does not want to keep it waiting or pay for 
being late.’13  
Expectations thus reveal themselves through conflict and give meaning to decisions. 
This is particularly so in the case of normative expectations. It is this type of expectation in 
particular which leads to the differentiation of social systems.14 Normative expectations must 
be retained counterfactually; they require confirmation even when ‘the damage cannot be 
undone’, and they must therefore must be ‘modalized’.15 Thus, not only must normative 
expectations which fail to find stabilization through law look to functional equivalents, but, 
they can be construed as being primed with a certain social force in communication which 
stimulates the emergence of facilitating social structures. 
This invites a search then for other emerging structures that may provide a solution to 
the problem of normative expectations arising at the global level which fail to find 
stabilization in law. Before taking such a ‘sidelong glance’ at the other possibilities, however, 
I will briefly summarise the conclusions made so far in identifying the problem.  
This thesis has addressed the problem of generalized norms which are formulated in 
global society, yet which fail to find realization in law. Such norms have been identified as 
arising in response to the ‘dark side’ of functional differentiation and the increasing 
attribution of risk to decision-makers. A systems theoretical concept of global law beyond the 
nation-state engages this problem by identifying ways in which the dynamics of functional 
differentiation can be harnessed to construct a system of law that is reflexive of the 
specialized issues arising in world society. In reliance on functional differentiation, however, 
such a model is over-determined to some extent by the special logics of functional systems, at 
the exclusion of certain norms arising at a more general level of global society. In particular, 
it is unlikely to accommodate the class of norms arising at the global level which 
communicate a need for action also within the sovereign boundaries of the nation-state. This 
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issue has been somewhat obscured by the prevailing shift of theoretical focus from function 
and norms to code. Thus, to understand the problem better it has been necessary to return to 
an earlier functionalist account and to thereby distinguish norms as counterfactually 
stabilized expectations that arise in support of meaningful communication. The function of 
law, on the other hand, has been presented as the congruent generalization of expectations in 
the temporal, social and material dimensions. With this, attention shifted to the public 
international legal system. In recent years, that legal system has increasingly orientated itself 
to generalized normative expectations of global public goods. However, attempts in this 
direction continue to be hampered by underlying structural conditions of the international 
legal system: the centrality of state sovereignty, the failure to domesticate physical violence, 
and lack of structural coupling with a centralized political system at the global level. Rather 
than appearing as relics of a past age, however, these conditions can be seen as a symptom of 
a complex of forms of societal differentiation which constitute contemporary world society. 
This leads to a paradoxical arrangement, whereby international law increasingly refers to the 
larger social system by two contradictory means; increasingly referring directly to the 
problem of general norms arising at the global level, while, at the same time, referring to the 
primary differentiation of the larger system through sovereignty doctrine. International courts 
have, nonetheless, shown themselves to be very resourceful in developing second order 
coding to manage this paradox. The case of nuclear weapons is very special though. It 
entailed such a poignant expression of the tension between global public goods and state 
sovereignty that the Court could not decide the issue. As neither global private law nor 
international law can differentiate itself and maintain functional reference in reference to the 
antinuclear norm, it is concluded that law cannot be said to have universal relevance for such 
normative expectations.  
 
6.2  General norms, social movements and organization 
 
At this point one can start to look for functional equivalents beyond the law. But where 
should one start looking? It is useful to bear in mind two key points here about the functional 
method: first, the problem observed will probably have been already resolved;16 and second, 
that the functional method is ‘as much about analyzing the problem that something is a 
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solution to, as it is about analyzing how problems are solved’.17 In the present context this 
suggests turning back to the nuclear weapons opinion, which provided such a crystallization 
of the problem constructed. It is there that the norm has found both its most concrete 
formulation and recognition in society and its most concrete expression of failed legalization. 
If one revisits the case through this lens, then other social systems that are orientated to the 
problem clearly come into view.  
I quote again Judge Weeramantry, this time at more length, who in detailing the 
‘overwhelming majorities’ who expressed their expectation of the prohibition of the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons to the Court, stated:   
 
Added to all these official views, there is also a vast preponderance of public opinion 
across the globe. Strong protests against nuclear weapons have come from learned 
societies, professional groups, religious denominations, women's organizations, political 
parties, student federations, trade unions, NGOs and practically every group in which 
public opinion is expressed. Hundreds of such groups exist across the world. The names 
that follow are merely illustrative of the broad spread of such organizations: International 
Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW); Medical Campaign Against 
Nuclear Weapons; Scientists Against Nuclear Arms; People for Nuclear Disarmament; 
International Association of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms (IALANA); Performers and 
Artists for Nuclear Disarmament International; Social Scientists Against Nuclear War; 
Society for a Nuclear Free Future; European Federation against Nuclear Arms; The 
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation; Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament; Children's 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. They come from all countries, cover all walks of 
life, and straddle the globe.18  
 
Indeed, the influence of such ‘powerful pressure groups’ on the WHO’s and UNGA’s 
decisions to request the opinion was so evident that Judge Oda had the clear ‘impression that 
the request for an advisory opinion which was made by the General Assembly in 1994 
originated in ideas developed by some NGOs.’19 Judge Guillame, on the other hand, 
wondered in hindsight if it would not have been better for the Court to have considered 
‘piercing the veil’ to dismiss the request as inadmissible on the grounds that it was so 
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19 Nuclear Weapons, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Oda, 335-336. 
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influenced by transnational civil society.20 Ultimately, the Nuclear Weapons opinion has 
become a ‘famous example’ of a civil society campaign for the recognition of a norm in 
international law.21  
I will return in the third section of this chapter to exploring in more detail the 
involvement of civil society groups in the Nuclear Weapons opinion,22 but first it is worth 
flagging something that becomes apparent when we bring such protests movements into view 
as a possible solution to the problem of generalized norms. Luhmann’s answer to his own 
question that was cited at the very outset of this study (‘what happens if generalized values 
can no longer be accommodated in differentiated society?’23) was that ‘social’ or ‘protest 
movements’ emerge as a solution to the problem.24 This is not exactly what I am proposing 
here as a solution to the issue of general norms, because social movements in themselves are 
a little too diffuse to provide a functional substitute to law in this respect. Nonetheless, it 
brings us closer to the conclusion, and therefore must be understood fully. 
Addressing the issue of the ‘conflict’ which arises when ‘expectations are 
communicated and the non-acceptance of the communications is communicated in return’,25 
Luhmann presents the idea of an ‘immune system’ as representing ‘forms of meaning that 
enable autopoietic reproduction in absence of agreement’.26 Of course, rejection will be 
commonplace in any complex society, but there must be mechanisms for selecting the ‘truly 
important contradictions’, the ‘promising ‘no’s’ that will stimulate autopoiesis.27 Law is the 
principal means of achieving this, Luhmann argues.28 However, since the latter half of the 
eighteenth century—that is, with advanced shift to functional differentiation29—another form 
of immune system that operates ‘independently of official structures’ becomes apparent in the 
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form of social movements.30 Protest communication reacts to the ‘perturbations’31 caused by 
the ‘side effects’ of functional differentiation which cannot be adequately addressed by other 
functional subsystems,32 and thereby ‘compensates for modern society’s manifest 
inadequacies in reflection’.33 
Of course, this is not to say that these problems must be solved for society to survive.34 
The immune system is not concerned with the prevention of conflicts or with re-establishing 
the status quo ante.35 Rather, the idea is to ‘redirect the energy of conflict into 
communication channels that that can tolerate both sides of the argument’ (‘yes’ and ‘no’),36 
so that autopoiesis may avoid running into ‘evolutionary cul-de-sacs’.37 In other words, the 
tendency of protest communication to abandon pre-existing institutionalized structures 
provides the rupture through which there is a chance to ‘rescue communication’s self-
reproduction’38 and to open ‘perspectives for new sequences of communication’.39 
This form of immune system has also become increasingly pronounced with the 
increased awareness of ‘risk’ in modern society. With an increase of risky decisions being 
taken there is an increased probability of protest ensuing as social movements are able to 
‘play off affected involvement against decision making’ and to take up ‘varying observer 
stances’ in response.40 Under these developments, the form of protest is very much one of ‘us 
versus them’, with the protesters on one side and what they protest against on the other. It is 
important to note, however, that this is not like a political opposition where one side wishes 
to take over responsibility from the other. Rather, protest, ‘negates overall responsibility’.41 It 
is addressed instead ‘to others calling on their sense of responsibility’,42 and assumes there 
are others to carry out what is demanded. Nonetheless, this form of differentiation—
protest/what is protested against—becomes increasingly important according to Luhmann, in 
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that it ‘does for protest movements what functional systems achieve through their code’.43 
That is, it achieves closure, allows for reproduction, and ultimately enables protest 
movements to emerge as autopoietic systems.44  
For Luhmann, of course, this is not to suggest that protest movements ‘know it better’ 
or can judge things better than other social systems.45  However, what is important about the 
emergence of such an autopoietic system is that the ‘very illusion’ that protest movements do 
‘know it better’, provides ‘the blind spot that enables them to stage resistance of 
communication to communication and thus to provide society with a reality that it could not 
otherwise construct.’46 Society needs an ‘internal boundary in order to be able to think about 
itself’, and the only possibility of this in a functionally differentiated society is through the 
projection of a ‘fictitious external standpoint’.47 This is what protest movements achieve. 
Blühdorn argues that Luhmann never settles on what he considers to be the true function of 
protest movements. On the one hand, he can be seen to suggest that the function of protest 
communication is to actually ‘include what up to now has been excluded’, through the 
provision of a simulated external perspective that can draw attention to the ‘adverse effects of 
functional differentiation’.48 On the other hand, he can be seen to suggest that the function of 
protest communication is merely to ‘externalize issues that cannot be included’ by creating a 
communication space which serves as a ‘realm of simulation’ for those issues.49 Blühdorn 
considers the latter ‘simulation’ thesis to be more ‘evident’; that through such simulation, 
protest communication reconciles the tension between the exclusion that inevitably results 
from functional differentiation and the ‘non-existent inclusive alternative’ on which 
functional differentiation now relies.50  
The connection here to what has been said already about the political system as the only 
system that can carry the illusion of legitimacy in functionally differentiated society should 
be immediately obvious,51 and there is now a burgeoning field of research on the possibilities, 
even necessity, of locating constitutionalism in global civil society as a ‘constitutionalism 
                                                          
43 Luhmann (2013a), 158.  
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from below’.52 These issues are not altogether extraneous to the present study, but in the 
interests of space I want to move directly to identifying a possible solution to the problem of 
general norms which go unrealized in law within the context of protest movements. Luhmann 
never explored this relationship in any depth, and this can be attributed to two factors. The 
first is general and relates to Luhmann’s attitude to protest movements. It is perhaps an 
exaggeration to say that Luhmann aimed to ‘discredit’ protests movements,53 however, it is 
clear that he was not very sympathetic towards them.54 This may have obscured from view 
the ways in which his own theory provided the basis for constructing a greater role for protest 
movements in modern society than he was prepared to admit. Although he defies stereotype, 
Luhmann may have been somewhat defined in this respect by notoriety in post-war Germany 
as a foil to Habermas and the Frankfurt school and for his reputation for technocratic 
functionalism.55 
Secondly, although Luhmann’s organizational theory departed from Weber’s concept 
of instrumentally rational bureaucracies,56 he still tended to associate ‘organization’ 
exclusively with the firm or the bureaucracies of the modern nation-state for example,57 even 
appearing to some to present a concept of organization that was ‘quite old-fashioned’.58 Thus, 
Luhmann was only prepared to admit that protest movements ‘secrete’ organization for 
‘residual purposes’.59 He argues that if we were to understand protests movements as 
organizations, ‘they would display a long list of deficient characteristics: they are 
heterarchical not hierarchical, polycentric, structured networks, and above all they have no 
control over the process of their own change.’60  
This needs refinement however. While it is undoubtedly true that protest movements in 
general do not display the characteristics of organization, it is undeniable that, within at least 
some of those broader social systems, there is often an organized core. Already in the mid-
1960s social scientists were beginning to examine social unrest in terms of ‘collective 
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action’61 and ‘social movement organization’ (SMO).62 These approaches argued that, in 
order to be sustained over time and have maximum effect, social movements increasingly 
relied upon at least some minimal form of organization for administration, leadership, 
collecting resources and encouraging participation. Since then, the proliferation of SMOs in 
world society in the last thirty years has been well documented.63 Smith, for example, 
presents empirical evidence of the number of transnational SMOs64 rising from less than two 
hundred in the 1970s to almost one thousand by the year 2000.65 Furthermore, in distinction 
to the Weberian assumption that increased organization would cause social movements to 
replace charismatic leadership and protest with bureaucracy and a more general conformity 
with society,66 research has shown such organizations to successfully balance 
bureaucratization with the ideological commitments of the social movement.67 Institutional 
scholars like Boli and Lechner, for example, point to what they call the ‘disinterested’ and 
‘irresponsible’ character of transnational civil society organizations.68 They are 
‘disinterested’, they argue, in the sense of being relatively unconcerned with their own 
parochial interests as an organization. This allows them to function instead as ‘nonprofit 
organizations promoting collective benefits, public good, the common weal, or the welfare of 
diffuse categories’.69  At the same time, they are ‘irresponsible’ in the sense that they do not 
have to answer to shareholders or an electorate, and are absolved from responsibility for 
broader political objectives, allowing them to focus on the promotion and proposal of specific 
legislative and regulatory changes.70  
                                                          
61 Gamson (1968). 
62 Ash and Zald (1966); McCarthy and Zald (1977), 1218ff. 
63 Boli and Thomas (1999); Drori, Hwang and Meyer (2006).  
64 Smith uses the term ‘TSMO’ to distinguish transnational social movement organization from their national 
associates. The distinction is not necessary here as reference is mostly to such organizations at the transnational 
level. Where otherwise it will be made clear that reference is being made to national SMOs.  
65 Smith (2005), 232. 
66 Weber (1968), 297ff; Michels (1949). 
67 Ash and Zald (1966); McCarty and Zald (1977). 
68 Boli and Lechner (2005), 123. 
69 Boli and Lechner (2005), 123. 
70 Boli and Lechner (2005), 124; see also Gaer (1995), 395; Meyer (1996). Thus, for example, Greenpeace 
believe that their effectiveness as an organization lies in their ‘unique independence from government and 
corporate funding’, Greenpeace Annual Report 2013: ‘To maintain absolute independence Greenpeace does not 
accept money from companies, governments or political parties. We're serious about that, and we screen for and 
actually send checks back when they're drawn on a corporate account. We depend on the donations of our 
supporters to carry on our nonviolent campaigns to protect the environment.’ 
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Even if we were to take Luhmann’s defining criteria for ‘organization’, which Kuhl 
presents as goals, hierarchies, and membership,71  then it becomes clear that many SMOs are 
not so deficient in the characteristics of formal organization after all.  
Goals have long been identified as an important character of organizations.72 This 
explains the importance of organization in functionally differentiated society. With the loss of 
authority that accompanied the shift from stratification to functional differentiation, 
organizations are a way of establishing superordinate goals, that is, at least within their 
boundaries as a social system.73 Thus, social movements can thus be commonly seen to rely 
on organization to achieve their normative goals. McCarthy and Zald define the SMO as ‘a 
complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social 
movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals.’74 The goals of the 
International Peace Bureau (IPB), for example, include ‘disarmament for development’;75 
those of the Centre for Socio-Eco-Nomic Development (CSEND) include ‘sustainable and 
integrated development through multistakeholder dialogues, institutional learning and free 
flow of information’;76 Fairtrade aim for ‘fairer terms of trade for farmers and workers’, etc. 
Moreover, there has been a noted development in the increasing number of SMOs adopting 
‘multi-issue’ goals, rather than the more traditional focus on single issues.77 Thus the ‘goals’ 
of World Wildlife Fund (WWF) include the ‘protection and restoration of species and their 
habitats’, ‘the conservation of natural resources that local communities depend on’, etc.;78 the 
‘goals’ of Oxfam include the ‘right for poor people to adequate and sustainable livelihoods’, 
‘placing specific obligations on states to protect the rights of those who are displaced, at risk 
or in need of assistance as a result of conflict, disaster and insecurity’, ‘fair sharing of natural 
resources’, ‘financing for development and universal essential services’, etc.;79 the ‘goals’ of 
Greenpeace include ‘stopping forestation for palm oil’, ‘stopping overfishing in the high 
                                                          
71 Kuhl (2013), 10. It is more precise to say that Luhmann’s only defining characteristic for organization is that 
it achieves operative closure though its decisions (which will be explained further below), although 
membership, goals and hierarchies can be seen to reflect such decided orders, see Ahrne and Brunsson (2008, 
45) and (2011, 85). 
72 Blau and Scott (1962), 5; Etzioni (1964), 3. 
73 Drepper (2005), 180. 
74 McCarthy and Zald (1977), 1218. 
75 IPB website, ‘IPB Constitution’, < http://www.ipb.org/web/ >, accessed 4 September 2015. 
76 CSEND website, ‘Vision, Mission and Objectives’, <http://www.csend.org/aboutcsend/vision-mission-
objectives>, accessed 4 September 2015. 
77 Smith (2005), 233. 
78 WWF website, ‘About Us’, <http://www.worldwildlife.org/about >, accessed 4 September 2015. 
79 Oxfam Strategic Plan, 2013-219.  
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seas’,80 ending the use of hazardous chemical globally’, etc.81 The list could go on and on 
with the vast number of civil society organizations proliferating at the global level. Moreover, 
these goals are not couched in the general terms of values, but, as can be seen from the 
examples, more often reflect norms and are often set out in highly detailed strategic plans for 
their achievement.  
The hierarchy that can be established with organization also reflects the importance of 
this form of social system within functionally differentiated society. Hierarchy symbolizes 
the apex of ‘constantly available official potential for collective action’.82 Again, even social 
movements must rely on hierarchy in so far as they want to organize attempts for the 
realization of their normative goals. Thus, Greenpeace International has a Council which acts 
as the supervisory body for the whole organization, and an International Board which is 
elected by and accountable to the Council, and which ratifies and carries out the Council 
decisions.83 Amnesty International has a similar structure with an International Council with 
‘ultimate authority’ for the conduct of the organization, and an International Board to provide 
‘leadership and stewardship for the whole of the Amnesty International movement.’84 This 
organizational hierarchy is reflected in many other SMOs, as will be seen in the case of 
antinuclear SMOs. Even those organizations which seek to establish a more consensual 
participation will have to rely on some measure of hierarchy. Thus, for example, CARE 
international not only has a secretariat based in Geneva which ‘provides coordination and 
support to a number of governance-, membership-, and strategic planning-related functions’, 
but also an International Board which oversees membership and pursues action in accordance 
with the CARE International Strategic Plan.85  
Finally, many of those organizations do have membership. The capacity of 
organizations to establish who may be referred to as a member of the system and to generally 
determine how this membership may be exercised is another important aspect of the 
                                                          
80 Another general norm the law has had difficulty realizing—a thus a candidate for further research into 
SMOs in functional relation to the norm, see Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v Japan; Australia v 
Japan), Provisional Measures, (27 August 1999), Award on Jurisdiction (4 August 2000),  Arbitral Tribunal 
constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea; and on its aftermath, 
Schiffman, H.S. and MacPhee, B.P. (2014):  ‘The Southern Bluefin Tuna Dispute Revisited: How Far Have We 
Come?’, 3 Transnational Environmental Law 2, 391-406. 
81 Greenpeace 2013 Annual Report.  
82 Luhmann (1995), 200. 
83 Stichting Greenpeace Council Rules of Procedure, sections 4 and 5. 
84 Statute of Amnesty International, section 6 and 7.  
85 CARE International website, ‘Governance’, <http://www.care-international.org/about-us/governance.aspx>, 
accessed 4 September 2015. 
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organization in a functionally differentiated society.86 The shift from stratification to 
functional differentiation meant a general loss of authority and the increasing inclusion of the 
lifeworld in functional systems. However, organizations exclude everyone except members 
chosen on the basis of their consent to the goals of the organization.87 Through this they are 
able to create the ‘zone of indifference’88 within which they can secure acceptance of the 
organization’s purposes and hierarchy.89  As Luhmann says, ‘soldiers march, secretaries type, 
professors publish, and political leaders govern—whether it happens, in this situation, to 
please them or not.’90 All expectations beyond the terms of membership (for example, that 
colleagues should take care of their personal hygiene or that they should say ‘hello’ to each 
other in the morning) are part of the informal organization.91  
Many transnational civil society organizations use membership in a very specific way. 
First, operating on a global scale, they are often ‘meta-organizations’ in that they have as 
their members other organizations (or both organizations and individuals).92 Secondly, they 
want to include as many members as possible, because the more inclusive they are, the more 
likely they are to achieve their normative programme. But at the same time they usually have 
some formal recognition of membership that will depend on agreement with the core norms 
and values they represent. Thus, for example, Greenpeace International stipulates that any 
candidate organization ‘must be established to pursue objectives compatible with the mission 
of Stichting Greenpeace Council.’93 Amnesty International stipulates that any affiliated group 
‘shall act in accordance with the core values and methods of Amnesty International, as well 
as any strategic goals, working rules and guidelines that are adopted from time to time by the 
International Council’, and that an individual member is ‘any person who contributes to the 
advancement of the mission of Amnesty International’, and ‘who acts in accordance with the 
core values and policies’ of the organization.94 Obviously these are two major SMOs that one 
                                                          
86 Luhmann (2003), 38. 
87 Luhmann (2013a), 151. See also Nassehi (2005, 189) in terms of inclusion/exclusion; and Baecker (2005, 
191): ‘Organization means loss of autonomy for the individual employee and a gain in autonomy for the 
organization.’ 
88 Barnard (1938). 
89 Luhmann (2005a), 97; (2003), 38.  
90 Luhmann (1982), 75. 
91 Kuhl (2013), 116; see also Selznick (1948), 27-33. Kuhl (ibid.) explains the distinction between formal and 
informal organization through an analogy with the formal rules of soccer and the unwritten rule that ‘a team will 
voluntarily send the ball out of bounds when a player on the opposing team is injured.’ If a player breaks this 
rule, it is not the referee who enforces the informal expectation, but the whistles and boos of spectators. 
92 Ahrne and Brunsson (2008) argue that meta-organization has become increasingly important in structuring 
and organizing global society. 
93 Stichting Greenpeace Council Rules of Procedure, as approved at the AGM 2014, section. 2.3. 
94 Statute of Amnesty International, as amended by the 31st International Council, meeting in Berlin, Germany 
18 to 22 August 2013, sections 16 and 17. 
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might expect to have formal membership criteria, but, as will be shown in the fourth section, 
even smaller SMOs that are devoted to more specific goals like the prohibition of nuclear 
weapons have similar terms of membership on the basis of the organizations core norms and 
objectives.  
The final point to be made about membership is that while membership in the firm or 
the bureau may typically be secured by salary or ascribed status, membership of the SMO is 
secured on another basis. In fact, members often pay the SMO for membership, but what they 
get in return for their money, time or resource is the better chance of securing their own 
normative expectations. 
There may be a question here from a systems theoretical perspective about closure and 
whether these organizations are selective enough to differentiate themselves out to the degree 
that one would expect of an organization. In Luhmann’s early theory of organizations the 
boundaries of organizations were constituted by expectations—that is, the expectational 
nexus established by membership.95 The expectational nexus established between the SMO 
and its members (i.e., co-expectancy of the generalized norm) would prove too diffuse for 
this, however. The assured congruence of members’ expectations with the expectations which 
the SMO has established as its goals is a little thin in this respect; there is not the same sense 
of certainty here. The partner of an international law firm in London can call the New York 
office during normal business hours and expect an answer.96 SMOs do not have that kind of 
control over their members’ lives.  
On the other hand, SMOs cannot simply rely on the binary form of protest for closure 
in the same way as the general social movements does. This would not differentiate them out 
much as organizations within those systems. 
So how does the SMO differentiate itself out?  
Luhmann revised his concept of the differentiation of organizations at some point 
around his autopoietic turn. From that point, he developed the concept that organizations are 
‘autopoietic systems on the operational basis of the communication of decisions’,97 that they 
‘produce decisions from decisions, and in this sense are operationally closed systems.’98 This 
is something Luhmann developed from Herbert Simon’s idea that every decision serves as a 
                                                          
95 Luhmann (1964), 71.  
96 And law firms as organizations have their own special relevance in transnational law making and economic 
governance, see Morgan and Quack (2005); Quack (2007), 650. 
97 Luhmann (2013), 143. 
98 Ibid., 143. 
173 
 
premise for later decisions in the organization.99  The decision premise is not re-opened, to be 
decided again—this would only paralyze the organization.100 Rather it is taken as given, as 
decided, and thereby provides a structural precondition of further decisions.101 The decided 
decision premise becomes the organization’s formal structure.102 But it is important also for 
Luhmann that the decision premise is a decision itself, and does not therefore indicate the 
broader category of everything that may influence a decision.103 On this more reflexive basis 
(i.e., processual self-reference), organizations ‘generate possibilities for decision-making that 
would not otherwise exist’ and ‘deploy decisions as contexts for decisions’.104 Thus, for 
example, the SMO may decide that the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights should be a ‘reality for the world’s people’,105 or that there should be an ‘inviolate’106 
guarantee of the ‘basic worth and welfare of individuals in distress in conflict situations’.107 
Thereafter, all decisions on membership, on funding, on future projects, etc., will grow out of 
this original decision premise. This is the basis of the autopoiesis of the organization. 
Organizations ‘produce decisions from decisions, and in this sense are operationally closed 
systems.’108 This is why Luhmann describes organizations as ‘systems made up of 
decisions’.109 The organizations cannot make decisions outside of itself,110 and, at the same 
time, every formal decision, from the founding of the organization, to the occupation of 
membership roles by persons, must be ‘treated recursively in the organization as its own 
decisions’.111  
I will return to this concept of the organization’s recursive decision-making in the next 
section when I take a closer look at spontaneous organization as functional equivalent to law 
                                                          
99 Simon (1957), 34ff. 
100 As demonstrated above, the decision is also a paradox, and this only makes it more necessary for the 
organization to avoid revisiting the decision (something that no doubt leads to bureaucracy). The decision is the 
unity of a selected alternative and the excluded alternatives, i.e., to present the chosen alternative as a decision 
one has to retain the options that were excluded. ‘The decision has to inform about itself, but also about its 
alternatives, thus about the paradox’ that the alternative is an alternative and at the same time is not an 
alternative, (Luhmann, 2000, 185, translation provided by Seidl and Becker, 2006, 26). Organizations are seen 
to develop various means of ‘displacing’ or ‘invisiblizing’ this paradox, see Knudsen (2005, 119-122); Nassehi 
(2005, 186f); Mormann and Seidl (2014, 139f).  
101 Seidl (2006), 41. 
102 Kuhl (2013), 98.  
103 Luhmann (2003), 96, n. 34.  
104 Luhmann (2013), 143. 
105 Peter Benenson, founder of Amnesty International, ‘40th Anniversary Peter Benenson Quote’, AI Index 
ACT30/009/20001. 
106 Dunant’s original goal that formed the basis of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
Dunant (1986), 126. 
107 The central principle of the ICRC, Forsythe (2005), 162. 
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in respect of the problem of general norms.  For now, it can be simply noted from the 
examples given that many civil society organizations do make decisions; that their original 
decision premise is often the decision to organize the realization of a normative expectation; 
and that every decision after this within the formal organization can be reinterpreted in 
accordance with that decision premise.  
 
6.3 SMOs as a solution to the problem of general norms? 
 
Now it is possible to compare the organization of social movements more exactly to law in 
respect of the highly generalized norms of global society. This is clearest in respect of the 
social and material dimensions of meaning. Normative expectations will be generalized in 
the social dimension when they are co-expected by anonymous third parties represented by 
the organization. As demonstrated, normative expectations are often part of the formal 
structure of many of those organizations, forming the basis of their goals and criteria for 
membership. These organizations ‘stand’ for certain normative expectations. They are 
collective action on the basis of such a norm. They therefore automatically entail a 
generalization of the expectation among anonymized co-expectant third parties beyond the 
immediate interaction context in which such norms might arise. This faculty is well 
documented by constructivist international relations scholars112 who present empirical 
evidence of transnational nongovernmental organizations as key ‘promoters of norms’ in 
global society.113 Thus, for example, the normative expectations of people living in the 
Ecuadorean Amazon that foreign oil companies should be prohibited from polluting local 
land and water can easily find generalization in the social dimension if they are congruent to 
the expectations of anonymized third parties represented by the SMO. And this generalization 
is all the more pronounced if the SMO is based as far away as Amsterdam or Geneva for 
example.114  
                                                          
112 Finnemore and Sikkink (2001), 392.   
113 Sikkink (2002), 301. Finnemore and Sikkink, for example, consider NGOs to offer the organizational 
platforms for the second of what they see as a three stage ‘norm life cycle’ that may eventually lead to a norm 
‘cascade’ into hard law (1998), 899-902. However, this approach adopts a much less elemental sociological 
perspective than Luhmann’s functionalism, and therefore cannot fully construct the theoretical link between 
highly generalized norms and civil society organizations. 113 Finnemore and Sikkink only locate the emergence 
with ‘norm entrepreneurs’, and therefore ignore more elemental bases of norms—that normal people also expect 
normatively. Their approach may have the advantage that it is more amenable to empirical research, but this 
comes at the cost of focusing on the normative expectations of elites. For a similar approach that also succumbs 
to this problem, see Wiener (2008). 
114 A common criticism of transnational social movement organizations is that they tend to be 
disproportionately based in the Global North. Sikkink and Smith present evidence to support this, but point out 
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In terms of the material dimension, it is clear that that as long as SMO’s always reflect 
normative expectations in their decision premises and publicize their goals on this basis, the 
norms are abstracted to a context to which congruent expectations can attach. In this way, the 
normative expectations can be imbued with a deeper meaning and can be linked to 
expectations arising in various specific interactional contexts. Thus, for example, normative 
expectations of the prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons may arise in different 
ways, e.g., the inhabitants of a small Pacific island state may develop such expectations in 
relation to any serious health and environmental problems they suffer as a consequence of the 
testing of nuclear weapons in their region, the citizens of a European city may develop 
similar expectations when they come to see nuclear weapons as an unjustifiable risk. Even 
the officials of a nation-state may develop such expectations if they reject the mutually 
assured destruction doctrine and oppose nuclear weapons as a threat to the peace. 
Nonetheless, all of those expectations can attach to the more abstract decision premise of the 
organization devoted to the elimination of nuclear weapons.  
Granted, there is not the same scale of the cultural store of ideas that we should expect 
from law. Things are much more fragmented than this, with SMOs necessarily devoting 
themselves to several or even just one general norm. However, it must be recognized that law 
was only able to achieve its vast cultural store through evolution. Even though the SMO as a 
social system is a relatively recent development, one can see already how many have 
strengthened and expanded the basis of their transmittable, cultural store of normative ideas. 
Thus, within a relatively short time frame, Amnesty International has gone from a limited 
basis of expectations of ‘freedom of opinion’, ‘fair and public trial’ and ‘rights of asylum for 
political refugees’115 to a much broader normative programme that includes, amongst other 
things, ‘rights of health, housing decent livelihood and education’, the ‘protection and 
empowerment of civilians during conflict’, and the ‘elimination of gender and sexuality 
based violence and discrimination’.116 This is not to suggest that the SMO will ever achieve 
the scale of modern law in the material dimension. The development of SMOs themselves 
suggest instead that society is evolving towards a much more fragmented institutionalization 
of norms. Indeed, this is the key insight here: functional differentiation not only involves the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the logistical reasons for locating the secretariat of those organizations near the political targets they seek to 
influence, (2002, 35-36). 
115 ‘The Forgotten Prisoners’, by Peter Benenson, The Observer, 28 May 1961.  
116 See for the full list, ‘Amnesty International’s Integrated Strategic Plan 2010 to 2016’, available at 
<www.amnesty.org.uk/sites/default/files/plan_2011_16_0.pdf>, accessed 4 September 2015.  
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increasing fragmentation of legal institutions and dispute settlement fora, but the increasing 
fragmentation of normative institutionalization.   
The functional equivalence of SMOs to law is not so obvious in the temporal 
dimension. How can those organizations institutionalize the time-binding form of normative 
expectations and present the possibility of ‘carrying’ normative expectations through time the 
way that law does? To see this it is necessary to go deeper into Luhmann’s organizational 
theory, and to explore the ways that organizations ‘absorb uncertainty’ and their unique 
‘communicative capacity’ in society. Both of these factors play different roles in carrying 
normative expectations through time. One diffracts the tension that is built up when 
normative expectations go unrealized in law. The other keeps these norms in circulation and 
holds out the possibility of them eventually finding realization in law—and it does so by 
communicating the norms at nation-states and international organizations, as something that 
appears necessary to the realization of those norms in differentiated society.  
As stated in the previous section, organizations are social systems that reproduce 
themselves on the basis of their decisions. They are ‘decision machines’.117 This not only 
allows them to differentiate themselves out from their environment, but it also enables them 
to absorb a considerable degree of societal complexity. Here again, Luhmann builds on the 
theory of March and Simon: ‘[u]ncertainty absorption takes place when inferences are drawn 
from a body of evidence and the inferences, instead of the evidence itself, are then 
communicated.’118 Because the decision premise does not need to be re-decided, it does not 
pass on the uncertainty in such a way that it can become an aggregated condition of the 
organization.119 Instead the information is ‘condensed at each stage and conclusions are 
drawn that are no longer checked at the next stage’.120 Prior to the decision there is 
uncertainty because of the open possibilities; after the decision, the ‘same contingency exists 
in a fixed form’121—the possibilities remain, but the uncertainty is reduced since one of the 
options has been chosen.122 This is how organizations compensate for the ‘uncertainty and 
complexity of the societal level.’123  
                                                          
117 Nassehi (2005), 185. 
118 March and Simon (1958), 165. 
119 Baecker (2005), 203. 
120 Luhmann (2013a), 147; Luhmann (2013b), 169. And, thus, the uncertainty absorption can lead to the 
‘irrational organization’, Brunsson (1985).  
121 Luhmann (2003), 37.  
122 Mingers (2003), 109. 
123 Drepper (2005), 180.  
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This is basically March and Simon’s concept of uncertainty absorption. However, 
Luhmann makes an important conceptual innovation in finding that it is not the decision 
operation itself that absorbs the uncertainty, ‘but a process that connects decisions.’124 
Uncertainty absorption cannot be the content of decisions because such is never the aim of 
decision-making.125 Rather, it is something that ‘happens automatically whenever decisions 
are taken in a communication system.’126 The whole point is that uncertainty is absorbed at 
each successive connection between decision premise and decision. What is important about 
this in the present context is that it means the concept of the decision premise is expanded 
from the structural level to the processual level,127 and it is this which brings the temporal 
dimension into play. As Knudsen says it is in the ‘time-dimension that decisions fixate 
contingency and absorb uncertainty.’128 Because the autopoiesis of decisions ‘follows real 
time’,129 the absorption of uncertainty can be said to take the form of the ‘stabilization of 
expectations’.130 Drepper even argues that organization may offer a possible functionally 
equivalent structure for ‘expectations that cannot be generalized permanently on the level of 
symbolic generalized media’.131   
The problem presented in the last chapter about law failing to decide on the illegality of 
nuclear weapons was also presented as a problem of normative expectations failing to find 
realization in law and a problem of persisting uncertainty at the societal level. However, as 
stated by Judge Weeramantry in the Court’s opinion, there are a significant number of 
organizations which do decide this normative question. The decision-premise of SMOs like 
the IPPNW and IALANA is to engage in collective organization to secure the realization of 
that norm, and every decision those formal organizations take after that absorbs the societal 
complexity in relation to the norm. In other words it stabilizes the expectations of the 
prohibition of nuclear weapons. This is how the norm is generalized in the temporal 
dimension. For this, it does not matter if those expectations are never realized in law. What is 
important is that the expectations are stabilized in time through the decisions of the relevant 
SMO. The SMO becomes a channel, or more like a firing chamber, into which all of the 
                                                          
124 Luhmann (2005), 96; Seidl (2005), 41. And here Luhmann makes a clear break with the Parsonian notion 
of the organization as the instrument of rational domination, Drepper (2005), 177.  
125 Luhmann (2005), 98. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid., 96. This reflects Weick’s concept of organization as process, see Weick (1979), 142-3: ‘The 
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128 Knudsen (2005), 115.  
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uncertainty arising from the problem of general norms can be dissipated and diffracted. It 
becomes a field into which those norms can expand endlessly without conflict, even without 
realization in the general social system, and it therefore allows for the absorption of the 
complexity that ensues in the mismatch of generalized norms and the traditional 
differentiation of society. Organizations ‘as decision machines’ are perfectly able to retain the 
normativity of those expectations, confirming them and absorbing the complexity that 
surrounds them at every stage of decision. 
Even if this is the main aspect of the function of SMOs in relation to general norms, 
however, there must be something else. The stabilization of expectations through recursive 
decision-making where the expectation can be confirmed with infinite regress is not concrete 
enough to attract normative expectations. The need for a decision on the norm must be 
communicated, and the organization must acquire relevance for the problem reference of the 
normative expectation in society. Moreover, as the critique of Teubner’s model of law 
showed, there must be some engagement of the international system for the stabilization of 
many general norms. There must be something to give notice of the potential successful 
realization of the normative expectation in differentiated society, including the nation-state. 
This is what is achieved through the organization’s communicative capacity.   
Luhmann argues that ‘organizations are the only social systems that can communicate 
with systems in their environment.’132 That is, they are the only systems that can engage in 
‘communication on behalf of the collective’.133 Interaction systems can only communicate 
within the boundary of present participants, and can only relate to their environment by 
‘internalizing the difference between present and absent’.134 Functional systems, on the other 
hand, cannot enter into outward communication as entities.135 However, organizations can 
both communicate outward on behalf of the collective, and they are the ‘only social systems 
in modern society that can be addressed as collective actors.’136 It is for this reason that 
organizations are necessary to ‘install forms of reflexivity into the function systems’,137 and 
                                                          
132 Luhmann (2013a), 151.  
133 Ibid., 145, n. 428. Luhmann argues this was an improbable achievement in functionally differentiated 
society that required either hierarchy as an apex that ‘symbolizes the constantly available official potential’ for 
collective action, or decision premises which include such collective action ‘in the meaning of the system’s 
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directed at organizations ‘beneath’ the functional subsystems, Teubner (2012), 54. 
137 Nassehi (2005), 188. This has led to a prevailing concept that organizations must therefore ‘belong’ in 
some way to specific functional subsystems (Francot, 2008, 85). Luhmann’s position on this was ‘somewhat 
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why modern society is now ‘flooded by representational communication’ that is directed at 
other organizations, ‘but never to the function-systems or to the entire society.’138  
The necessity of organization to anyone who wishes to communicate with their 
environment has of course not gone unnoticed by social movements. As Drepper points out, 
the ‘process of becoming a communication address’ through organizational structures and 
standards ‘can often be noticed in cases of social movements aiming at political goals.’139 In 
this sense, the social movement is ‘forced to become a visible body in the world-wide system 
of political communication.’140 Again, this is well demonstrated in empirical evidence of the 
proliferation of SMOs in the past thirty years.141  
This communicative capacity of SMOs is very important in the context of general 
norms which goes unrealized in law. First of all, the reflection of the norm in the decision 
premise of the SMO, and thus the autopoeisis of the SMO on the basis of its decisions, keeps 
the norm ‘live’ within the system for further application. Secondly, the communicative 
capacity afforded by the organizational form means that the norm can be kept in circulation 
within its social environment as a proto-legal communication and, more specifically, can be 
continuously projected at the legal system (i.e., the legal system’s organizations), as well as 
international organizations and the organizations of national political systems.  
Again, the solution to the problem here does not depend on the success of the SMO in 
ensuring the norm cascade into law. However, research has consistently pointed out how such 
organizations have become increasingly effective in this respect.142 Many now point to the 
role of transnational civil society organizations in securing ‘norm cascades’ into the 
international public sphere,143 as the ‘engines of the global expansion of human rights’, 144 
and as ‘socializing’ governments into codification of human rights and general welfare 
norms.145 Well-known examples include the influence of civil society organizations in the 
establishment of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,146 in the prohibition of land 
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mines,147 or in the establishment of the International Criminal Court.148  Not only do such 
successes help secure the universal relevance of the SMO for the problem-reference of 
general norms, and highlight their capacity to communicate with nation-states, they also 
highlight the limited negative side-effects of the stabilization of norms through this functional 
system.  
Finally, the communicative capacity of the SMO to keep norms in circulation as 
proto-legal communications in society is important in that it presents a potential ‘norm 
cascade’ in the traditional public sphere; in other words it also helps to present a ‘not yet’ 
finding which further supports the stabilization of the normative expectations along the 
temporal dimension through the recursivity of decision-making in the organization. The SMO 
cannot guarantee the norm will be realized—it has not got the power to do so—but it can 
successfully externalize it into the future if it can, through decision, keep it circulating within 
the environment, primed for realization within differentiated functional subsystems.    
Thus the SMO can be said to achieve congruent generalization of the normative 
expectations in the temporal, social and material dimension. If the SMO can achieve 
relevance for the problem-reference of general norms, then it offers a functional substitute to 
law that cannot accommodate such norms. According to Luhmann’s functional method 
‘[o]nly on the underpinnings of a scaffolding composed of such statements does it seem 
worthwhile to investigate underlying causalities empirically.’149 That, however, would no 
doubt take up the space of another thesis at least. This thesis has been engaged instead with 
the problem with a view to indicating functional equivalents. Nonetheless, in order to further 
refine the theory through method, and to gain better understanding of what is involved in 
larger scale empirical analysis of this question, the following section will briefly engage in 
some limited degree of empirical investigation of SMOs as functional equivalents in respect 
of the antinuclear norm.  
 
6.4  Antinuclear SMOs and international law 
 
The focus of empirical analysis here should be on the decision chains of SMOs in relation to 
the general norm and the communication of the norm by the SMO to the social environment 
(and particularly to the political and legal systems, in so far as such supports stabilization in 
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the temporal dimension). For the reasons stated above, this will help identify the functional 
equivalence to law in respect of normative expectations of the prohibition of nuclear 
weapons. Both of these aspects can be empirically observed through interviews with relevant 
organizational members, content analysis and secondary analysis of empirical studies.150 As 
such, this section relies upon a select number of interviews with executive officers of key 
organizations and upon analysis of official documents of decisional and organizational 
structure of key antinuclear SMOs. However, rather than engaging in relatively large scale 
participant observation, what is undertaken here is only a rudimentary historical analysis of 
the antinuclear SMOs in the period from the early 1980s until March 2015. Even this brief 
empirical study, however, will provide some refinement of the theory and sound out issues 
for future research.  
The antinuclear protest movement was born in the immediate wake of the use of atomic 
weapons against the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945151 and, in reflection of the 
truly global nature of the threat, the peace movement was of a transnational character from 
the outset.152 Within a month of the bombing of Nagasaki the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC)153 was challenging the legality of the use of such weapons and calling for 
their elimination.154 Since then the protest movement has grown in reflection of the 
increasing risk of the use of such weapons throughout the Cold War. During this period, and 
particularly in the 1980s, it proliferated through numerous organizations at both the 
transnational and national level and manifested in antinuclear demonstrations in cities around 
the world. Since the end of the Cold War, however, there has been some decline in public 
interest155; by the late 1990s, for example, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) 
which had been the primary SMO throughout the latter half of the Cold War, no longer had a 
youth wing and had only a fraction of the members it did during the early 1980s.156 
Nonetheless, rather than pointing to a complete cessation of the antinuclear protest 
movement—of a hopping from one protest topic to the next, as Luhmann might say157—it 
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might be said that, rather than disappearing, the movement, like much of the rest of society, 
became more fragmented and specialized. 
There are now so many civil society organizations and bodies in the world that 
prescribe to the antinuclear norm that they are difficult to quantify. Some are of a purely 
transnational nature, others are based only at the regional and national level. Some are 
devoted to the elimination of nuclear weapons, many others include this within a broad range 
of protest goals. The Abolition 2000 network, which started in 1995 in response to perceived 
failure of nation-states to negotiate for disarmament according the Non-proliferation Treaty 
(NPT),158 now includes over two thousand organizations from more than ninety different 
countries.159 However, the thirty-nine organizations which the U.S. based antinuclear 
organization, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (NAPF) lists on its website as its ‘partner 
organizations’ can be considered to present a reliable picture of the core organizations 
involved in the antinuclear movement today.160 For the purpose of exploring the relationship 
between law and antinuclear SMOs it is only necessary to introduce in any detail a few of 
these organizations. 
Firstly, the IPB is the largest global peace movement organization. Founded in 1891 
and recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1910, it lay dormant through the first and second 
world wars only to reassert itself again in the 1960s. As a more general peace movement 
organization, the IPB goals are somewhat broader than those organizations that are dedicated 
specifically to the nuclear weapons issue. The IPB ‘exists to serve the cause of peace by the 
promotion of disarmament, the non-violent prevention and resolution of conflicts and 
international cooperation’ and membership is open to any organization or individual who 
supports those aims.161 It has a parliamentary organizational structure with an Assembly (its 
‘highest policy-making body’) that meets once every three years, as well as a Council to 
oversee the implementation of the policies decided by the Assembly, and a Steering 
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Committee which is responsible for the practical management of the organization between 
meetings of the Council.162  
The second organization worth mentioning, and arguably the most important in this 
respect, is the IPPNW. Founded in 1980 by physicians from Russia and the United States on 
the basis that ‘physicians in all countries must work toward the prevention of nuclear war and 
the elimination of nuclear weapons’,163 it quickly established itself as a leading organization 
in the field and was awarded the Nobel peace Prize in 1985 for its ‘considerable service to 
mankind by creating an awareness of the catastrophic consequences of atomic warfare.’164 
The success of the IPPNW has been attributed to the way in which it has ‘medicalized’ the 
issue of nuclear weapons, ‘framing the disarmament issue in concerns for health, disease, 
societal survival, and the ultimate universal value of life.’165 However, its success must also 
be attributed to the extent to which it relies upon formal organization. The IPPNW describes 
itself as a ‘non-partisan international federation’ made up of affiliate national physician 
organizations and individuals as its members.166 However, it would be more apt to describe it 
as a hybrid meta-organization, composed mostly of organizations, but also of individuals.167 
Membership is only for those national or regional medical organizations or individuals who 
are judged to be ‘working for’ the established goal of the organization in ‘the prevention of 
nuclear war’.’168 And this is overseen by a hierarchical structure, with an International 
Council which meets at least once every other year, and a Board of Directors which is 
appointed by the Council to implement IPPNW’s policies.169 
Another principal organization in terms of the social movement’s functional 
equivalence to law is the International Association of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms 
(IALANA). IALANA is also best described as a hybrid meta-organization, although it is 
                                                          
162 IPB website, ‘IPB Constitution’, < http://www.ipb.org/web/ >, accessed 12 September 2015. 
163 Preamble of Proceedings of the First Congress of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear 
War, Arlie, Virginia, March 1981.  
164 Nobel Prize website, ‘The Nobel Prize for 1985’,  
< http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/ >, accessed 12 September 2015. 
165 DiIorio and Nusbaumer (1985), 63ff. 
166 Constitution of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, amended as of 26 August 
2014, section 2.1 and 31 (on file with the author). The IPPNW now has some 57,000 members in 63 countries, 
see http://www. ippnw.org . 
167 A more complex form of organization that is quite common to professionally organized SMOs, yet which is 
not adequately covered in Ahrne and Brunsson’s (2008) text. 
168 Constitution of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, section 2.1. And national 
and regional affiliates are liable for minimum dues to the organization, section 8.2. Beyond this the ‘financial 
resources of IPPNW shall include contributions from its affiliates (including dues), individual members, and 
persons and organizations interested in supporting IPPNW’s activities’, section 8.1 (and ‘persons and 
organizations’ here, in practice, includes diplomats and nation-states.) 
169 Constitution of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, sections 4.0, 4.1, 4.2. 
184 
 
mostly composed of national affiliate organizations as its members.170 It is, nonetheless, 
something of an anomaly in this respect as it was first established in 1988 by, what is now its 
subsidiary, the U.S. based Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy (LCNP).171 The ‘overriding 
goals of IALANA are the complete elimination of nuclear arms and the prevention of nuclear 
war.’172 As a professional legal organization it also aims for the ‘strengthening of 
international law’ in this area,173 and the IALANA Statute explicitly provides that the 
organization will ‘promote norms and institutions that will produce an effective peace system 
for the world community.’174 IALANA does not boast the same degree of transparency of 
organization as IPPNW,175 but nonetheless clearly has adequate characteristics of 
organization. The organization has a hierarchy represented by a General Assembly as its 
‘supreme body’,176 and a Board of Directors who ‘support and supervise’ an Executive 
Committee which is charged with implementing the policy of the organization.177 
Membership is on the basis of agreement and conduct in accordance with IALANA’s 
goals.178 
Finally, mention must be made of the ICRC. In general, the ICRC has not had the same 
degree of involvement with the antinuclear movement that these other organizations have. 
After its reaction to the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the organization has been 
consumed in the broader task of providing humanitarian relief in armed conflict around the 
world, and beyond its involvement with the antinuclear movement during the Cuban missile 
crisis in the early 1960s, it has tended to leave the nuclear weapons issue to the many SMOs 
that emerged with that more specific aim in the 1980s.179 Nonetheless, the ICRC has become 
increasingly involved again in the antinuclear movement in recent years, starting with (then) 
president Jakob Kellenberger’s appeal for an elimination of nuclear weapons before the NPT 
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review conference in 2010, and further in the organization’s adoption of a resolution on the 
issue in 2011,180 and their adoption in 2013 of a four year plan to advance negotiations on 
disarmament.181 What is particularly noteworthy about the ICRC’s involvement is that it is 
known to have a high level of organization and to be very effective in influencing national 
governments on issues of concern. In fact, as will be explained below, the primary role the 
ICRC played in securing the treaty to ban land mines182 can be seen as one of the principal 
reasons the organization has been drawn into the antinuclear campaign in the last few years. 
Before examining how these SMOs have stabilized normative expectations of the 
prohibition of nuclear weapons in the last thirty years, two brief points need to be made. First 
it is worth noting that two of the principal organizations presented above are established 
around the institution of professional roles. This has been a prevalent trend in respect of the 
antinuclear movement.183 It is not only doctors (IPPNW, Physicians for Social 
Responsibility) and lawyers (IALANA) in this respect, but also scientists (Pugwash), 
engineers (INESAP), parliamentarians (PNND), mayors (Mayors for Peace), and even 
models (Universal Models for Peace) that organize themselves on the antinuclear issue. 
Beyond the relation this bears to what Luhmann has said about roles serving as more 
concrete ‘expectational nexes’,184 organization around professional roles has been 
instrumental in the antinuclear weapons movement, either as a way of rising above the 
emotive nature of general protest and to engage the nuclear weapons issue instead as a highly 
technical and complex problem (as in the case, for example, of the IPPNW), or bolstering the 
communicative capacity of the organization (as in the case, for example, of Models for 
Peace). Thus, according to the executive director of IALANA, the importance of the 
representation of the issue by professional groups lies in its ability to ‘convince international 
institutions’, and to show that ‘it is not just emotional feeling, not just reaction’, but that there 
is a distinctive professional argument to be contributed.185  
Secondly, an important point needs to be made at the outset about the distinctive roles 
of networks and organizations in the antinuclear movement. The antinuclear organizations 
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have formed a number of loose coalitions and networks over the years for the purposes of 
different campaigns addressing the nuclear weapons issue. It has apparently been necessary 
for them to do so at points simply in order to break stalemates and to bring the right people 
together.186 However, these informal networks have not proved very irritating for entrenched 
political and legal institutions. In terms of what has been said already about the functions of 
organizations, it seems that without any hierarchy, and without any consistent recursive 
decision-making on the basis of decision premises,187 the informal networks relied upon by 
the antinuclear movement have not been able to engage in the kind of outward 
communication with their environment that is necessary to stimulate political action, or even 
to sufficiently provide the illusion of doing so.  Thus, for example, despite amassing the 
support of two thousand organizations from around the world, the Abolition 2000 network 
which was set up to irritate nuclear weapon states into negotiating for disarmament under the 
terms of the NPT has not proved particularly effective, and has been described as a ‘very 
loose, largely unstructured network without much focus or common direction for the 
activities of participating organizations’.188 Moreover, while the networks established through 
the Middle Powers Initiative (MPI),189 and the Mayors for Peace ‘2020 Vision campaign’,190 
have perhaps been more successful in focusing resources, they have not proved as irritating 
as the more tightly organized campaigns. As it will be seen, it is for this reason that the 
antinuclear movement has in recent years generally decided to move away from the network 
model and the further proliferation of organizations and to move instead towards the 
formation of a meta-organization campaign.  
The important departure point for the evolution of the function of antinuclear SMOs in 
terms of the norm can be located in the mid-1980s. From that point in time through to the 
years following the end of the Cold War much of the antinuclear movement was engaged in 
securing a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Even in the years after the Cold War, public 
opinion was still focused enough on the nuclear issue that the antinuclear movement could 
rely on the mass media and consumers to bring massive pressure to bear on those nation-
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states that were still conducting explosive testing.191 When the Australian government tabled 
a resolution at the UNGA for a test-ban treaty, civil society organizations around the world 
pressed their respective governments to support the resolution.192 After the Comprehensive 
Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was adopted by the Assembly in September 1996,193 it was 
immediately signed by the P5—something that was initially seen as a major achievement for 
global civil society.194   
From the mid-1980s, while efforts were being made towards securing the CTBT, 
factions of the antinuclear movement were developing other lines to securing the prohibition 
of nuclear weapons in law. In 1985 the London Nuclear Warfare Tribunal was established by, 
amongst others, Sean MacBride (then president of the IPB) and Professor Richard Falk of 
Princeton University to examine the legality of nuclear weapons.195 On declaring nuclear 
weapons to be illegal under customary international law, the tribunal recommended ‘the 
initiation of an effort to obtain an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 
status of nuclear weapons, strategic doctrines and war plans.’196 However, it was not until a 
year later that civil society really began to mobilize in this direction. Richard Falk had visited 
New Zealand in 1986 for discussion with civil society groups there, and in 1988 retired New 
Zealand judge Harold Evans addressed the IPPNW meeting in Australia on the issue.197 Later 
that year the IPPNW adopted a resolution approving the initiative,198 and the following year 
the newly established IALANA adopted its Hague Declaration on the Illegality of Nuclear 
Weapons backing the initiative and calling upon nation-states to take ‘immediate steps 
towards obtaining a resolution by the United Nations General Assembly under Article 96 of 
the United Nations Charter requesting the International Court of Justice to render an advisory 
opinion on the illegality of the use of nuclear weapons.’199 
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In 1992 ‘The World Court Project’ was officially launched through collaboration of the 
IPPNW, IALANA and the IPB.200 Work began immediately towards a WHO resolution for a 
request for an advisory opinion of the Court. The IPPNW began with a ‘coordinated intensive 
campaign’ in every country in which it had members, visiting national health ministers to 
persuade them to argue for the resolution and making further ‘soundings’ within the WHO 
bureaucracy as to the viability of the resolution.201 The real turning point came in 1993 at the 
World Health Assembly (WHA), as the forum where national health ministers meet every 
year in Geneva to set to WHO policy. The IPPNW had sent a strong lobbying team headed by 
the Swedish neurologist, Ann Marie Jansen and former New Zealand Director-General of 
Health, George Salmond, to persuade the Assembly to adopt a resolution requesting an 
advisory opinion form the World Court202 on a question that was drafted by IALANA 
lawyers.203 Both had considerable experience with WHA procedure and both had well 
established relationships with many of the delegates at the Assembly.204 Beyond this, the 
IPPNW had prepared and distributed at the Assembly ‘readable and well referenced papers’ 
so that key delegates could make strong presentations within committee meetings.205 Despite 
intense lobbying by nuclear weapons states to block the resolution, the WHA adopted a 
resolution on 14 May 1993 requesting an advisory opinion form the World Court on the 
following question: ‘In view of the health and environmental effects, would the use of 
nuclear weapons by a state in a war or other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations 
under international law including the WHO constitution.’206 
At the same time the three antinuclear organizations were engaging the broader 
international peace movement and civil society, drumming up support and collecting the two 
million signatures that they would eventually submit to the Court before the opinion. In 
addition, before the WHO had even adopted the resolution requesting an advisory opinion the 
organizations had also embarked upon lobbying campaign at the United Nations in the 
interests of securing a similar resolution from the UNGA requesting an advisory opinion on 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and International Law (1993), xiii. In its written statement to the Court, the UK government described the 
WHO’s request for an opinion as ‘the result of a sustained campaign’ by NGOs in the hope of persuading the 
Court that the request was inadmissible for the lack of standing of such civil society groups.  
200 Burroughs (1997), 9; Wittner (2009), 207; Krieger and Nanda (1998), 69ff; Lindblom (2005), 219; Written 
Statement of the Government of the United Kingdom, International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or 
Use of Nuclear Weapons, June 1995, para. 2.3. 
201 Dewes and Green (2002), 501. 
202 Ibid.; Interview with Tilman Ruff, 19/03/2015. 
203 Interview with Reiner Braun, 11.03.2015. 
204 Dewes and Green (2002), 501.  
205 Ibid., 502. 
206 Forty Sixth World Health Assembly, Geneva 3-14 May 1993, Resolutions and Decisions, WHA46.40. 
Adopted by seventy-three votes to forty, with ten abstentions.  
189 
 
the issue from the Court.207 IALANA was aware from the outset that there was a possibility 
that the ICJ may have concluded that it was beyond the scope of the WHO’s function to 
request such an opinion from the Court, and the UNGA request was pursued as a more robust 
alternative. Again, the movement faced fierce opposition from the nuclear weapons states, 
but through working with the nonaligned movement within the Assembly the movement was 
able to secure a UNGA resolution in December 1994 requesting an advisory opinion on the 
question: ‘Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under 
international law?’.208 
Once the UNGA resolution had been secured for the request of an advisory opinion, the 
antinuclear organizations became heavily involved in preparing submissions for the case. 
Although civil society groups have no right of representation before the Court in advisory 
opinions, both IALANA and IPPNW drafted model submissions for the case, and even 
directly helped draft the submissions of smaller nation-states to the Court.209 Moreover, a 
team from IALANA offered ‘on the spot’ legal advice to any supportive government 
deputations.210  
Despite the fact the Court avoided a pronouncement on the question of whether nuclear 
weapons were illegal under circumstances of ‘self-defence’, the World Court Project 
represented a significant achievement for the antinuclear movement. IALANA in particular 
took some comfort in the Court’s reiteration of nuclear weapons states’ obligation under 
international law to negotiate in good faith for disarmament.211 The Project has also helped to 
develop relationships between civil society and national governments on the nuclear weapons 
issue.212 But, most importantly, the Project played an important part in verbalizing and 
formulating normative expectations of the prohibition of nuclear weapons within a legal 
forum—something which condensed the formulation and recognition of the norm.  
Despite these advances, however, in many respects the Court’s ambiguity on the 
illegality of nuclear weapons marked the beginning of a period of frustration for the 
antinuclear movement.213 It soon became obvious that nuclear weapons states paid little 
attention to the Court’s stipulation of an obligation under international law to negotiate in 
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good faith for disarmament. After the 2005 NPT review conference was concluded without a 
single line devoted to the disarmament issue a sense of despair began to creep into the 
antinuclear movement.214 The problems of the NPT were becoming all too clear; it fails to 
provide any organization to oversee Article VI obligations to disarm, it lacks verification 
provisions, a time frame for disarmament, and many other relevant details.215 Without further 
instruments it was clear that it would only ensure the lowest common denominator in terms 
of disarmament.216    
It was on this basis that the antinuclear organizations began to develop different 
approaches to moving forward with the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. IALANA for its 
part has recommended, on the one hand, a ‘Return to the Court’ project which would put the 
question of the illegality of nuclear weapons before the World Court again, and, on the other, 
has advocated the drafting of a detailed and highly comprehensive ‘Model Nuclear Weapons 
Convention’. 
In respect of the ‘Back to Court’ project, IALANA had initially worked to secure 
another UNGA resolution requesting an advisory opinion on disarmament.217 However, this 
has not as yet been successful (it seems that without the political will that existed in mid-
1990s and without the full engagement of the IPPNW on the Back to Court project, the 
request for an advisory opinion is not as easy to organize as it was in the early 1990s). Thus, 
IALANA have focused instead on supporting litigation in contentious cases brought by the 
Marshall Islands (RMI) against nuclear weapons states. Together with the NAPF, IALANA 
has worked in this respect with the government of the RMI, a small pacific island state that 
has suffered serious health and environmental problems for a number of years because of 
explosive testing of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific. The project has culminated in legal 
actions being pursued both at the national and the international level. First the RMI filed a 
lawsuit against the United States government in a Federal US District Court in San Francisco 
in April of 2014 for failing to comply with its obligations under the NPT.218 The motion was 
dismissed for lack of standing, on the basis that the Court could not order specific 
performance of the United States government’s obligations under the treaty, and because it 
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raised a ‘fundamentally non-justiciable political question’.219 In that case a number of 
transnational and US based SMOs were able to file amicus briefs, including the IPPNW who 
were asked to do so by the NAPF and IALANA on the basis of its medical expertise.220 
Secondly, the RMI filed at the same time an application with the ICJ against nine nuclear 
weapons states on the basis of their failure to comply with disarmament obligations under the 
NPT.221 The case is now pending before the ICJ. In both cases, IALANA has been actively 
involved in the RMI’s applications. The organization’s vice president, Peter Wiess, is chair of 
the lawyer’s committee of the RMI government, and IALANA lawyers are reported to be 
working a lot on the case ‘behind the scenes’.222 
The other line being pursued by IALANA at present is the Model Nuclear Weapons 
Convention. After the ICJ’s opinion in 1997, IALANA, along with the IPPNW and INESAP, 
decided to draft a Model Nuclear Weapons Convention. The objective of the Model 
Convention has been not so much to provide a blue print on a take-it-or-leave it basis for 
nuclear weapons states, but rather to develop a comprehensive package that clearly addresses 
all the crucial issues, including for example, rights and obligations, agency, phases for 
implementation, national implementation measures, verification processes, dispute settlement 
measures, and financing amongst other things. Furthermore, the aim of the Model 
Convention has been to build upon existing treaty law, including the 1997 Chemical 
Weapons Convention, and successful nuclear weapons conventions, such as the 1987 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. 
The Model Convention is now available in the six official languages of the United Nations, as 
well as German and Japanese.223 It was submitted to the UNGA by the Costa Rican 
government, and has subsequently been circulated by the UN Secretary-General.224 In 2008 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon proposed the Model Convention as a ‘good point of 
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departure’ for future negotiations.225 However, as yet, has the Model Convention has had 
little impact beyond this so far. Judging by the scant attention it has received at the NPT 
Review Conference in New York of May 2015, it does not seem likely that nuclear weapons 
states are going to take inspiration from the Model Convention any time soon. It may be that 
the relative complexity of the Convention, together with the current international security 
climate and the lack of will on the part of nuclear weapons states, are frustrating efforts in 
this direction.  
In light of these difficulties, a number of antinuclear organizations—led principally by 
the IPPNW—have decided to pursue an alternative approach of a shorter and relatively less 
complex ban treaty to be ratified by the majority of non-nuclear weapons states in the hope of 
eventually pressuring nuclear weapons states into compliance. Thus, in April 2007 the 
IPPNW decided to establish the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons 
(ICAN), as the ‘the next stage of doctors, mayors and citizens joining with governments to 
work for a Nuclear Weapons Convention’.226 On analysis, the genesis of ICAN can be said to 
be two-fold. On the one hand, the campaign was borne out of frustration with the lack of 
progress that was evident at the 2005 NPT Review Conference, and the limited impact of the 
Model Convention. But more so, it was influenced by the notorious success of the 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines, as a well-organized, cohesive civil society 
campaign which led to the adoption of the Ottawa Treaty banning landmines.227  
Thus, in reflection of the landmines campaign, ICAN has aimed to work through an 
organized coalition of civil society partner organizations, select national governments and 
international organizations. Ultimately, ICAN was established to consolidate the loose 
networks of antinuclear SMOs and to be as ‘nimble and lean’ as possible in this respect.228 
The proliferation of further organizations and the expansion of a disparate network of 
antinuclear organizations has been viewed as counterproductive to the prohibition of nuclear 
weapons. In fact, the national governments who were liaising with civil society on this 
issue—and, importantly, who were contributing funding to the campaign—made it clear to 
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the IPPNW that they did not want an expanding network of civil society organizations to 
work with, but rather wanted a consolidated movement with government structure and with 
‘one coordinating go-to partner to work with’.229 
These expectations are very much reflected in the ICAN structure that has emerged. 
Although ICAN describes itself as an ‘inclusive campaign’, rather than an organization, 
analysis clearly reveals hallmarks of a meta-organization. To begin with, while ICAN seeks 
to be as inclusive as possible, the criteria for membership for partner organizations involves 
‘pledging to: (1) promote the campaign’s objective of a treaty banning nuclear weapons; (2) 
identify publicly with the campaign; and (3) operate non-violently’.230 Furthermore, ICAN 
clearly has an internal hierarchy, with its apex represented in the International Steering Group 
(ISG), which oversees the strategic planning, campaign building, fundraising, policy 
formulation, information sharing, and coordination of international events. The operative 
closure of the organization is located in the decisions of the ISG, which meets regularly to 
take decisions on its decision-premise of securing a treaty banning nuclear weapons.231  
This structural arrangement has proved effective in terms of balancing inclusivity with 
organizational properties of closed decision-making and communication of collective action 
to the environment. ICAN has now over 424 partner organizations in 95 countries. The 
campaign has been noted for its capacity to build interest among younger people and for ‘re-
energizing’ national governments on the issue.232 ICAN was heavily involved with the 
organization of the 2014 Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear 
Weapons, where the Austrian government made a ‘national pledge’ to identify and pursue 
effective measures to ‘fill the legal gap’ for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear 
weapons.233 Although the Vienna Convention did not result in a norm cascade the way in 
which the Ottawa Convention did for landmines, it was nonetheless notable for ICAN’s 
coordination with Amnesty International and the ICRC on the issue of nuclear weapons. The 
involvement of the ICRC on this issue, in particular, is said to be ‘one of the most significant 
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developments in decades in relation to civil society advocacy for nuclear disarmament’.234 As 
stated, the ICRC was particularly influential in securing the mine ban treaty. Moreover, its 
evolved structural relationship with national governments is such that it is one of the very few 
civil society organizations that has been granted observer status at the UNGA235 (which is 
only reflected in the fact that it has a budget greater than that of some nation-states236). 
Ultimately, if nothing else, the Vienna Convention demonstrates the effectiveness of ICAN in 
establishing structural relations with national governments, international organizations and 
key transnational civil society organizations. 
 
Discussion 
 
The above facts represent the relevant developments of transnational antinuclear SMOs in 
relation to the general norm of the prohibition of nuclear weapons. If one reconstructs these 
facts through the theoretical lens developed in the thesis, then it is relatively easy to see how 
the antinuclear SMOs involved maintain a functional reference to the problem-reference of 
that general norm. These organizations clearly reflect the norm in their decision-premises—
already here they have made a decision that law cannot. However, it is through the recursive 
decision-making on the basis of that premise, and thus in the evolution of the formal 
organization, that norm is stabilized along the temporal dimension. Thus, the IPPNW has 
decided to organize on the basis of the elimination of nuclear weapons, and then on that basis 
decides to pursue its objectives through the CTBT, through the World Court Project, then 
through the Model Convention, then through ICAN, and so on. Of course, this is just the tip 
of the iceberg—just a select few of the decisions made by just one antinuclear organization—
but it shows how with each decision the norm is carried along the temporal dimension, and 
how at every stage uncertainty surrounding the norm is absorbed.  
Furthermore, the membership within these organizations aims to be inclusive as 
possible, but merely requires agreement and conduct in accordance with the objectives of the 
organization. In other words, it only requires co-expectancy of the norm represented by the 
decision-premise. In this way the SMO provides the institutionalization of anonymized third-
parties who co-expect the prohibition of nuclear weapons. And stated already, such SMOs 
can provide a sufficiently abstract context of expectations for the prohibition of nuclear 
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weapons. Thus, for example, ICAN’s decision-premise for the elimination of nuclear 
weapons may equally reflect the expectations that arise for the Austrian government, as it 
may do for those small civil society organizations who represent the concerns of citizens of a 
small south pacific island state.  
Moreover, one can see how important the communicative capacity of SMOs is here. 
The way in which those organizations have been able to keep the antinuclear norm in 
circulation in world society as a proto-legal communication is important for stimulating 
further communication of needs for the stabilization of such normative expectations, and thus 
for stimulating their own functional specification and autopoiesis. This suggests that what is 
communicated as a need with the emergence of a normative expectation, is not a specific 
need for a decision between legal or illegal, but rather is a need for decision as an autopoietic 
operation. This accords with Luhmann’s thesis about expectations being equated with 
decisions, and about expectations giving meaning to decisions.237 Thus SMOs, as decision-
machines, which adopt general norms as their decision-premise, must be recognized as a 
highly functional development in response to the increasing problem of general norms arising 
with globalization. 
In addition, it is clear that the communicative capacity of the antinuclear SMOs 
engages the nation-state and international organizations. That was seen to be an issue with the 
global private law model in marginalizing the role of the nation-state in the global normative 
order. However, SMOs are clearly set up to communicate with the international system. 
Again, this is not to claim that there must be a ‘norm cascade’ within the traditional pubic 
sphere, but clearly there are a class of norms, such as the antinuclear norm, which can only be 
stabilized by the prospect of international political and legal action. Thus, the communicative 
capacity of SMOs to project the norm as a proto-legal communication at the public sphere 
can be seen to be very important.  
If one were to appraise the function of organizations involved in the antinuclear 
movement in this respect, it would seem that the approach adopted by the IPPNW represents 
the most functional development in the general movement (this is not to say anything about 
which approach is more likely to secure a norm cascade, but rather which proves more 
functional in relation to the reference-problem). The high degree of formal organization 
adopted by the IPPNW absorbs a significant degree of uncertainty around the antinuclear 
norm, and its decision to pursue a public campaign for a relatively simple ban treaty along 
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with its developed communicative network with national governments, supports the 
stabilization of the norm, and stimulates the autopoiesis of the organization, and the general 
social movement. This can be seen as somewhat more functional than the approach being 
pursued by IALANA. The nuclear weapons states are evidently little interested in adopting 
the Model Convention, and its complexities further undermine its communication to the 
broader social environment. Moreover, the Return to Court Project is unlikely to draw a 
decision by the legal system on the illegality of nuclear weapons and is even unlikely to 
provoke a non liquet this time. First, the Court only has jurisdiction in respect of three of the 
nine respondent nuclear weapons states (India, Pakistan and the UK).238 According to 
procedure, the Court has communicated the Royal Marshall Islands application to the 
remaining six nation-states, yet it remains to be seen whether they will accept the Court’s 
jurisdiction. More importantly though, whereas with the 1996 request for an advisory 
opinion, the Court was confronted with a clear question on the illegality of nuclear weapons 
by the UNGA, this time it is a contentious case, that merely asks the Court to restate 
disarmament obligations under the NPT. The question about whether such an obligation 
exists under customary international law is an interesting one (regarding India and Pakistan 
who have not ratified the NPT), however, it does not ask the direct question on the illegality 
of nuclear weapons that the UNGA’s request did, but only if there is opinio juris and state 
practice to support the obligation to fulfil the terms of what is admittedly a flawed treaty. It 
should be remembered how sophisticated the Court can be in developing code to avoid 
directly adjudicating on the legality of general norms. Moreover, there is even a possibility 
that the Court will side-step the issue in such a way as to detract from the poignant statement 
of the problem of general norms that was achieved with the non liquet in 1996. 
Possibly the greatest refinement of the theory offered by this brief empirical analysis, 
however, lies in what it suggests about the need for meta-organization over loose networks, 
and for periodic consolidation over the endless proliferation of organizations. The 
development of ICAN, the increasing reliance on meta-organization and the move away from 
proliferation and loose networks, suggests that the function of SMOs in relation to general 
norms lies not simply in the diffraction of the problem through increasing fragmentation of 
normative institutionalization. Of course, it was primarily national governments who 
expressed a desire for consolidated and organized civil society—and essentially what was 
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expressed to the IPPNW, and which the IPPNW agreed with, was the need for an apex in 
civil society, ‘symbolizing the constantly available potential for collective action’239—but 
there is something here that corresponds with Ahrne and Brunsson’s thesis of the increasing 
importance of meta-organization in world society240 (although they do not devote any 
attention there to SMOs, nor even to the use of meta-organizations in global civil society). It 
suggests that, rather than a relatively simple trend towards increasing diffraction of norms 
through fragmented institutionalization, what is actually happening—with norms in civil 
society at least—is a to and fro movement between diffraction and consolidation; a 
massaging of the normative tension through social structure, so to speak.  
The to and fro between diffraction and consolidation also accords with the systems 
theoretical analysis. While the proliferation of institutionalized normative decision-making 
helps to stabilize the norm, optimal communication of normative decision-making requires an 
apex for collective action amongst the networks of organizations. That is, because the 
communicative capacity is also important to the stabilization of the norm, there must be 
periodic consolidation and meta-organization of the loose association of SMOs.  
Of course, these conclusions must be refined through further empirical analysis. 
Nonetheless, the hypothesis is clear: transnational social movement organizations operate as a 
functional equivalent in reference to norms which are recognized and formulated in global 
society, but which are inadequately realized in law.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
Systems theory is increasingly compared to new institutionalism, in the hope that overlap 
between the sociological paradigms might provide scope for ‘important developments’ in 
theoretical and empirical research.241 Both approaches develop a theory of ‘world society’ 
and importantly both view the organization as a ‘core unit’ in processes of structure 
formation in world society.242 New institutionalists, for their part, draw on a wealth of 
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empirical data to construct a theory of ‘continued expansion and penetration of formal 
organization throughout the world.’243 
For this reason, new institutionalists would seem a valid approach for developing the 
systems theoretical insights offered here. However, there is one significant difference 
between the theories that would need to be reconciled first. In short, new institutionalists 
reject functionalist interpretations of the proliferation of organizations in world society. 
According to them, functionalist arguments cannot explain empirical evidence of 
organizational expansion in areas and social sectors that ‘seem not to have changed in 
complexity’.244 Organizations proliferate, they argue, regardless of ‘GDP or population size’, 
and the ‘rate of change in organization is higher than the rate of social change in 
modernization- or complexity related functions.’245 
New institutionalists point instead to concepts of ‘legitimacy’ and ‘culture’. Legitimacy 
here does not refer to the Luhmannian concept of self-legitimacy or the legitimacy conferred 
through external reference, but rather to Weberian notions of Western socio-cultural 
rationalization, and of rational formal structures as a source of legitimacy in modern 
society.246 ‘Culture’ here refers to the main tenets of ‘Occidental rationalization’ (belief in 
progress, justice, spread of means/end rationality, etc.),247 which become ‘cultural scripts’ or 
‘myths’ that legitimate some forms of organization over others.248 This, in their view, leads to 
‘isomorphism’ and standardization across organizational forms in world society.249 
These aspects of new institutionalism undermine any synthesis of the theory with the 
systems-theoretical approach developed here. From this perspective new institutionalism 
appears to operate ‘on a very high level of generalization’.250 For example, the fact that there 
are more university students today in a country with low GDP and societal complexity than 
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there was in the entire world a century ago251 in no way denies functional differentiation, but 
only confirms the globalizing nature of functional subsystems like the education system. 
More to the point, new institutionalism is unable to offer much insight into the relationship 
between law and the proliferation of organizations in world society. In terms of law, the 
failure of new institutionalism to investigate the specific logics of functional specializations, 
has led the approach to reflect a ‘naive legal formalism’252 in which ‘rules are clear, 
enforcement is firm, and legal effects are substantive.’253 
It is therefore unfortunate that new institutionalism has proved so influential amongst 
international relations scholars who focus specifically on the development of norms at the 
transnational level.254 They have thus, to some extent, carried over the naive legal formalism 
of new institutionalism,255 and this is reflected, for example, in the freely admitted incapacity 
of constructivist international legal scholars to distinguish ‘legal norms from other norms’,256 
and in the prevailing assumption there that weak law is always something of a ‘normative 
failure’.257 
It is suggested that the important empirical based research being carried out by 
constructivist international legal scholars would be better informed by the conjunction of 
functional analysis and systems theory developed here, which does make a clear distinction 
between social and legal norms, and which reveals a much broader picture of the role of 
norms in the evolution of world society than is observable through the lens of new 
institutionalist theory. Furthermore, the theory of SMOs as a functional substitute in reference 
to norms which are formulated at a general level of world society, but which cannot be 
accommodated in law, could be greatly enhanced by drawing on the empirical research which 
constructivist international relations scholars have carried out in relation to normative 
influence at the transnational level. Ultimately, it is suggested that a combination of both 
approaches is likely to prove productive in research terms.  
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7 International law and civil society organizations 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
A number of potential avenues for further research open up once the possibility of the SMO 
is presented as a functional solution to the problem of general norms. As stated in the 
conclusion of the previous chapter, one could, for example, draw upon elements of the 
constructivist international relations research to examine how such functional subsystems are 
involved in ‘norm cascades’ in the traditional public sphere. On the other hand, one could 
stay more squarely within the systems theoretical paradigm to catalogue, for example, all of 
those norms that are most problematic in respect of their general character, before identifying 
the organizations that absorb that norm in their decision premise and then looking at the 
decisions the SMO takes. That would allow one to get a better picture of the structural 
relationship between the norm and SMO. Or one could examine the distinctions such an 
SMO uses in its self-description in order to understand how the SMO maintains its 
boundaries, what that means for its evolution, and what it might mean for society as a social 
system. Another possible avenue of research is to look at the structural couplings that are 
achieved by social movements through the emergence of such organizations. Organizations 
are said to ‘condense structural couplings and contribute to the structural couplings between 
subsystems.’1 At the same time, it is said that ‘[i]f there is autopoiesis, there is also structural 
coupling’.2 One then could envisage all sorts of structural couplings; between social 
movements and the mass media, between social movements and the political system, etc. In 
this chapter I want to turn back to look at law and examine what kind of structural coupling is 
achieved by law through social movement organizations. However, this is not so ambitious as 
to engage in analysis of the kind of coupling that Teubner is addressing with his concept of 
social movements as a means through which law can externalize its paradox and thereby 
achieve legitimation.3 That is a good question, but not one that can be adequately engaged in 
the space left here. Instead this chapter will look at structural coupling in a more modest way.  
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Luhmann defined structural coupling as when a ‘system presupposes certain features of 
its environment on an ongoing basis and relies on them structurally’,4 and it is in this more 
basic sense of structural coupling—as structural reliance on other social systems—that this 
chapter will engage by focusing on how law has come to structurally rely on social 
movements through orientation to SMOs. Even this limited concept of structural coupling 
shows how law has evolved in relation to social movements, but, more to the point, it also 
brings issues of the legitimacy of law into focus in its own way. 
International law might be seen as slow to recognize the importance of social 
movements in the global normative order. International law, even international human rights 
law, is said to have remained ‘virtually isolated’ from the emergence of social movements.5 
However, one should not look for a direct relationship between law and social movements 
themselves. As stated in the last chapter about the communicative capacity of organizations, 
any structural relationship must be directed at organizations ‘beneath’ the functional 
subsystems. From this perspective, what is more interesting is that international law has not 
been able to build more refined structured relationships with SMOs or other civil society 
organizations. The closest international law has got in this respect is a conceptual orientation 
to the ‘NGO’, which of course is a lot more vague and ambiguous than SMO.6 This lack of 
conceptual refinement is obviously problematic from the perspective of the functional 
specification of the SMO, whereby SMOs can be seen to have functionally differentiated in 
reference to general norms, and even appear to maintain structural relationships with 
international law through their communicative capacity. Nonetheless, in examining 
international law’s construction of this relationship with SMOs, this chapter cannot go further 
than what the legal system has achieved, and will therefore use the broader terms ‘civil 
society organization’ or ‘NGO’ that international law uses to denote a category of 
organizations that obviously includes the SMO. Of course, the ultimate aim of the section is 
to draw conclusions specifically about SMOs and international law.  
Whether this failure to perceive SMOs is problematic for international law itself is 
another question. But what we can see already is that when international law orientates itself 
to ‘NGOs’, issues of legitimacy soon come to the fore; not just the legitimacy of civil society 
organizations acting beyond the public accountability mechanisms, but the legitimacy of 
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international law itself.7 This chapter will address this under two headings. First it will look at 
the way that law has expanded through questions about the legitimacy of NGOs, principally 
through concepts of international constitutionalism and global administrative law. The 
interesting thing about law’s attempts to construct accountability mechanisms for civil 
society organizations is the way it always rebounds back to questions of the legitimacy law 
itself. Of course, that must be expected if civil society organizations do operate as functional 
equivalents to problems that law cannot solve. But, as it will be seen, because the problem of 
legitimacy keeps reflecting back on law when it tries to construct accountability of global 
civil society organizations, the only way this can be achieved is through measures that are not 
only sensitive to such organizations’ unique opposition function, but which also reflect law’s 
own problems of legitimacy in this respect. 
In the second part the chapter will look at the way in which law aims to further include 
global civil society organizations in order to bolster its own legitimacy. This approach is 
more sensitive to the special function that civil society organizations may have acquired in 
global society, and the greater inclusion of civil society organizations in the public law-
making sphere is ostensibly recommended in light of the increasingly important role they 
play in the global normative order. However, this chapter will end by questioning whether it 
is functionally necessary (i.e., for society as a social system) to further include civil society 
organizations in the international legal system, considering the function they have achieved 
outside the formal public sphere. In a way this is to question the motivation of law in 
attempting to further include civil society organizations. Legitimacy is a scarce resource in 
functionally differentiated society, and yet—however one defines it—legitimacy is obviously 
an important ingredient for satisfying the growth compulsion of media steered systems. From 
the perspective of the theory developed in this thesis of the SMO as providing a functional 
solution to the problem of general norms in a way that is completely independent of the 
politico-legal structures that would traditionally have provided solutions to such problems—
indeed, of the SMO as a ‘functional substitute’ to law—it would seem that a high degree of 
caution is necessary on the part of lawyers in constructing any structural relations with 
SMOs, and perhaps even ‘NGOs’ in general. Otherwise, there is a danger that law’s 
                                                          
7 Reflecting the functionalist account of law, which has been adopted throughout the thesis, and which 
generates insights through a distinction between cognitive and normative expectations, ‘legitimacy’ here will 
refer to: when one can expect normatively that directly affected persons cognitively adapt to what decision-
makers communicate as norms, Luhmann (1985a), 201. This basic formulation is not far removed from a basic 
Weberian concept of legitimacy, Weber (1968). Nor does it enter into the debate about the mechanisms of 
securing such legitimacy, reflected in the Habermas/Luhmann exchange about discursive rationality and 
procedural legitimacy, Habermas and Luhmann (1971).   
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incorporation of such civil society organizations may lead to a co-option and over-
determination of those organizations in such a way as to undermine the very function they 
have achieved in respect of general norms. 
 
7.2  International law and the legitimacy of civil society organizations 
 
The proliferation of organizations at the transnational level has long been recognized as 
having potentially important ramifications for the development of law.8 One need hardly 
accept Weber’s concept of legitimation through rational-legal administration and bureaucratic 
procedures9 to see that the proliferation of formal organizations at the transnational level will 
likely be attended by increasing legalization. Even things like leasing premises for a 
secretariat, handling of donations or adopting a constitution laying down substantive 
objectives of the organization may require some form of legal entity.10 Certainly, the 
definition of an organization adopted in the previous chapter—i.e., of organization as a social 
system that remains operationally closed on the basis of its decisions—must recognize the 
potential for such a closed system to even develop the reflexive mechanisms to constitute a 
partial legal order in itself, even if such a legal order can only extend as far as the boundaries 
of the organization and achieve no broader societal function.  
In reflection of  the way in which such operational closure can lead to the emergence 
of such partial legal orders, a considerable body of international legal scholarship has evolved 
to systematically map out the institutional rules that govern the legal status, structure and 
functioning of international organizations.11 Such approaches generally depart from 
observations on the proliferation of international organizations since the Second World War 
as a ‘response to an evident need arising from international intercourse’, and a growing need 
for nation-states to cooperate in the form of international organizations.12 Moreover, in 
reflection of the trend towards isomorphism highlighted by new institutionalist scholars,13 
                                                          
8 Jenks (1958), 175ff. 
9 Weber (1968). 
10 Especially if such a right of collective action is supported by a more general constitutional instrument. For 
example, Article 11 of the European Convention of Human Rights necessitates the contracting nation-state to 
offer potential legal entity to NGOS, see see Sidiropoulos and Others v. Greece (57/1997/841/1047), European 
Court of Human Rights, 10 July 1998, paras. 32-47. 
11 See for example, Blokker and Schermers (2011); Klabbers (2009); White (2005); Klein and Sands (2001); 
Amerasinghe (2005). 
12 Klein and Sands (2001), 1. 
13 Meyer and Rowen (1977); DiMaggio and Powell (1983); Boyle and Meyer (1998); Meyer et al. 1997; 
Meyer (2009); see also Ahrne and Brunsson’s concept of ‘meta-organization’: (2008), 2: ‘we argue that 
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international institutional lawyers have perceived institutional problems and rules of different 
organizations to be ‘more or less the same’,14  and with that have undertaken the task of 
‘extracting common principles which address the concerns and hopes that give rise to this 
field’.15 Under this schema a vast and complex body of rules open up (e.g., rules on 
membership, rules pertaining to the legal constitution of organizations, rules relating to 
internal structures, the delegation of powers, policy-making organs, etc.),16 in such a way as 
to allow for the expansion of a robust form of law that both constitutes and limits the 
proliferation of organizations at the transnational level.17 However, despite the way in which 
this international institutional approach has proved the basis of a very successful expansion of 
law in recent years,18 its exclusive focus on international organizations created between 
nation-states on the basis of treaty appears limited in respect of the growing importance of 
SMOs. In fact, international institutional law generally neglects the growing participation of 
nongovernmental organizations in international law making and law enforcement all 
together.19  
Including civil society organizations in international law is admittedly not an easy 
task. It requires a bold reconfiguration of the existing framework of international law, a 
complete ‘paradigm shift’.20 Projects that have been launched to address the increased 
relativization and fragmentation of public authority in world society have faced serious 
difficulties in establishing a basis of law capable of capturing the diffuse and heterogonous 
nature of global civil society organizations. Thus, for example, the international ‘public’ law 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
organizations such as the EU, IATA or FIFA do not constitute unique cases, but that they exhibit strong 
similarities to each other and to many other organizations.’ 
14 Blokker and Shermers (2011), 27. 
15 von Bogdandy, Dann and Goldmann (2009), 25. 
16 For a comprehensive account, see Blokker and Shermers (2011). 
17 In so far as it is constitutive, however, international institutional law generally takes a much more modest 
approach to constitutionalism than that of global constitutionalists, limiting it to the provisions relating to the 
organs of the organizations and their interrelationship, and the legal framework for any operation exercising 
power in the context of the organization’s established function, Blokkers and Schermers, (ibid.), 12-13. On the 
other hand, and for similar reasons, established approaches in both international institutional legal scholarship 
and in the jurisprudence of international courts subscribe to the doctrine of ‘functional necessity’ to limit the 
autonomy of the organization to the degree to which it is ‘functional’ to achieving the aims stipulated by the 
contracting nation-states in the founding treaty of the international organization, see for this approach Blokker 
and Schermers, (ibid.). This is increasingly subject to criticism, however; see, for example, Klabbers (2006), 37. 
18 International relations scholars have also presented the increased role of international organizations in 
transnational life as elevating them to effective ‘law-makers’, according to the ‘normative ripples’ they are seen 
to create in global society, see Alvarez (2005). This, however, has not been particularly influential on positive 
minded lawyers (Klabbers 2006, 154), and it is somewhat at odds with a the ‘external’ perspective of law 
pursued in the present study, so far as it develops a sociological concept which identifies law by its own 
functional specification and coding rather than the ‘ripple’ effects it may have society. 
19 Klabbers (2002), 9-12; Peters (2006), 593ff. See also Michaels (2005), 1234. 
20 Peters (2009a), 221. 
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approach suggested by the ‘Heidelberg group’,21 which set out with the ‘ambitious agenda’ of 
developing a ‘new way of ‘understanding, framing and taming the growing jungle of 
international law and global governance’,22 is forced to admit that, in the sea of global 
governance , ‘it is very difficult to construe a meaningful argument regarding the legality of 
an exercise of international public authority’.23 In the interests of ‘legal positivism’24 that 
approach focused instead on standardized instruments by which public authority is 
exercised—a move which not only puts civil society organizations out of reach (they 
typically do not operate on the basis of such standardized instruments of public authority), 
but also reduces the legal basis for scrutiny to such a narrow basis that, conceptually, it 
requires the lawyer to ‘dance on the head of a pin’.25 
International lawyers have not ignored the increasing role of civil society organizations 
in the global normative order, however. Not only does the legitimacy of international law 
require that they are included within the international legal system, but also their growing 
importance at the global level poses questions about the legitimacy of the organizations 
themselves which law has traditionally been orientated to. The position is well summed up by 
Klabbers: 
 
‘As soon as organizations become more than debating clubs, as soon as they 
exercise public authority, it becomes possible and plausible to wonder whether 
they do a good job, or whether someone else would have done better. …. They 
operate, so to speak, on the market of legitimacy, and legitimacy, however 
precisely conceptualized, is a scarce resource.’26 
 
This is not only based upon the protection of vested interests of a consensualist state-based 
legal framework that was reflected in Judge Guillaume’s criticism of the involvement of civil 
society organizations in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion at the ICJ,27 or in Serge Sur’s 
concern that the ‘excessive’ role played by NGOs at the Rome Conference that adopted the 
                                                          
21 See von Bogdandy, Dann, Goldman (2009) 
22 Leibfried, (2009), 52. 
23 von Bogdandy, Dann and Goldmann ibid., 20.  
24 Goldman (2009), 666. Klabbers’ commendation of Goldmann’s positivism on the basis that sociology 
cannot appreciate the ‘internal’ approach to law (Klabbers, 2009, 717) reflects a serious lack of sophistication in 
respect of the development of the sociology of law in the last thirty years. One of the key virtues of systems 
theoretical accounts of law in particular is in how it accommodates both an external and internal approach to law 
(Nobles and Schiff, 2004, 44).  
25 See for example Matthias Goldmann’s approach, Goldmann (2009).  
26 Klabbers, (2008), 20. 
27 Nuclear Weapons, Separate Opinion, Judge Guillame, 288. 
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Statute of the International Criminal Court amounted to a ‘risk’ of the Court becoming a 
‘people’s tribunal’.28 Rather it is based on a more basic recognition ‘that public authority is 
now exercised at the international level in a growing number of informal ways which are 
estranged from the classical international law-making processes’,29 and thus of the need for 
the development of an ‘international legal framework in order to provide some form of 
accountability in cases of possible NGO irresponsibility.’30 
These issues have been most squarely addressed by international constitutionalists and 
global administrative lawyers. International constitutionalists devote significant attention to 
the fact that civil society organizations ‘play an increasingly important role in the 
international legal process.’31 As such constitutionalists like Peters see international law as 
having both a constitutive and limitative role in relation to ‘NGOs’, that is, as ‘steering’ as 
well as ‘containing’ such a development.32 In terms of the latter, constitutionalism is seen to 
require the ‘accountability of all actors participating in the fulfilment of constitutional 
functions, including NGOs themselves.’33 NGOs are thus identified as having insufficient 
accountability to the ‘oppressed’ and ‘excluded’ constituencies they commonly speak on 
behalf of,34 and international constitutionalism is presented as a means of establishing 
transparency, participation and an evaluation of those organizations is a comprehensive legal 
framework. Although this introduces a ‘high degree of formalism into the legal process’ and 
a ‘formalization’ of the legal status of civil society organizations,35 it is worth noting that 
international constitutionalism is relatively sensitive to the necessary flexibility and 
independence of global civil society organization. Thus, while Peters recognizes that the 
accountability and transparency of civil society organizations must be subject to some 
scrutiny in the international constitutional framework, she also argues that they should also be 
                                                          
28 Sur (1999), 35. Citation and translation provided by Kamminga (2002), 388.  
29 d’Aspremont (2011b), 4. 
30 Nowrot (1999), 598. Even social scientists who identify SMOs as increasingly important to the global 
normative order argue that their efficiency in questioning the legitimacy of nation-states is tied up in questions 
about their own legitimacy. Sikkink (2002), for example, argues that protest and advocacy NGOs must be seen 
to be impartial and independent of political or economic interests (especially because many do rely upon nation-
states and other interest groups for funding) (313), that they must be reliable in the quality of information they 
provide (314), and that they must establish some form of internal democracy to sustain this claim to 
representativity (ibid.). Certain NGOs have for example come in for criticism on the basis that they often pursue 
a short-term, donor-led and ultimately neo-liberal agendas that are not representative of the demos they are said 
to represent, Shivji, I.G. (2007): Silences in NGO Discourse: The Role and Future of NGOs in Africa, Nairobi 
and Oxford: Fahamu. 
31 Peters (2009a), 219. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 237. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 156. 
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kept at a distance from the political and legal process ‘in order to fulfil their watchdog and 
opposition function’.36 Moreover, Peters recognizes that the level of review is not dictated by 
a democratic mandate by the global citizenry; civil society organizations do not need such 
‘because they are in functional terms the global opposition.’37 Thus, the limitative approach 
advocated can be seen to be relatively sophisticated in terms of being sensitive to the function 
of civil society organizations that was presented in the last chapter. 
Despite this sophistication, however, the international constitutional approach still faces 
the problem that was pointed out in the fourth chapter about the difficulty of establishing 
such a comprehensive international and global constitution in absence of a centralized 
political system at the global level. Thus, when Peters argues that ‘NGOs deserve a 
constitutional role in law-making only if contributions enhance the legitimacy of these of 
these processes and their outcome’,38 one wonders to who’s ‘legitimacy’ she is referring. 
Who’s legitimacy is legitimate in global society? Who is specially authorized to speak on 
behalf of global society?39 This question exposes the shaky foundations on which 
international constitutionalization aims to ensure the accountability of all actors participating 
in the fulfilment of constitutional functions, including NGOs themselves.  
Global administrative lawyers have also sought to address the role of accountability of 
the range of actors engaged in global governance. Indeed, global administrative lawyers 
recognize that just as ‘thick’ forms of legitimacy have withered for national law, international 
law can no longer draw on the consent of sovereign states the way that it once could.40 For 
them this means legitimacy questions have to re-framed for the ‘entirety of order’.41 
However, global administrative lawyers have strived to achieve this on a more limited basis 
than constitutionalists, and thus to avoid problems of legitimacy such an expansion of law 
itself might face. Thus global administrative law (GAL) is presented as being ‘more limited 
in scope’ and ‘with a more modest reach’ than constitutionalist approaches to the 
accountability of global governance.42 It does not aim at a full account of the conditions 
under which global governance would be legitimate, but instead adopts a more modest 
‘normative ambition’ in the hope that it can ‘bracket some of the more intractable’ normative 
                                                          
36 Peters (2009a), 156-157. 
37 Ibid., 236. 
38 Ibid., 235. 
39 Luhmann (1987), 103. 
40 Krisch (2012), 13.  
41 Ibid. 
42 Krisch (2010), 245. 
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issues, and thereby to focus better on practical accountability mechanisms in global 
regulatory governance.43  
On this basis, global administrative lawyers scan the vast sectors of social life at the 
global level to identify, what they term, a ‘multifaceted global administrative space’,44 and 
the way in which many institutions within that space can be said to perform functions that 
traditionally (i.e., at the municipal level) would be observed as having an ‘administrative 
character’.45  Importantly, a range of private and hybrid public-private bodies are thus drawn 
into their net as part of this ‘global administrative space’, including ‘NGOs’.46 What NGOs 
potentially have in common with this more general category of transnational bodies, 
according to global administrative law, is that they perform administrative functions, without 
being ‘directly subject to control by national governments or domestic legal systems or, in the 
case of treaty-based regimes, the states party to the treaty.’47 With this, the ground is primed 
for an expansion of municipal administrative law to the transnational level as a global 
administrative law which is defined as: the ‘mechanisms, principles, practices, and supporting 
social understandings that promote or otherwise affect the accountability of global 
administrative bodies in particular by ensuring they meet adequate standards of transparency, 
participation, reasoned decision, and legality’ that are commonly imposed upon 
administrative bodies at the municipal level.48 By observing49 all such organizational activity 
falling within this schema as ‘administration’, the GAL project expands the established 
principles and framework of domestic administrative law to apply to the problem of 
accountability at the global level.50  
A problem should become immediately obvious at this point with GAL in terms of civil 
society organizations in general, and SMOs in particular. Under the GAL approach ‘NGOs’ 
are lumped together with a broad range of other ‘regulatory regimes’, including the ICANN, 
                                                          
43 Ibid., 257. 
44 Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart (2005), 18. 
45 Ibid., 17.  
46 Ibid., 16.  
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 17.  
49 Or as Dyzenhaus says, by operating with the ‘implicit assumption’ that global bodies are public legal 
authorities, GAL can turn to the question of how to make the bodies accountable, Dyzenhaus (2009), 5.  
50 Krisch, (2012), 976, 977. However, this is not to say that proponents of global administrative law seek to 
directly transplant domestic administrative law to the global level: ‘Direct analogies between national and 
transnational administrative law must be viewed with great caution’ they admit, Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart 
(2005), 17. And instead municipal administrative law is seen to serve only as a ‘framework for identifying 
converging and diverging developments’, Krisch (2010), 256. However, they do generally seek to ‘identify, 
design, and help build transnational and global structures to fulfil functions at least somewhat comparable to 
those administrative law fulfils domestically, and to reform domestic administrative law to enable it to deal with 
the increasingly global character of regulation’, Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart (2005), 17. 
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the World Anti- Doping Agency, the WHO, International Organization for Standardization, 
the Basle Committee, and even the committees of regulatory bodies like the WTO, the IMF.51 
Not only does GAL fail to distinguish the more specialized genera of ‘NGOs’, there is no 
attention to the special characteristics of civil society organizations in general, nor even of the 
possible function SMOs in general may fulfil in terms of a ‘global opposition’ in the way 
international constitutionalism perceive.  Of course, that may not be such a serious a problem 
if GAL does adopt a much more limited normative scope and more modest reach than 
constitutionalism, and whether it does so escape the problematic questions of legitimacy that 
international constitutionalism succumbs to.  
Kingsbury, Kirsch and Stewart, on their joint paper on the topic, present three different 
possibilities in this respect: ‘international administrative accountability, protection of private 
rights or the rights of states, and promotion of democracy.’52 The first option is viewed the 
‘normatively least demanding of the three’.53 It merely involves ensuring ‘agents within the 
order perform their appointed role and conform with the internal law of the regime.’54 The 
second makes ‘stronger normative presuppositions’,55 as in a pluralist international society 
‘the social basis for a global administrative law based on individual rights is largely absent.’56 
In this case it might be better to defer to nation-state concepts of rights in the assumption that 
‘states’ rights might be useful in organizing the representation of individuals or of social and 
economic group interests on the global level.’57 (Although, this is a problematic assumption 
in respect of what global administrative lawyers admit as the issues international law now 
faces in drawing its legitimacy from the consent of sovereign states.58)  The third option, the 
democratic strand, they consider to be the ‘normatively most demanding’,59 and ultimately 
suggest that the goal of democratizing global administration should be set aside and that the 
focus should instead be placed on the less demanding normative basis of controlling the 
periphery to ensure the integral function of a regime, protecting rights, and building 
                                                          
51 Ibid.,22. 
52 Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart (2005), 43. 
53 Ibid., 44. 
54 Ibid., 44. 
55 Ibid., 45. 
56 Ibid., 46. As Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart acknowledge, treaties rarely directly address issues of 
administrative law, whilst the state practice element of customary international law precludes it from fully 
incorporating the relevant practice of many global administrative bodies, and the ‘general principles of law’ 
cited in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice have been limited. Ibid., 29 
57 Ibid., 47. 
58 Krisch (2012), 13.  
59 Ibid., 48. 
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meaningful and effective mechanisms of accountability to control abuses of power and secure 
rule-of-law values.’60 
It is left up to the authors individually to develop this further. Kingsbury, for his part, 
engages the dilemma directly by asserting that global governance entities implicitly embrace 
normative commitments which are inherent to public law. Nonetheless, he admits that any 
claim to ‘law’ made by the global administrative legal project, will likely need to diverge 
from, and be sharply in tension with, the ‘classical models of consent based inter-state 
international law and most models of national law.’61 To resolve the tension, Kingsbury 
proposes that global administrative law involves ‘not only questions of ‘validity’, but also 
questions of ‘weight’.62 Thus, whereas positivist law within a unified legal system is able to 
establish itself on the binary code of validity/invalidity, the ‘absence of a very organized 
hierarchy of norms and institutions in global governance, and the dearth of institutions with 
authority and power to determine such questions in most cases, means the actual issues in 
global administrative law often go to the weight to be given to a norm or decision.’63 
However, to not fall into the trap of natural law, Kingsbury grasps for some kind of ‘rule of 
recognition’ so that the ‘internal rules actually held by leading participants and those dealing 
with and critically evaluating them’ could be observed as an essential a condition of law.64 It 
is in this respect that he turns to the ‘qualities immanent in public law’ as a rule of 
recognition.65  Essentially, the key idea here is that any entity which effectively engages in 
administrative action at the global level should be seen to embrace- and therefore be assessed 
by reference to ‘the attributes, constraints and normative commitments that are immanent in 
public law.’66 Thus, the more positivist concept of law is maintained in a ‘loose sense’, he 
argues, if the rule of recognition includes a ‘stipulation that only rules and institutions 
meeting these publicness requirements immanent in public law (and evidenced through 
comparative materials) can be regarded as law.’67  
This arguably represents the most ambitious attempt to expand administrative law in 
relation the increasing influence of non-state actors on international law. Nonetheless, despite 
Kingsbury’s manoeuvring, this only exposes the need to engage the ‘intractable normative 
                                                          
60 Ibid., 50. 
61 Kingsbury, (2009), 26.  
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid., 27. 
64 Ibid, 30. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
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issues’ and ultimately assert some concept of the political, and with that of the legitimacy of 
GAL. One ‘cannot have rule by law without rule of law’, as Dyzenhaus argues.68 Kingsbury’s 
concept of ‘publicness’ in relation to ‘qualities immanent to public law’, for example, is 
proposed as meaning that law has been ‘wrought by the whole society’, and that it ‘addresses 
matters of concern to the society as such’.69 Although he admits that the overarching 
principle of ‘publicness’ does not yet have anything like the significance in global 
administrative law that it does at the level of domestic administrative law, he nonetheless, 
proposes that ‘it is an idea that is likely to be carried forward as mechanisms and modalities 
develop for specifying public entities meeting requirements of publicness in GAL.’70 In this 
respect Kingsbury lists a number of principles (and note, not norms) which he sees as 
providing ‘some content and specificity to abstract requirements of publicness in law’,71 
including the principle of legality, the rule of law, rationality, proportionality and human 
rights.  
This problem with GAL has been highlighted by Susan Marks as a danger ‘of treating 
as technical or cultural that which needs rather to be considered as political.’72 Marks’ 
concern is ultimately about the ‘public turn’ in the global administrative project leading to 
‘co-option’ in so far as it forestalls ‘emancipatory change’ and ‘sustains exploitation with a 
fresh legitimating ideology’.73 Nonetheless, what is more interesting than any ideological 
bias, is that by calling out the ‘political’ nature of the global administrative project, Marks 
reveals the very illusory basis of such a model of law. As stated in chapter four, the legitimate 
representation of society within society can no longer be achieved as it was under hierarchical 
forms of differentiation.74 Under the conditions of high modernity the fiction of a general will 
could only be sustained through representative democracy; something that is obviously 
lacking at the global level. The extent to which this is still achieved at the national level today 
is only due to the successful structural coupling between the legal and political system.75 
Thus, from a sociological perspective, it is clear that no concept of ‘publicness’ exists at the 
global level as it does at the national level.  This is the reason that such a concept of GAL can 
become immediately subject to critical analysis which reads it as surreptitiously promoting a 
                                                          
68 Dyzenhaus (2009), 6. 
69 Ibid., 31. 
70 Ibid., 32. 
71 Ibid., 32. 
72 Marks (2006), 996.  
73 Ibid., 998. 
74 Luhmann (1987).  
75 And in such a way as to invisiblize their respective paradoxes, see Luhmann (2013a); c.f. Teubner (2015) 
who now argues this structural coupling is now achieved at the societal level.  
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‘global north’,76 or as ‘sustaining exploitation’.77 From this perspective, it seems indeed that 
the ‘iterations of administrative governance in the global realm cannot permanently exclude a 
more thorough engagement with the parallel constitutional debates.’78 
Ultimately, it must be recognized as very difficult to expand law on the basis of a 
global administrative or public law to effectively scrutinize the accountability and legitimacy 
of civil society organizations as they have evolved at the global level. Any attempt to cast the 
net of law so wide as to capture such a global administrative space, including civil society 
organizations, will always require doing so from such an Archimedean point that it will 
inevitably be subject to critical analysis itself in terms of legitimacy, and will thereby be 
forced into a more contextualized concept of GAL. 
It is in this sense that Nico Krisch’s concept of GAL must be preferred. Krisch has 
more fully engaged the legitimacy problems that beset concepts of GAL. In the fragmented 
nature of global society, he acknowledges, the problem of transnational institutions 
performing administrative functions is not so much their accountability deficit itself, but 
rather that these institutions may be accountable to the wrong constituencies.79 In this sense 
Krisch identifies three competing constituencies in global administrative law: the national, 
international and cosmopolitan.80 In global administrative law, according to Krisch, no such 
order prevails, but rather the ‘contest between the different constituencies’ shapes the 
constitutional framework of global administrative law.81 This is what Kirsch calls ‘pluralist 
administrative law’, the ‘fundamental contestation over the question of to whom global 
governance should be accountable.’82 Thus, with the ultimate reference points of the law ‘in 
flux’83 and in a constitutional order where ‘coherence’ is to be replaced by ‘compatibility’,84 
GAL should adopt a more ‘limited ambition’ by a ‘deliberate narrowness of focus and 
provisionality of claims.’85 In this respect Krisch envisages a kind of reflexive administrative 
law, one that in focusing on global accountability mechanisms retains an ‘awareness of the 
                                                          
76 Harlow (2006). And GAL has largely relied upon the model of US administrative law, Krisch (2010), 257; 
Stewart (2005), 104.  
77 Marks (2006), 998. 
78 Zumbansen (2013b), 521.  
79 Krisch (2006), 250; Krisch (2010), 261. 
80 Krisch (2006), 253ff. 
81 Ibid., 256.  
82 Ibid., 248.  
83 Krisch (2012), 12. 
84 Ibid., 296. 
85 Krisch (2010), 261. 
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institutional context in which those mechanisms are embedded and the broader normative 
questions they raise.’86 
Although this may only amount to an ‘administrative law lite’,87 this kind of scaled 
back approach may provide the only credible form of global administrative law to ensure the 
accountability and transparency of NGOs, and more specifically of SMOs, which after all 
may be better suited to representing general norms than law is. Nonetheless, so far as Krisch 
comes close to the ideal in terms of the limitative approach, he has given little specific 
thought to the special character of civil society organizations vis-à-vis international law, and 
even less to that of SMOs. Thus, as part of its awareness of the institutional context in which 
the accountability mechanisms are to be embedded, Krisch’s concept of a less imposing 
global administrative law must reflect at least the sensibility towards the ‘opposition’ 
function of civil society organizations that international constitutionalists have achieved.  
That international constitutionalists have achieved this sensibility can be attributed to 
some extent to the fact that they take both a limitative and constitutive approach to the 
development of international law in respect of civil society organizations. A combination of 
both a ‘lite’ and reflexive limitative approach, as well as a constitutive approach, represents a 
step closer to a more sophisticated structural relationship between law and civil society 
organizations, and particularly SMOs. Nonetheless, as it will be seen, the constitutive 
approach itself is in need of refinement in light of the apparent functional specification of 
SMOs.  
 
7.3  Civil society organizations and the legitimacy of international law 
 
Just as the construction of a limitative approach on the basis of the legitimacy of civil society 
organizations as global governance structures often rebounds to questions of the legitimacy of 
such a basis of law, the increasing importance of such organizations in the global normative 
order has also brought issues of the legitimacy of international law into focus in a more direct 
way. It has already been shown in relation to the antinuclear movement that the ICJ remains 
relatively closed in respect of the standing and participation of SMOs.  Only nation-states 
may be parties before the Court, and the Court may invite ‘public international organizations’ 
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to furnish information in contentious cases.88 Moreover, as seen, this obstacle applies even in 
advisory proceedings,89 with the Court, for example, declining the IPPNW’s request for leave 
to submit information in the form of written or oral statement in the 1996 advisory opinion.90 
At the same time, it has also been shown that the role of NGOs in the global normative order 
is such that often what happens in practice is that NGOs work behind the scenes to influence 
submissions before the Court.91  
The limited approach to subjectivity reflected in the Court’s statute can therefore be 
seen to be out of step with the development of transnational society. That was already an 
issue pointed out by the policy-orientated perspective of the New Haven school, principally 
associated with the work of Myers McDougal in the 1960s, which advanced a theory of 
international law as a comprehensive process of decision-making influenced by a variety of 
actors rather than as a defined set of formal rules and obligations.92 Although the reliance of 
that approach on the notion that the social process was steered by basic values of human 
dignity proved problematic,93 it nonetheless proved ahead of its time in so far as it introduced 
to international legal scholarship the idea that the subjects of international law and the social 
structure of the legal system were ‘mutually-constitutive’.94 This led to a well-noted critique 
of the formal limitation of the subjects of international law to nation-states and international 
organizations as having ‘no functional purpose’, and as comprising ‘an intellectual prison of 
our own choosing’.95 By the late 1980s this was increasingly identified as problematic in 
respect of transnational civil society. Philippe Sands, at that time addressing the transnational 
problems of global problems such as climate change, argued that ‘to describe international 
society as comprising a community of states is to ignore reality.’96 
Nonetheless, beyond the International Court of Justice, there has been evidence in the 
last thirty years of the international legal system evolving towards more inclusiveness of civil 
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society organizations. Much of this is owed to the broader effects of the functional 
differentiation which has led to the proliferation of dispute settlement mechanisms at the 
global level.97 The fragmentation of the international legal system in this respect can be said 
to have been accompanied by a ‘ratione personae pluralization of international law-
making’98 which has led to increasing calls for ‘a re-assessment of the interrelationship 
between international judicial bodies and that part of civil society which is represented by 
NGOs.’99 
This is reflected in the standing civil society organizations now enjoy before a wide 
range of international bodies. While those organizations cannot refer cases to the prosecutor 
of the International Criminal Court, the prosecutor may seek information from ‘non-
governmental organizations, or other reliable sources that he or she deems appropriate’, once 
an investigation has been initiated by a state party or by the prosecutor proprio muto.100 
Similar provisions apply for the participation of civil society organizations in investigation of 
the prosecutor of the ICTY101 and the ICTR102. The European Court of Human Rights, on the 
other hand, is open to receiving applications ‘any person, non-governmental organisation or 
group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting 
Parties’.103 The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights allows ‘any non-governmental 
entity legally recognized in one or more member states’ to lodge a petition with the 
Commission.104 The Inter-American Court makes no explicit provision for civil society 
organizations, but in practice petitions by NGOs have been accepted by the Court.105 The 
Protocol of the African Court of Human Rights provides that the Court may entitle ‘relevant’ 
NGOs to institute cases if the state parties have made a declaration accepting the competence 
of the Court to receive such cases.106 Furthermore, NGOs have also gained participation in 
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dispute settlement procedures in the area of environmental law through the relevant articles 
of the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to justice in Environmental Matters.107 Concerned with protecting ‘the 
right of every person of present and future generations to live in an environment adequate to 
his or her health and well-being’, the Convention aims to grant the ‘public concerned’ the 
right to access to court of law.108 While this only guarantees the right of access of civil 
society organizations to domestic courts,109 it has proved influential in opening the door for 
their standing before regional courts such as the ECJ.110  
At the same time many point to the increasing number of amicus curiae briefs 
submitted before international judicial proceedings as an avenue for growing role of civil 
society in the international legal system.111  Thus, amicus briefs are seen to have ‘proved to 
be a good substitute for direct intervention given the many limitations that international law 
still imposes upon non-state actors in terms of legal standing’.112 The ICC, for example, may 
grant leave to ‘any organization to submit any observation on any issue the Chamber deems 
appropriate.’113 The Intern-American Court of Human Rights has also been willing in 
practice to receive amicus briefs from civil society organizations. Furthermore, the WTO 
hand has also accepted amicus briefs from NGOs,114 at least where it considers it ‘pertinent 
and useful to do so’.115 
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Moreover, civil society organizations have now established better cooperation 
mechanisms with international organizations. Under Article 11 of the UN Charter, the 
Economic and Social Council may make ‘suitable arrangements for consultations with NGOs 
which are concerned with matters within its competence.’116 The United Nations General 
Assembly on the other hand has granted observer status to four NGOs, including the ICRC in 
reflection of the ‘special role’ carried on by the organization in international humanitarian 
relations.’117 
Finally, many now view international conferences as providing an important platform 
for civil society to influence international law-making.118 These are seen as the primary fora 
in which civil society organizations can be ‘important catalysts in the promotion of the goals 
of peace and disarmament, antislavery, women’s rights, humanitarian law, environmental 
law, human rights, worker rights, and international economic law.’119 NGOs can be seen to 
have provided instrumental participation in human rights and environmental law conferences: 
for example 14,000 NGOs were registered at the 1992 Rio Summit on Environmental and 
Development;120 ‘NGOs outnumbered representatives of States’ at the 1997 United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change leading to the Kyoto Protocol;121 again, the 1997 
Ottawa Conference is commonly ‘heralded as a model for cooperation between governments 
and non-governmental organizations’;122 or the 1998 Rome Conference, where up to eight 
hundred civil society organizations headed by Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch lobbied for the establishment of the International Criminal Court.123  
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Despite these advances however, many international lawyers still feel that civil society 
organizations and other private non-state actors have not yet attained their proper status in 
international law. Ryngaert, for example, states that ‘[n]on-state actor participation in 
international norm-setting processes remains a ‘discretionary’ decision of relevant bodies and 
institutions.124 Likewise, Boyle and Chinkin argue that despite the inroads that have been 
made in inclusion of private organizations in the public international legal system, it is still 
‘premature to assert that there is a right to access and participation’ for those organizations.125 
In general, many feel that ‘the opportunities for participation of NGOs and other civil society 
actors in the legal sphere continue to be limited to domestic litigation with the role of NGOs 
in international dispute resolution still largely relegated to advisory and publicity roles’;126 or 
that a ‘legacy of positivism’ in international legal scholarship continues to frustrate any 
inclusion beyond nation-states and international organizations..127 The position is well 
summed up by Pierre-Marie Dupuy: ‘We are led back to the role of legal scholars faced with 
the paradox of NGOs: de jure these entities have no existence or a very narrowly defined one, 
if any; but de facto they do a lot, especially in the functioning of international institutions and 
the implementation of the law created in their midst.’128  
Many perceive this dissonance between the de facto and de jure positions of civil 
society organizations as an issue of the legitimacy of international law itself.  The question 
according to Charnowitz, is not ‘whether it is legitimate to allow NGOs into international 
governance, but rather the opposite: is legitimate to keep NGOs out?’129 Thus, for many the 
issue cannot be simply limited to the ‘seemingly technical issue of international legal status’, 
but rather relates to ‘broader questions about participation and representation of different 
groups on the international plane and the legitimacy of international law.’130 This approach 
conceives that the ‘legitimacy gains of NGO involvement are apt to outweigh the legitimacy 
problems’,131 and that, in fact, international law’s failure to constitute and reflect the de facto 
emergence of global actors poses a ‘legitimacy crisis’ for the international legal system 
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itself.132 Thus, in excluding non-governmental organizations from fuller participation in the 
affairs of international society, the international legal system is seen as lacking effectiveness 
and failing to reflect an important reality about the international community.133 This marks 
recognition that civil society organizations contribute to a ‘communicative process whereby 
the conduct of states is no longer assessed in terms of acting in conformity with international 
binding rules, but by a much less formal code according to which the legality of their 
behaviour largely depends on its being consistent with some basic understanding of certain 
human values the respect of which is perceived to be fundamental.’134  
In light in what has been said about expectations emerging as social structure, it is 
worth pointing out that many now see civil society organizations as having a ‘legitimate 
expectation’ of the general right to participate in international legal discourse.135 In 
acknowledging such a legitimate expectation, Ann Peters argues that while a ‘principle of 
openess’ has not yet fully crystallized in international law, it is nonetheless ‘nascent’.136 
Thus, Peters argues that accredited civil society organizations have a legitimate expectation 
of rights of participation, that international institutions have a corresponding ‘good faith’ 
procedural obligation to realize those rights of participation, and that any denial of such a 
right must be attended with a ‘concrete justification’.137 As a review mechanism in this 
respect, Peters suggests an ‘NGO ombudsman’ who would impose sanctions for undue 
refusals of the participation of civil society organizations.138 
This approach is commendable for the extent to which it recognizes the importance of 
civil society organizations in the global normative order. That could certainly provide the 
basis of a developed legal recognition of the function of SMOs in the global normative order 
in particular. However, the problem is that, even with this more constitutive approach, the 
kind of legal formalization involved may lead to a co-option and over-determination that 
would ultimately frustrate the important function that such organizations have come to 
perform in world society. The issue is accurately summed up by the question posed by 
Bakker and Vierucci: ‘Does the increasing international role that NGOs de facto play require 
a reconsideration of their de jure position, or, on the contrary, does the flexibility currently 
enjoyed by NGOs constitute the most effective and desirable solution for all international 
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actors involved?’139 It is a point James Crawford also raises, although admittedly his concerns 
may lie with the positivity of the legal system, rather than the function of civil society 
organizations in world society: ‘[s]tates and international organizations, and by inference 
other subjects, are bound not to intervene in the domestic jurisdiction of another state. The 
whole point of an NGO may be to do just that, in the pursuit of its aims.’140  In this sense, the 
recognition and inclusion in the international legal system which many advocate may lead to 
constraints which ultimately frustrate those aims. 
Of course, Peters’ approach is already quite unique amongst predominantly legal 
approaches in its sensitivity towards this special character of civil society organizations. 
Thus, she recognizes that the important role they play is one of ‘opposition and contestation’ 
at the global level,141 that such organizations ‘speak for minorities, for vulnerable groups, or 
for otherwise voiceless entities’,142 and that such organizations ‘do not need a democratic 
mandate by the global citizenry, because they are in functional terms the global 
opposition’.143 Furthermore, Peters clearly recognizes the need for civil society actors to be 
‘kept at a distance from the international law-making process’ and for the need for them to 
‘stay outside the formal political and legal process in order to fulfil their watchdog and 
opposition function.’144  
Much of this sensitivity to the function of transnational civil society organizations, 
however, is only exercised in respect of constructing the limitative approach to civil society 
organizations. Peters suggests that the participation of NGOs is extended only to a ‘voice’, 
and not a ‘vote’,145 and that on this more contained basis of participation, the problems of the 
accountability of civil society actors is not so contentious as to require imposing excessive 
limitative measures. But, Peters does not seem to entertain the possibility that the degree of 
formalization envisaged to afford those organizations participation rights within the 
international legal system may itself lead to a co-option and over-determination of that 
‘voice’ by the political and legal sphere, and ultimately to the frustration of the function of 
civil society organizations as a global opposition.  
Like the limitative role of international law vis-a-vis civil society organizations, the 
constitutive role of international law in this respect, must also be developed by a more refined 
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appreciation of the function of civil society organizations, and particularly SMOs, in the 
global normative order. It too could be developed by a more functionalist and reflexive legal 
approach that both understands and supports the function of those organizations in world 
society, and which better understands the specific institutional context of those organizations. 
This approach must understand the limits of the inclusion of civil society within international 
law. Only this can ensure that the participation of civil society organizations within the legal 
system will not lead to a co-option of their ‘voice’, and only this will preserve their function 
as a ‘global opposition’.  
 
7.4 Conclusion  
 
In light of the difficulties involved, it might be wondered whether it is really necessary for 
civil society organizations, and particularly SMOs, to find a ‘voice’ in international law. 
From the functionalist perspective, the evolution of SMOs can be construed as a response to 
the exhaustion of law in globalized society; SMOs stabilize the norm through their recursive 
decision operations and through their communicative capacity. So far as the trajectory of 
antinuclear norms can be generalized to other general norms, it might be said that social 
evolution has already found a solution to the problem of such norms through the functional 
specification of SMOs. However, it would seem somewhat premature to draw definite 
conclusions without further empirical research; the problem-solution could be much more 
complex than this. It could be that SMOs provide only some elasticity in the general 
evolutionary framework, that they allow for a diffraction and consolidation of the problem of 
general norms in such a way that they may yet find a greater realization in differentiated 
society beyond the social movement, including within the legal and political spheres. SMOs 
and law may be just part of the bigger picture here, and therefore it would seem more 
sensible to develop law in such a way that it cautiously responds to the development. 
Much of the discussion of the structural relation between law and civil society 
organizations in this chapter has centred around the issue of ‘legitimacy’. There certainly 
seems to be an underlying theme here about legitimacy being no longer able to ‘anticipate 
evidence of the validity of its prescriptions or observations in easily discernible socio- 
institutional settings’, as being no longer able to suppose ‘a demos to underwrite its 
power.’146 That seems to be especially true in relation to the evolution of law in relation to the 
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structures the increasing fragmentation (and consolidation) of normative institutionalization 
in world society. This development necessitates a more contextualized legal approach to this 
issue. 
In the second chapter, this thesis argued that the ‘reflexive turn’ marked a point in the 
development of law away from the focus on the kind of questions that were taken up in this 
study. That was not to ‘throw the baby out with the bathwater’ though. Once function and 
norms are brought back into view, and the function of SMOs in stabilizing norms is observed, 
the reflexive law approach could be developed to refine law’s construction of civil society 
organizations. The way in which reflexive law is tailored to a structural correspondence with 
the institutional contexts and realities of an increasingly fragmented society may be just what 
is needed here. Of course, it would have to balanced out, with a more relaxed focus on 
coding, and with a more maintained focus on function and norms. The introduction of the 
concept of functional equivalents to law, and even of the concept of the limits of law, may 
appear slightly out of left field for reflexive law, but it is difficult to see why that should be 
anything other than an improvement of that approach, allowing it understand better the 
institutional contexts its structurally corresponds to in terms of the larger social system.    
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Conclusion 
 
One of the most intriguing things about law is that, while it places such importance on 
distinguishing between ‘what is legal, and what is not’, the limits of the law remain so 
elusive.1 Both these qualities come from the same place, however. It may well be said that 
law—much like Marx complained of capital2—can hardly abide a boundary, but must 
reconstruct it instead as an internal distinction, and thereby transcend it. This is not to suggest 
anything dysfunctional about law’s openness and closure per se. It is this expansionist 
capacity which secures the relevance of law to those behavioural expectations in society that 
must be carried through time and projected against a disappointing reality in the future. One 
can see just how important coding has been to law’s evolution in recent years, effectively 
maintaining the legal system’s functional reference to the fluid conditions of globalized 
society. But, non liquet offers a rare glimpse ‘behind the curtains’, a chance to ‘break through 
the illusion of normality’. With it, the limits of law are suddenly thrown into sharp relief.  
This thesis has focused on the limits of law in order to study the problem of generalized 
norms which are formulated and recognized in society, yet which are inadequately realized in 
law. What happens to such norms? The thesis answered that, in one case, the connecting 
thread of such a norm can be traced to social movement organizations which stabilize it 
through decision-making and through communication of the norm at the political and legal 
systems. This has formed the basis of a theory of the functional specification of social 
movement organizations as institutionalizing norms in the social, material and temporal 
dimensions, similar to how law functions in respect of norms. This has also been used to 
point out the complexity of the evolution of the global normative order, suggesting not only 
the increased fragmentation of normative institutionalization through the proliferation of 
organizations, but also the periodic organization of such organizations in the interest of 
retaining an apex for collective action. 
There are a number of implications to this. For a start, it should mean that more care 
needs to be taken with statements like, ‘[t]here is hardly any alternative to law with respect to 
the stabilization of normative … expectations’,3 or ‘the stabilisation of normative 
expectations, can only be fulfilled within the self-referential structures of a legal system’.4 
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This appears a little overbearing now and takes too much for granted. Moreover, it is no 
longer precise. There do seem to be increasing institutionalization of norms beyond law at the 
global level; there may well be an alternative to law with respect to the stabilization of 
normative expectations; and, it is possible that the stabilization of normative expectations can 
be fulfilled in self-referential structures beyond the legal system. The change may seem 
trifling, but it could prove the basis of a more sophisticated development of law in respect of 
the global normative order. Bringing the limits of global law into perspective like this turns 
hitherto unexamined practices or structures within the system into themes or problems. 
One legal practice which it problematizes, for example, is the excessive focus that 
lawyers place on coding in global law. The necessity for law beyond the traditional structures 
of the nation-state and for law in ever tighter and rarefied social spaces (as well as the 
competition that normative stabilization now faces with cognitive mechanisms), has probably 
resulted in some anxiety in the focus on legal coding. As stated, coding is necessary to 
maintaining the functional relevance of law. However, code alone is not law.5 Norms are 
what give law content and substance after all. Moreover, the cognitive shift of global society 
should not be exaggerated. Nor should everything outside the internal worlds of global 
society be reduced to the transfer of meaning components between normative orders. Norms 
function on the global level too, above differentiated society, and this is only becoming 
increasingly so as the negative side-effects of those internal rationalities spill out into the 
larger system.  
This is not to say that, if there was a more balanced approach with as much focus on 
norms and function as there is on code, that law could be reformed to better accommodate 
general norms. It seems to be that law cannot offer a direct solution to this problem of 
globalized society. But, that does not mean that there are no possibilities for the functional 
development of law here either. The communicative capacity of social movement 
organizations, and the importance of keeping norms in circulation as proto-legal 
communications, seems to suggest a complex aggregate of factors here. The deeper reasons 
for this can only be discovered on further research.6 At any rate, whatever law’s exact 
relationship with social movement organizations turns out to be, it would still be prudent for 
the legal system to develop more sophisticated structural relations with civil society 
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organizations. Thus far, lawyers have contemplated such organizations in contexts like, civil 
society organizations forming part of the discursive logic of law, as a potential source of 
legitimacy for law, as global governance bodies that need to be held accountable by law. 
However, there has been little contemplation so far by the legal system of those organizations 
as a functional equivalent to law. Developing a better understanding of the function of social 
movement organizations would certainly result in a more considered approach to the way that 
law structurally relates to those organizations.  
There are implications here too for broader social science research. The concept of the 
functional differentiation of social movement organizations in reference to general norms 
should be of interest to international relations scholars and sociologists who focus their 
research on the global normative order. More specifically the thesis should be relevant to the 
work of people like Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink who already pay particular 
attention to the role of norms at the global level, or Jackie Smith who looks more specifically 
at social movement organizations. As I said, those approaches could be developed by casting 
off any old Weberian notions of norms as ‘culture’, and by adapting the insights of more 
detailed approaches to the internal logics of the legal system. But, if they were willing to 
develop their approach in this way—there is a some aversion to functionalist sociology in the 
American academy7—they would be well poised for undertaking further research into the 
functional specification of social movement organizations. 
This thesis has relied heavily upon Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory and functional 
method of analysis to generate the insight, but it does not seem necessary to adopt a strict 
Luhmannian approach for developing research in this area. The question addressed in this 
thesis first took shape during time spent in The Hague, studying international law. It was 
borne out of a sense of frustration with the way in which law’s description of itself always 
obscured its limitations in respect of general norms. Luhmann’s method has proved very 
useful for breaking through this illusion.8 The observer need not be frustrated about the 
smoke screens law uses to hide its limits in respect of general norms. One can actually admire 
now how the World Court has managed the challenges of globalization, just as one can 
admire many things about how law has developed itself beyond the state in the various niches 
of world society. Most impressive of all, however, is how civil society has organized itself 
without law.  
                                                          
7 Which is more a reaction to Parsons structural-functionalism than Luhmann’s functional-structuralism, see, 
for an early statement, Gouldner (1971).  
8 In this respect, Luhmann is too often overestimated by his critics and underestimated by his most devoted 
followers. 
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Appendix: list of interviewees 
 
 
1. Interview with Mr. Reiner Braun, Executive Director of International IALANA, 
Executive Director of IALANA Deutsche Sektion, Berlin, 11/03/2015, Skype call, 
interview recorded using Amolto Call Recorder software. 
 2. Interview with Mr. Tim Wright, ICAN Asia Pacific Director, New York, 11/03/2015, 
Skype call, interview recorded using Amolto Call Recorder software. 
 3. Interview with Ms. Alice Slater, New York Director of NAPF, member of the 
Coordinating Committee of Abolition 2000, New York, 11/03/2015, Skype call, 
interview recorded using Amolto Call Recorder software. 
 4. Interview with Dr. John Burroughs, Director of IALANA United Nations Office, 
Executive director LCNP, New York, 17/03/2015, Skype call, interview recorded using 
Amolto Call Recorder software. 
 5. Interview with Professor Tilman Ruff, Co-president IPPNW, Australian chair of ICAN, 
Melbourne, 19/03/2015, Skype call, interview recorded using Amolto Call Recorder 
software. 
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